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Abstract 
Insights from Human Factors and Ergonomics and Safety Science suggest that 
both success and failure must be studied to understand how to ensure safety. 
Applying this to change management, an explorative study is presented in which 
twelve experienced change managers from different German industries and 
organizations are interviewed about their experience with both of these outcomes.  
 
The structure of the interviews is based on the four cornerstones of Resilience 
Engineering (monitoring, responding, anticipating and learning). In addition, 
organisational and individual perspectives are considered separately to better 
reflect the complexity of organisational systems.  
 
The results showed that managers are an important interface between 
organisations and those affected by change, and relevant competencies were 
identified, such as a holistic and systemic perspective, designing structures and 
processes, and perceiving people-issues that are of relevance for managing 
projects. 
 
However, changing structures and processes requires organisational support and 
design authority, which are often not sufficiently available. Furthermore, an over-
reliance on existing managerial competencies and a lack of sustainable 
organisational learning from negative aspects of successful outcomes in particular 
were found.  
 
These findings underline that Resilience Engineering and Human Factors and 
Ergonomics concepts (holistic/system understanding, design orientation, 
combined outcome of performance and human well-being) have great potential for 
making organisations more adaptive and pro-active, and therefore to increase the 
success rate of change projects. 
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1. Introduction 
This research explored the potential of Human Factors & Ergonomics (HFE) and 
safety science to increase the success rate of change projects by trying to better 
understand why and how such projects fail or succeed. 
 
Much has been written about how change projects could or should be successfully 
performed (Al-Haddad & Kotnour, 2015), and yet less has been written about why 
and how these projects fail (Schwarz, Watson, & Callan, 2011). Very little literature 
exists that explicitly focuses on comparing and contrasting both outcomes (Decker 
et al., 2012). This research intends to fill that gap. In that context, there are several 
general gaps which affect this research endeavour. The challenges of increased 
complexity (Grady & Grady, 2013) require systemic considerations while no 
framework has yet been able to address such demand adequately (Thomas, 
George, & Rose, 2016; Todnem By, 2005). In addition, people-issues as well as 
the design of organisational structures and processes are under-researched but 
have been identified as relevant in the context of failed change (Latta, 2015; 
Maheshwari & Vohra, 2015) while theory and practice seem to be distant from 
each other (Appelbaum, Habashy, Malo, & Shafiq, 2012). 
 
Research within high risk environments e.g. aviation and with a focus on 
explaining and preventing failure is connected to the two closely intertwined fields 
of Safety Science and HFE (Grote, 2014). A connecting element between both 
fields is Socio-Technical System Theory (STS) which has produced a wide body of 
research including the recent paradigm shift known as Organisational Resilience 
(OR) or Resilience Engineering (RE) (Waterson et al., 2015). This new paradigm 
seeks to understand how organisations can become more adaptive under varying 
conditions of an environment that is understood as having a high degree of 
complexity and uncertainty (Lundberg & Johansson, 2015).  
 
A broadly accepted concept of OR is that of the four cornerstones by Erik 
Hollnagel (2011a). These four cornerstones (anticipating, monitoring, responding 
and learning) describe competencies that an organisation needs to be adaptive in 
the face of adverse events and disruptions (Lay, Branlat, & Woods, 2015). Within 
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the systemic view of OR and safety related HFE organisational design, human 
behaviour and practical application have received much attention (Dul et al., 2012; 
Nemeth & Herrera, 2015).  
 
It is argued in this study that HFE and OR, via the four cornerstones, can provide 
new insight to counter the gaps relating to change project failure. The research 
rationale behind this argument is based on what HFE and OR have contributed to 
the body of knowledge: consideration of complexity as central challenge (Kantur, 
2015), the systemic design orientation of HFE (Dul et al., 2012), the focus on the 
interface between human issues and organisational aspects (Kleiner, 2006) and 
bridging theory and practice with concepts like ‘work as it is done’ (WAD) 
(Hollnagel, 2014d; Lay et al., 2015). Whilst the research of Decker et al. (2012) 
has investigated failure for the purpose of anticipation, this research also covers 
monitoring, responding and learning but with the focus on both outcomes: failure 
and success. Such a focus has not been found in the reviewed literature.  
 
As a result, the following research aim and subsequent research objectives (RO) 
are proposed: 
 
What is the potential of safety science and HFE to increase our understanding of 
how change projects in German based organisations fail or succeed, and to 
improve outcomes? 
 
RO1: To explore and report how failed and successful projects differ when 
regarded from the perspective of the four cornerstones of organisational 
resilience. 
 
RO2: To investigate and understand various aspects of human behaviour and 
organisational phenomena that can be observed in failed and successful 
projects. 
 
This focus on the different outcomes, systemic consideration (via the four 
cornerstones), human and organisational aspects as well as design and 
practitioner orientation are reflected further in research questions related to: 
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 How do successful projects differ from failed ones? 
 To what extent are systemic aspects considered? 
 Which topics emerge on the macro and on the micro level? 
 To what extent are design aspects considered? 
 What insights does the research provide as far as the difference between 
work as it is done (WAD) versus work as it is imagined (WAI) is concerned? 
 
In order to study these twelve change managers from different industries and 
organizations were interviewed about their experiences within failed and 
successful projects led or partly led by each of them. This contrast of failure and 
success enabled a broader understanding of these phenomena. 
 
Based on a qualitative and interpretative research methodology, semi-structured 
interviews were used for data collection. Qualitative interviews were deemed the 
most effective form of data collection because they allowed further exploration of 
change managers’ experience within those projects via in-depth follow-up 
questions. 
 
The rationale for this study is to be found within the specific aim of a DBA format. 
On the one hand it is meant as a contribution to the body of knowledge about 
change outcomes and how they come about. On the other hand, it provides a 
practitioner tangible insight in how to approach change projects and increase their 
success rate.  
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1.1 Structure 
 
This thesis is divided into nine chapters. Chapter two explores the two fields of 
HFE and safety science and how the paradigm-change of OR emerged from STS 
theory. Chapter three takes a more specific examination of failure and how it is 
understood and investigated in the field of change management. Finally, both 
views are contrasted in chapter four to identify the gaps that inform the research 
aim of this study. 
 
The methodological framework is presented in chapter five, which is followed by 
the findings and their interpretation in chapter six. This first part of the analytical 
framework looks into each cornerstone separately. The second part of the 
analytical framework discusses the contribution to theory and practice in chapter 
seven and also contains the conclusion and addresses the research question in 
chapter eight. Finally, personal development is described in chapter nine. 
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2. Human Factors & Ergonomics and Safety Science 
This chapter will provide an overview of HFE and how it relates to Safety Science. 
It will lead to an understanding of STS theory and a resulting approach called 
Resilience Engineering (RE) that is a new paradigm in safety research. A well-
established contribution to RE, the four cornerstones of organisational resilience, 
will be presented (Patriarca, Bergström, Di Gravio, & Costantino, 2018). These will 
serve as a lens through which change shall be regarded in this research. 
 
2.1 Human Factors & Ergonomics defined 
The focus of HFE lies in the interaction between humans and the environment, 
where the environment is seen as a combination of the physical, the organisational 
and the social (Dul et al., 2012). Wilson (2014) stated that HFE seeks to 
understand the social, physical and cognitive characteristics of humans while 
interacting with the environment and therefore described the discipline as holistic. 
Karwowski (2005) described HFE as a unique and independent discipline that has 
evolved over the last 60 years and “..as the discipline that focuses on the science, 
engineering, design, technology, and management of human-compatible 
systems.” (Karwowski, 2012, p. 33) 
 
The International Ergonomics Association (IEA) also considers HFE as a discrete 
discipline, as can be seen on its website:  
“Ergonomics [or human factors] is the scientific discipline concerned with 
the understanding of interactions among humans and other elements of a 
system, and the profession that applies theory, principles, data and 
methods to design in order to optimize human well-being and overall 
system performance.” (IEA, 2014) 
However, a discussion began around whether HFE is a foundational discipline or a 
hybrid science (Marras & Hancock, 2014). Norros (2014) therefore sees a 
challenge in creating a unique discipline identity because HFE is ontologically 
diverse, with psychology as a core discipline and many connections to physiology, 
neurosciences, social sciences and technology. Similarly, Badke-Schaub, 
Hofinger, and Lauche (2008) have described Human Factors as an 
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interdisciplinary science that makes use of several other basic disciplines e.g. 
management, psychology, ergonomics and engineering. From their perspective, 
ergonomics and human factors are related disciplines (Badke-Schaub et al., 
2008), whereas Parker (2015) noted that “ergonomics” and “human factors 
engineering” are used synonymously and refer to the same discipline. However, a 
complete discussion of these definition issues is beyond the scope of this study. 
As the IEA as well as many authors (Chung & Williamson, 2018; Karltun, Karltun, 
Berglund, & Eklund, 2017; Karwowski, 2005, 2012; Salvendy, 2012; Wilson, 2014) 
currently use the term HFE, it has therefore also been used in this study. 
 
Many objectives of HFE research can be found in the literature (Chapanis, 1995). 
Salvendy (2012) has identified two related and paramount objectives, on the one 
hand understanding interactions between humans and everything that surrounds 
them, and on the other optimizing human well-being and overall system 
performance. Effectiveness and efficiency of work as well as safety are also seen 
as aims of HFE (Sanders & McCormick, 1993). These are in line with the definition 
of the IEA.  
 
Considering the aims and objectives of HFE as well as the mix of knowledge that 
the discipline uses, Karltun et al. (2017) have claimed that there is a strong basis 
for analysis, design and creation of individual, high quality work situations in 
addition to benefits for system performance in a large variety of operations. 
However, the discipline faces the risk of being perceived as unclear and superficial 
because of its’ broad focus and diverse content (Karltun et al., 2017). Moreover, 
the focus on practical application raises the question of balance between theory 
and practice. There are different opinions on where the emphasis should be. 
Hollnagel (2014a) sees the main challenge in practical use as being that the 
nature of work is a rapidly moving target that makes constant adaptation 
necessary. Likewise, Wilson (2014) has argued that research should happen ‘in 
the wild’ rather than in the laboratory.  
 
Several definitions have described HFE as a scientific discipline that applies 
theoretical principles and tests hypotheses (Sanders & McCormick, 1993). 
However, a content analysis of 621 published articles in Human Factors and the 
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Annual Meetings of the Human Factors and Ergonomics Society (HFES) between 
1965 and 1995 found that most of the articles did not mention theory (Meister, 
1999). A recent study found that while research often finds its way into practice, 
there seems to be a gap between theory and research and less emphasis is 
placed on theory and its development within HFE (Chung & Williamson, 2018). 
The authors of the study assumed that HFE seems to be primarily an applied 
science, and they argued that the link between theory and research needs more 
attention so that practice can be based on a strong scientific foundation. 
 
HFE as a discipline faces several challenges that are related to establishing a 
clearer picture of its boundaries and its theoretical underpinnings. It cannot be said 
at this stage to what extent that challenge relates to unclear communication of 
research or the lack of it. The need to address such issues however, has not gone 
unnoticed and has led to the establishment of the Future of Ergonomics 
Committee by the IEA in 2010 and subsequently a white paper that was approved 
in 2012 which addressed the future of HFE and how the discipline and the 
profession could be maintained and strengthened (Wilson & Carayon, 2014).  
 
The report of the committee described HFE as having a unique combination of 
three characteristics: 
 HFE takes a systems approach, 
 HFE is design driven, and  
 HFE has a focus which rests on the two closely related outcomes of 
performance and human well-being (Dul et al., 2012).  
This report has prompted considerable discussion, much agreement and triggered 
further work and research agendas, some of which can be seen in a special issue 
of the peer-reviewed journal Ergonomics, which is exclusively dedicated to this 
topic and discussion (Wilson & Carayon, 2014). 
 
HFE faces challenges concerning a clearer definition of its boundaries and theory 
related research, which is why a wider picture of HFE research is needed in order 
to locate safety related HFE research within that wider picture and make it more 
tangible. Furthermore, there is a need to clarify where there are general overlaps 
with management literature and research to confront the threat of being perceived 
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as unclear and superficial as Karltun et al. (2017) have pointed out. Where is the 
contrast to management research, what is different in HFE research and where is 
the general benefit? To answer these questions, a short overview of the 
development of the HFE discipline will be given. In addition to narrowing the focus 
to safety-related HFE, this overview will also shed further light on the rationale 
behind the systems approach in HFE research together with the theoretical 
underpinnings of such an approach. Thereafter safety-related HFE research will 
be described. It will be shown how accidents and incidents are understood and 
explained from a theoretical perspective as well as dealt with from a practical 
perspective. 
 
2.2 Human Factors & Ergonomics discipline and theory 
Looking into the origins of HFE, one immediately finds an overlap with 
management theory. For example, Taylor’s scientific management is one of the 
roots of HFE, because the focus was on the nature of work and how it could be 
designed for optimization of results (Badke-Schaub et al., 2008). Karwowski 
(2012) also mentioned the relation to Taylor when he stated that there is a natural 
congruence between contemporary management and HFE. He referred to Griffin 
(2001), who described management as a set of activities that includes e.g. 
planning, decision making, organising, leading and controlling.  
 
Karwowski (2012) has further argued that these aspects are also essential to HFE 
and has provided a detailed description of the exact overlaps. Most authors, 
however, see the period of the Second World War as the beginning of HFE 
(Hollnagel, 2014a; Karltun et al., 2017; Marras & Hancock, 2014; Meister, 1999; 
Salvendy, 2012) as this was the time when it became a recognized scientific 
discipline, introduced by Murrell who was one of the scientists that founded the 
Ergonomics Research Society (Edholm & Murrell, 1973). 
Morel, Amalberti, and Chauvin (2009) differentiated between two lines of HFE 
research, Micro- and Macroergonomics. Microergonomics, as the first line, relates 
to human-machine interactions as well as to the interaction of user and interface 
(Hendrick, 1997; Kleiner, 2006) and relies on the fields of anthropometrics, 
physiology, and cognitive psychology (Morel et al., 2009). Karwowski (2005) has 
described Microergonomics as consisting of two domains of specialisation, which 
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are physical and cognitive ergonomics. Wilson (2000) stated that ergonomics, 
which has its roots in Europe, is commonly associated with physical ergonomics, 
whereas human factors, which has its roots in the US, is commonly associated 
with cognitive ergonomics (Waterson & Eason, 2009). 
 
Macroergonomics, the second line according to Morel et al. (2009), is described by 
Karwowski (2005) as a domain of specialisation called organisational ergonomics 
and sometimes used synonymously with the term systems ergonomics (Kleiner, 
2006).  
As Hollnagel (2014a) pointed out, the effects of changing technologies on the 
nature of work has often created the need to modify existing approaches of 
explaining and dealing with such changes. Mismatches in human-machine 
interaction in aviation were some of the principal causes for the development of 
the field of microergonomics (Chapanis, 1995) and in the case of 
macroergonomics, new trends in the late 1970s, such as increased technology 
and global competition among others, again required a new approach to counter 
such trends (Murphy, Robertson, Huang, Jeffries, & Dainoff, 2018). 
 
Macroergonomics extended the view to the interaction of humans with the job, the 
organisation and the environment, while focusing on the relationship of macro 
aspects like design, culture and structure with outcomes on the individual level 
such as performance and stress (Rivera-Rodriguez et al., 2013). This perspective 
on the organisation is related and influenced by organisational theory, namely by 
the Classical and the Human Relations School, which provided concepts like 
supervision, hierarchy and rewards on the one hand and a focus on teams and 
motivation on the other (Murphy, Robertson, & Carayon, 2014). Since these fields 
also focus on the nature and design of work, they overlap with HFE and serve the 
image of blurred borders towards other fields and disciplines. Karwowski (2005), in 
contrast, while describing the congruence between contemporary management 
and HFE, pointed out that what is unique to HFE is discovering knowledge of 
human characteristics in order to develop human–system interface (HSI) 
technology.  
Hendrick and Kleiner (2001) characterised macroergonomics as the study of work 
systems, a term that was described (Karwowski, 2012, p. 27) as consisting of  
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“...people interacting with some form of (1) job design (work modules, tasks, 
knowledge, and skill requirements), (2) hardware (machines or tools) and/or 
software, (3) the internal environment (physical parameters and 
psychosocial factors), (4) the external environment (political, cultural, and 
economic factors), and (5) an organisational design  (the work system’s 
structure and processes used to accomplish desired functions).” 
The basic work system model, as it is described by Kleiner (2006), is shown in 
Figure 1.  
 
Figure 1: Basic Work System Model (Kleiner 2006) 
Macroergonomics is therefore described by Haro and Kleiner (2008) as a 
comprehensive process that can assess the different subsystems as well as the 
interactions between those components. Changes in one subsystem can affect the 
other subsystems and the resulting interactions are within the scope of 
macroergonomics (Murphy, Robertson et al., 2018), which is why Wilson (2014) 
stated that HFE in general is explicitly adopting a ‘systems view’. 
Apart from macroergonomic methods like MacroErgonomic Analysis and Design 
method (MEAD) and Macroergonomic Analysis of Structure (MAS) (Haro 
& Kleiner, 2008), the subdiscipline follows a theoretical framework which 
originated in the open systems theory from biological science and is called Socio-
Technical Systems Theory (STS) (Kleiner, 2006; Waterson et al., 2015). 
With regard to the above mentioned overlaps to contemporary management, Haro 
and Kleiner (2008, p. 450) described the uniqueness of macroergonomics as 
based on “...its special attention to organisational design and management factors 
within the multiple subsystem, sociotechnical perspective.” 
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A systems perspective in general and STS in particular are important for this 
thesis and the next section will focus on these topics. The next section will also 
start to narrow the HFE perspective down on safety, which will be the lens through 
which failed change shall be regarded later. 
 
2.3 STS theory and system thinking 
STS theory forms the basis of macroergonomics and is used as the means 
through which complex systems are sought to be understood (Waterson et al., 
2015). The theory dates back to work done at the UK Tavistock Institute of Human 
Relations, where productivity was explored in relation to changes in the nature of 
work, e.g. working methods but also to the effects of human properties and skills 
(Kleiner, 2006; Trist & Bamforth, 1951). Later, in the 1960s and 1970s, the focus 
shifted further towards new technologies and their effects on the system of work 
(Davis, 1971). 
 
The main elements that make up a sociotechnical system are:  
 a collective operational task,  
 the existence of a social and technical subsystem,  
 an open system influenced by the environment, and  
 that it is unfinished due to constantly new emerging demands which require 
flexibility (Eason, 2011).  
One of the aspects that STS theory is most recognized for are the principles 
offered by Clegg (2000) on how to design socio-technical systems (Murphy et al., 
2014). Other aspects include criteria for well-designed jobs and the innovations of 
autonomous work groups (Emery, 1964). Furthermore, there are three phases in 
the development of STS systems that can be distinguished - design, 
implementation and operation (Clegg, 1988). These phases emphasise the 
dynamic perspective of STS theory and at the same time form a relation to change 
management in its broadest sense. 
 
Although STS theory has been criticized for the apparent lack of specificity in its 
propositions (Grant, Fried, & Juillerat, 2011) and a lack of empirical and 
conceptual development (Parker, Axtell, & Turner, 2001), recent research has 
linked macroergonomics to safety climate (Murphy, Huang, Robertson, Jeffries, & 
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Dainoff, 2018; Murphy, Robertson et al., 2018) and to a better integration of 
macro- and microergonomics across different levels e.g. individual, group, 
organisation and industry (Karsh, 2006; Karsh, Waterson, & Holden, 2014). Klein 
(2014), on the one hand critically remarked that the terms ‘sociotechnical’ and 
‘system’ are by definition inevitably imprecise, but on the other hand she stated 
that sociotechnical theory makes explicit that in a work system, technology and 
people are interdependent.  
There are many models within the range of an STS view that try to explain the 
different elements and their interdependencies and interactions, as Carayon 
(2006) showed in an overview of different models. It is therefore the nature of 
HFE, as Wilson (2000) pointed out, to understand these interactions and the 
people involved as well as to improve them all in real settings. Yet defining the 
boundaries of systems and consequently the interactions and system elements on 
which to focus is a major challenge, as Klein (2014) remarked. This challenge is 
further increased as even the boundaries are subject to change (Choi, Dooley, & 
Rungtusanatham, 2001). This line of thought basically extends the above 
description of STS elements provided by Eason (2011) by adding an additional 
element: dynamic borders. 
 
2.3.1 Complexity and Systems Theory 
It has been said that HFE adopts a systems approach (Dul et al., 2012). While this 
seems obvious at first, based on the above summary of STS, it has raised 
criticism. Hollnagel (2014a), for example, has reflected on the term system, which 
for him seems to be a term much ‘en vogue’ but very rarely explicitly defined and 
hence there are different interpretations and applications of the term. He argued 
from a systems theory and cybernetic perspective, in which a system is 
characterized by its functions and therefore by what it does rather than by what it 
is. In his opinion HFE does not yet live up to the ambition of taking a systems 
approach (Hollnagel, 2014a).  
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To further clarify the term system within HFE research, Wilson (2014, p. 6) 
provided the following definition:  
“A system is a set of inter-related or coupled activities or entities (hardware, 
software, buildings, spaces, communities and people), with a joint purpose, 
links between the entities which may be of state, form, function and 
causation, and which changes and modifies its state and the interactions 
within it given circumstances and events, and which is conceptualised as 
existing within a boundary; it has inputs and outputs which may connect in 
many-to-many mappings; and with a bow to the Gestalt, the whole is 
usually greater (more useful, powerful, functional etc) than the sum of the 
parts.” 
The scientific theory that is concerned with systems is called systems theory and 
was created as an alternative to analytic reduction (Bertalanffy, 1969). This 
happened in a time during the 1940s and 1950s when traditional engineering 
approaches to system design became less and less effective, due to the 
increasing complexity of the systems being built (Leveson, 2017). Seven decades 
later the complexity of the systems that we live in is seen by Wilson (2014) as part 
of the rationale of the HFE discipline, where the need to understand can be 
achieved by means of a clear systems approach.  
 
While being aware of the challenges that his demand makes for current research, 
Wilson (2014) has required that a HFE systems approach should consider six 
defining, significant and overlapping features: systems focus, context, interactions 
(including complexity), holism, emergence and embedding (Table 1). 
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The 6 defining features of systems to be considered in HFE research (Wilson 2014) 
I. Systems focus 1. Treats the focus of interest as a system 
2. Does not see systems as stable 
3. Includes the natural system as parent or sibling system to our 
socio-technical system 
II. Context  1. Behaviour does not happen in a vacuum 
2. Needs to understand system boundaries and how they provide 
context 
3. Needs to define system boundaries and/or cross-overs 
4. Research should mainly be carried out ‘in the wild’ to consider 
the context. 
III. Interactions 
 
1. Consists of interacting parts 
2. Focuses on interactions rather than components 
3. Strongly relates to complexity of systems 
4. No applications of linear models (part of paradigm) 
IV. Holism 1. HFE research cannot be easily partitioned 
2. Seeks to understand physical, cognitive and social characteristics 
of people and their interactions with artefacts, information, 
organisations and people 
3. The above aspects have to be considered in a project to an 
appropriate extent  
4. Input as well as output is considered holistically 
V. Emergence 1. Systems in real use will display unexpected characteristics and 
properties 
2. The impact of poor design may be mitigated by user abilities and 
overcome system shortcomings 
3. People can unexpectedly take advantage of systems and 
products or find uses not dreamed of by the designer 
IV. Embedding 1. Considering how ergonomics fits within the organisational system 
and is embedded in practice 
 
Table 1: Defining features of systems (Wilson, 2014) 
While these features shall be considered when undertaking research on complex 
systems, the question comes up of just when a system should actually be 
considered complex? Manser (2008) cited three criteria of complex systems: the 
number of elements, their variety and their interconnectivity. If all of them are high, 
the system is complex. An exact number or measure is not named but she pointed 
out that the demands, which for her are mainly cognitive, challenge or supersede 
the human ability to understand the dynamics and interactions of the system. From 
this definition, it becomes clear that any change intervention that addresses a 
complex system faces the challenge of dealing with this factor. However, complex 
tools and information systems have to be managed and the complexity of the work 
itself requires more and more abstract understanding (Reiman & Oedewald, 
2007). What does that mean for the nature of work? 
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The recent understanding of HFE as a design discipline with a system approach 
(Dul et al., 2012), requires considering complexity in the design or re-design of 
STS. Although design principles exist and were reworked to consider the critique 
of the changed nature of work and its complex interdependencies (Clegg, 2000), 
these principles were formulated more than seventeen years ago (see appendix 
B). Complexity as a challenge has gained momentum since then, which is one 
reason why an area for further development within STS is the enhancement of its 
predictive utility (Carayon et al., 2015; Davis, Challenger, Jayewardene, & Clegg, 
2014).  
 
One approach that addresses predictive aspects and also adopts an STS 
perspective is Resilience Engineering, which is concerned with safety (Kleiner, 
Hettinger, DeJoy, Huang, & Love, 2015). One aspect of performance in relation to 
the dynamic activities between social and technical components of a system, is 
safety as Kleiner et al. (2015) stated. It is argued here that safety in general and 
RE in particular are worth investigating for their potential regarding organisational 
change.  
 
What role do predictive aspects play in change management and to what extent 
could RE contribute? Could certain change initiatives actually be described as safe 
or unsafe and could their failure be predicted?  
 
2.4 Safety and failure 
2.4.1 Safety science and HFE 
Several authors have referred to safety related research as safety science or the 
discipline of safety (Haavik, 2014; Kyriakidis, Kant, Amir, & Dang, 2017). Safety as 
a concept was characterised by Aven (2014) as possessing two predominant 
perspectives, one being a condition with absence of unwanted events or accidents 
and the other a condition with acceptable risks that should be as low as possible. 
Subsequently, two challenges are being faced: on the one hand predicting safety 
conditions in processes and industries with the goal of preventing accidents, and 
on the other, to find causes for accidents when they have happened (Haavik, 
2014). Specifically, one major concern of work safety related HFE lies in 
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understanding failure (Norros, 2014) and ergonomic methods play a key role in the 
design of safe and efficient systems (Salmon, 2016):  
“Human factors/ergonomics knowledge and methods have probably been 
employed most extensively for systems that entail major risks for humans 
and the environment.” (Grote, 2014, p. 37) 
In order to understand failure and design safe systems, models for explaining 
accidents and incidents have always been used (Kleiner et al., 2015). As a new 
approach to deal with failure, Resilience Engineering is the theoretical 
underpinning for this study.  
 
2.4.2 Making sense of failure  
The 1980s witnessed a series of large-scale industrial accidents and catastrophes 
such as the chemical catastrophe in Bhopal (1984), the reactor explosion in 
Chernobyl (1986) and the oil rig fire of Piper Alpha (1988). These created the 
momentum for increased research in safety related fields, including human factors 
(Badke-Schaub et al., 2008). Reason (1990) described in detail the complex 
events that led to some of these catastrophes, shifting the focus to organisational 
contributions while at the same time highlighting how human characteristics make 
the design and management of interfaces between man and machine a challenge.  
 
Today, as a result of researching such events, organisations operating in high 
hazard industries are considered ultra-safe due to principles often found in the 
technical design such as ‘fail safe’ and ‘defences in depth’; as early as the design 
stage, failure is considered and minimized via barriers or redundancies 
(Fahlbruch, Schöbel, & Domeinski, 2008). That way, the reliability of a safety-
critical organisation can be increased but by adding more elements to the system, 
the overall complexity of that system is also increased which in turn can lead to 
unpredictable consequences (Perrow, 1987).  
 
Safety is therefore described by Murphy et al. (2014) as an outcome of a work 
system with cooperating components. Jointly optimised subsystems are hence key 
attributes of safer STS as Kleiner et al. (2015) argued and one reason for this is 
their tight coupling (Flach, Carroll, Dainoff, & Hamilton, 2015). Models that explain 
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accidents and catastrophes have always been used but many have recently 
focused on STS theory as Kleiner et al. (2015) has shown.   
 
2.4.3 Between linear and complex approaches 
Several theories have emerged to explain why organisations within a hazardous 
environment can be unsafe, develop dangerous states, experience near misses or 
even suffer accidents and catastrophes (Fahlbruch, Schöbel, & Domeinski, 2008). 
Drawing on the historical development of scientific safety studies analysed by Hale 
and Hovden (1998), Waterson et al. (2015) provided a broad overview of methods 
for STS and safety, where they differentiated between three ages: the age of 
technology (using technological methods to prevent accidents, e.g. safety valves), 
the age of human factors (integrating HFE methods into risk and safety analysis) 
and the age of complex socio-technical systems.  
 
Figure 2 is taken from their article and gives a broad overview of methods and 
traditions concerning STS and safety. 
 
Figure 2: A timeline of the development of methods for sociotechnical systems and safety (Waterson et al., 
2015) 
Figure 2 shows the evolution from a focus on sequential and unambiguous 
relations between causes and effects, to acknowledging complexity and 
intractability with an increased emphasis on systemic approaches (Haavik, 2014). 
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Within this spectrum, Hollnagel (2007) sees three types of models used to analyse 
accidents: linear models (sequential), complex linear models (epidemiological) and 
non-linear or systemic models. 
 
Heinrich’s Domino model (1941) represents the first type of model and is seen by 
Haavik (2014, p. 37)  as a prime example of a sequential and linear world view, 
with the accident as an adverse event in an otherwise stable system. The model 
provided an early understanding of accidents as having a root cause: safety can 
be enhanced by changing the sequence of elements, taking them out or placing 
them with more space in between (Hollnagel, 2007). However, in the case of US 
missile systems, complexity related design problems emerged between the 1950s 
and 1960s and analytic reduction used in the Domino model fell short in explaining 
accidents related to the interaction between system components and not the 
failure of single components (Leveson, 2017). 
 
Prominent examples for the second type of model are NAT (natural accident 
theory) and HRO (high reliability organisations) as well as the Swiss cheese model 
of Reason (Hopkins, 2014). The latter represents a paradigm change in safety 
science (Hollnagel, 2014b). The age of human factors began (Waterson et al., 
2015) because the existing models could not explain events like the Challenger 
space shuttle accident. His work put the emphasis on organisational failure 
(Reason, 1997) as well as on human error.  
 
Safety management thus became popular in the 1980s because safety was 
recognised as a control or management problem and not just a technical issue of 
engineering safety into a system (Oedewald & Gotcheva, 2015) as the Domino 
model suggested. Based on analyses of different catastrophes in high risk 
environments, accidents are seen to be caused by a complex chain of events, like 
a projectile piercing through different layers of protective barriers (Reason, 1997).  
 
The model is easy to comprehend which might be a reason why it has been used 
intensively in the literature on human factors training (CAA etc.). Hollnagel (2008) 
critically remarked that combining risks with barriers does not equal safety. Whilst 
this approach is still widely used in accident analysis although it has been 
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criticised as being too linear and the image of a net seems more appropriate than 
a chain of events (Hofinger, 2008). More criticisms of this type of model have been 
outlined by Hopkins (2014). Therefore, a new type of model seems necessary. 
 
2.5 Resilience Engineering – the new paradigm in safety science 
2.5.1 Safety 1 and safety 2 
Starting from the two perspectives of safety as the absence of unwanted outcomes 
and acceptable risks, a generally agreed-upon definition of safety has been 
developed (Fahlbruch et al., 2008). Safety has been defined as a dynamic non-
event with no dangerous events in its presence: instead of being a passive state 
the dynamic element stands for many activities happening at the same time 
(Weick & Sutcliff, 2001). This view on safety is called safety 1 by Hollnagel 
(2014b), who therefore critically asked if safety is actually a subject for science, 
because a non-event cannot be studied nor measured. Considering that a 
condition where nothing goes wrong is only described by the absence of adverse 
outcomes, he asked: “How to measure an increase in safety by counting how 
many fewer things go wrong?” (Hollnagel, 2014d, p. 95) 
 
A process on the other hand, e.g. safe operation (Rochlin, 1999), is tangible and 
can be observed as how work is done and the characteristics it has, instead of a 
condition of safety that is difficult to define (Hollnagel, 2014b). Building on the 
definition of Weick and Sutcliff, Hollnagel (2014b) suggested replacing a sole 
focus on failure with an additional focus on success. Ensuring that things go right 
instead of just preventing them going wrong is called safety 2 and he defined it as 
“..the ability to succeed under expected and unexpected conditions alike, so that 
the number of intended and acceptable outcomes (in other words, everyday 
activities) is as high as possible.” (Hollnagel, 2014b, p. 23) 
 
When things go wrong and accidents or even disasters happen, the traditional 
view on them from an epistemological perspective is to explain what happened by 
finding a cause-effect relationship (Dekker, 2015). The assumptions which 
sometimes come up in such a context, that great effects/accidents can always be 
traced back to great causes or that more details collected equal a higher accuracy 
of investigation was rejected by Dekker (2015).  
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The focus on causes is even more problematic within newer work environments 
because they are characterized by increasing complexity (see age of complex 
STS in Figure 2) where finding the factors that affect safety 1 is a challenge and 
root/cause types of explanations fall short (Kleiner et al., 2015). This linear cause-
effect explanation is called causality-credo and, from a safety 2 perspective, it is a 
problematic assumption and hence, a myth (Hollnagel, 2014d) or delusion of 
safety (Pitzer, 2015) because systemic effects are ignored and consequently 
alternate causes or explanations not found (see Appendix 2 for further descriptions 
of this and other myths).  
One purpose of an accident investigation is prevention of future accidents (Dekker, 
2015). Looking back into the error chain through the cheese layers of Reason 
(1990), the assumption of reverse causality constitutes a simplistic safety 1 view of 
the complex interactions within adverse events, for example because 
countermeasures and additional barriers can have unintended side effects 
(Hollnagel, 2014d). 
 
Many methods concerning STS and safety are rather old as Waterson et al. (2015) 
showed, but safety relevant work environments demand new approaches to deal 
with their increasing complexity (Kleiner et al., 2015). To move away from the 
causality-credo, system understanding is required which, within safety 2 type 
thinking, means to understand how work is done rather than how it is imagined 
(Havinga, Dekker, & Rae, 2018). Since work as it is done (WAD) represents the 
reality of people, work as imagined (WAI) might be inadequate, which is why 
Hollnagel (2014d, p. 122) demanded: “We must be willing to meet that challenge 
head-on. Otherwise we may inadvertently create the challenges of the future by 
trying to solve the problems of the present with the models, theories and methods 
of the past.”  
 
In order to understand accidents, the safety 2 methodology investigates daily or 
normal work (Havinga et al., 2018). As a consequence, the mindsets of the people 
investigating an accident might change due to the new perspective, but this is time 
consuming and might not always have a direct consequence for operations 
(Hollnagel, 2014d). In addition, as Hollnagel (2014d) further argued, breadth of 
investigation is more important than depth, because any event being studied is a 
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representation of normal or daily work. That work usually goes right, and in the 
context of accidents, looking at it can generate alternate or ‘second stories’ 
regarding the cause that can supplant the first cause or ‘first story’, however 
obvious it may seem or deeply it has been investigated in the first place. 
 
The above illustrates a new perspective on incidents by use of the safety 2 
methodology, where the role of humans is also seen differently. Towards the end 
of the age of human factors (see Figure 2), the term human error stood for the 
human contribution to accidents and disasters, giving this contribution a negative 
touch. At present, ‘human error’ is a set topic in the different human factors 
training syllabi within the high-risk environment of the aviation industry. The 
rationale is that pilot error is still denominated as the main cause of fatal accidents 
and incidents (Afrazeh & Bartisch, 2007; Oster, Strong, & Zorn, 2013). In aviation, 
such training is mandated but outside of high-risk industries no requirements exist 
for such training. 
 
With a stronger focus on human error, humans suddenly became a central 
problem to be solved in safety, one counter to which was considered to be 
automation, leading to a significant decrease of accidents by using highly 
automated airplanes (Manzey, 2008). Unfortunately, Bainbridge (1983) showed 
that automation can lead to side effects such as decreased operator skills and a 
loss of awareness of what the system is actually doing, phenomena known as 
‘ironies of automation’ in the field. This concern has not lost but rather gained 
momentum in the face of current complex and automated systems (Baxter, 
Rooksby, Wang, & Khajeh-Hosseini, 2012).  
 
Safety 2 does not see humans as a problem but rather as an asset, because 
humans have the ability to adjust their performance and make things go right in 
the majority of  cases (Hollnagel, 2014a). After all, if humans are the cause of the 
majority of unwanted events, they are very likely also the cause when things go 
right and hence an asset. 
Both results have the same source: the variability of human behaviour (Hollnagel, 
2014d), but positive results are rarely a matter of interest and hence not 
investigated (Oster et al., 2013). 
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The gap, identified by Hollnagel (2014d), is the relative lack of vocabulary for 
performance adjustments compared to when things go wrong (e.g. types of failure, 
event classification, causes etc.). Safety 1 is therefore not rejected but included in 
the wider perspective of safety 2, because an accident analysis is needed to 
understand what has happened as well as to identify hazards (Hollnagel, 2014d). 
Figure 3 summarizes and contrasts both perspectives. 
 
 
Figure 3: Differences between safety 1 and safety 2  (Hollnagel, 2014d) 
 
Since humans do not fail in a random fashion, the organisational context has to be 
considered (Leveson, 2017). The next section will therefore look at Resilience 
Engineering where the safety 2 perspective is meant to increase the adaptiveness 
of an organisation. 
 
2.5.3 Resilience Engineering 
The term resilience has received considerable attention in the safety science 
community in recent years since the start of its use at a conference in 
Söderköpinge, Sweden in 2006, and several authors have engaged in literature 
reviews to define the term because its meanings are multiple and they sometimes 
seem contradictory (Bergström, van Winsen, & Henriqson, 2015; Bhamra, Dani, & 
Burnard, 2011; Hosseini, Barker, & Ramirez-Marquez, 2016; Reid & Botterill, 
2013; Righi, Saurin, & Wachs, 2015). Resilience Engineering is described by 
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Kleiner et al. (2015) as an approach towards system design and safety that has 
adopted an explicitly sociotechnical perspective. For Patriarca et al. (2018) it is a 
safety management paradigm with the focus on how systems cope with complexity 
and which tries try to balance safety and productivity in a proactive way. The 
approach is thought of as a key concept with regards to safety and Norros (2014, 
p. 62) stated that:  
“Central in the proposed new safety paradigm is acceptance of the 
variability and unexpected events in the system as inherent features of the 
system that cannot be fully eliminated.” 
With a traditional understanding of safety, where adverse events are as low as 
possible, risk management seeks to maintain such a condition and stop things 
from going wrong (Hollnagel, 2014a). Resilience engineering, on the other hand, 
seeks to also understand why things go right with the underlying assumption that 
failure and success are two sides of the same coin. 
 
Safety is therefore not seen as the absence of a condition that we do not want, but 
an emergent system property which allows the system to succeed under 
conditions that are constantly varying (Oedewald & Gotcheva, 2015). Resilience 
therefore includes safety 1 as a part of safety 2 (Figure 4). 
 
Figure 4: The relation of safety 1 and safety 2 (Hollnagel, 2014d) 
 
Safety is therefore an ability of the system, something that the system does and 
not something that the system has, e.g. a good or bad safety record (Hollnagel, 
2011a). Resilience in the context of this study is therefore defined as: 
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“The intrinsic ability of a system to adjust its functioning prior to, during, or 
following changes and disturbances, so it can sustain required operations 
under both expected and unexpected conditions.” (Hollnagel, 2011b, 
p. xxxvi) 
Resilience Engineering studies how the characteristics of work systems make 
failure or success more likely when faced with disruptions and hence tries to 
understand and improve the adaptive capacity of the system (Branlat & Woods, 
2010). Oedewald and Gotcheva (2015) argued that the system cannot be 
deconstructed and then locally improved but has to be understood in its complexity 
to achieve coping mechanisms for changing conditions. Based on the view of 
safety as a systemic construct stated by Kyriakidis et al. (2017), research and 
system design therefore have to consider systemic aspects like e.g. the design 
principles of Clegg (2000) and the system properties of Wilson (2014). Apart from 
this, the question of how RE increases the adaptive capacity of a system or an 
organisation has become a research topic. 
 
2.5.4 Research and gaps of Resilience Engineering 
To approach the challenge of increasing the adaptive capacity of a system, Woods 
and Hollnagel (2006) have seen the need to identify core values. To guide the field 
of practice, Nemeth and Herrera (2015) proposed and explained in detail three 
values, which are observation, analysis and design. Other authors (Branlat 
& Woods, 2010; Woltjer, Pinska-Chauvin, Laursen, & Josefsson, 2015a) recently 
developed principles (see Appendix 6) for practical application and described how 
those were tested. Most of these principles refer to concepts which have already 
been described in the section about safety 2, e.g. reducing the gap between work 
as imagined versus work as actually done, adopting a system view to understand 
complex work and accept variability and uncertainty as inherent properties of 
complex work.  
 
Woods (2015) identified four recurring concepts of resilience: (I) rebound (making 
reference to existing properties in place before a disruptive event, allowing the 
system to move back to a stable form afterwards), (II) robustness (making the 
system resistant to harming effects but only within expected parameters, being 
brittle without), (III) graceful extensibility (where the system is able to stretch when 
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surprised – a dynamic capability)  and (IV) adaptability (balancing trade-offs and 
the ability to perform sustainable adaptation over several cycles). Since it is 
impossible to address general characteristics of resilience for each engineering 
purpose, it has to be explicitly defined which of these characteristics are under 
study when examining the resilience capacity of a system (Woods, 2015). 
Patriarca et al. (2018) noted that the interactions between these four concepts 
requires further research, especially when they are engineered into a system. 
However, the research just discussed leaves open the question of how to actually 
measure or assess the resilience of a system (Pęciłło, 2016), even though many 
attempts to do so have been carried out by different researchers (Demichela, 
Gallo, & Salzano, 2015; Dinh, Pasman, Gao, & Mannan, 2012; Saurin & Junior, 
2012; Shirali, Mohammadfam, Motamedzade, Ebrahimipour, & Moghimbeigi, 
2012; Shirali, Motamedzade, Mohammadfam, Ebrahimipour, & Moghimbeigi, 
2012). Many of these attempts have too much focus on theory as Labaka, 
Hernantes, and Sarriegi (2015) stated. Addressing this gap is not easy because it 
is difficult to measure the adaptive capacity of an organisation without exposure to 
hazards in the first place, as Mendonça and Wallace (2015) remarked. Branlat and 
Woods (2010) concluded that research has to be carried out in practice with a 
middle-out approach, that it should seek acceptance of workers and management 
alike, and undertake and evaluate design activities.  
 
Ultimately, there is a need for more evidence concerning the value for application 
of RE in a real context (Patriarca et al., 2018). The authors have also described 
RE as moving away from a strict adherence to safety, which can set the scene for 
broad applications in other fields. In order to do so, as Leveson (2017) argued, the 
research should focus more on interdisciplinary approaches.  
 
It can be summarized that criticism of RE in general focuses mainly on two 
aspects, that it is nothing new (Hopkins, 2014) and that it is too broad and hence 
unclear (McDonald, 2008). Hopkins (2006) however also noted that RE has 
potential for further development compared to NAT and HRO, and Pęciłło (2016) 
sees the openness of the RE concept as a strength that allows integration in 
existing models and theories. All of the above suggests that applying RE to 
another field can be promising and is likely to create beneficial effects within such 
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fields. The question to be answered beforehand, however, is how and on which 
theoretical foundation? 
 
2.5.5 The four cornerstones of Resilience Engineering 
On his website (http://erikhollnagel.com/onewebmedia/Resilience_Engineering. 
pdf) Erik Hollnagel, the leading author behind safety 2 and the resulting concept of 
RE, illustrated how the definition of RE has evolved over time and referred to the 
four cornerstones of resilience (anticipation, monitoring, responding and learning) 
that describe the adaptive or resilience capacity of an organisation (Hollnagel, 
2014c). According to Pęciłło (2016), these four cornerstones are the fundamental 
ideas behind RE and have been widely used and integrated into research 
(Azadeh, Roudi, & Salehi, 2017; Hollnagel, Paries, Woods, & Wreathall, 2011; Lay 
et al., 2015; Pęciłło, 2016; van der Beek & Schraagen, 2015) and they have found 
broad acceptance. 
 
After being proposed by Hollnagel, Woods, and Leveson (2007) and further 
refined by Hollnagel et al. (2011), the following description has evolved and will be 
used as the central theoretical basis for this study: 
 
Anticipation – ability to address the potential 
Knowing what to expect 
Anticipating developments, threats and opportunities further into the future, such 
as potential changes, disruptions, pressures and their consequences. 
 
Monitoring – ability to address the critical 
Knowing what to look for 
Monitoring that which is or can become a threat in the near term. Monitoring must 
cover both events in the environment and the performance of the system itself. 
 
Responding – ability to address the actual  
Knowing what to do  
How to respond to regular and irregular disruptions and disturbances either by 
implementing a prepared set of responses or by adjusting normal functioning. 
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Learning – ability to address the factual 
Knowing what has happened 
How to learn from experience, in particular how to learn the right lessons from the 
right experience – successes as well as failures.  
 
Figure 5 shows the dependencies among these four abilities and the environment. 
 
Figure 5: Dependencies among resilience abilities (Hollnagel, 2014c) 
 
The most extensive literature review published so far about the field of RE has 
recently labelled the four cornerstones as a well-established contribution (Patriarca 
et al., 2018). One study has found some overlaps between the two cornerstones of 
monitoring and anticipation, but the validity of the concept of four cornerstones has 
partly been confirmed (van der Beek & Schraagen, 2015).  
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2.6 Conclusion 
HFE and safety science have been discussed in this chapter with the focus on 
safety. The new paradigm of safety 2 is a central aspect of Resilience 
Engineering, which seeks to study and promote the adaptive capacity of an 
organisation or a system. Branlat and Woods (2010) pointed out that safety 1 is 
just one result or goal of the adaptive behaviour of a system which is why it can be 
concluded and is argued here that change management can profit from an RE 
approach. 
 
Several authors have made a general connection to change management 
(Bahadur, Ibrahim, & Tanner, 2010; Davis et al., 2014; Nemeth & Herrera, 2015; 
Norris, Stevens, Pfefferbaum, Wyche, & Pfefferbaum, 2008; Pęciłło, 2016) and 
see RE as an effective approach for business continuity in uncertain settings. The 
concept of ‘work as it is done’ (WAD) has for example been proved as relevant in 
the management of change in specific safety related areas (Morel et al., 2009). 
Moreover, the concept of resilience is also used in management literature, as 
Kantur (2015) described, but he also pointed out that much more solid research 
has been done in safety related areas.  
 
It seems that RE as a concept, and especially the four cornerstones, are robust 
and solid enough to be used to investigate change projects that have worked well 
or failed. What would be the result if change projects involving the same manager 
that went both right and wrong were analysed using the four cornerstones of 
Resilience Engineering? This might provide an answer as to the usefulness of RE 
and an avenue to measure resilience in a way that has not yet been done. The 
next chapter will therefore focus on failure and success in change management 
and further pursue that question. 
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3. Change Management 
In this chapter a short overview of the discipline of change management (CM) is 
given. After highlighting gaps and actual challenges in the research about 
organisational change, the failure of change projects is reviewed as well as how 
failed change is explained theoretically and dealt with by practitioners. It has to be 
noted that this study focuses clearly on change as opposed to project 
management. Although many change management programmes will contain 
significant elements of project management within them this research is concerned 
with a more holistic notion of change. This may problematise the research in the 
sense that change management can be considered as “..a complex, dynamic and 
challenging process rather than a set of recipes” (Paton & McCalman, 2008, p. 4). 
However, this very nature of complexity makes the area worthy of study by 
comparison to project management which at its simplest level can be seen as 
methods or ‘recipes’ to manage resources like cost, time and performance. 
Aspects such as, staffing are not clearly delineated as a function of the project 
manager but of operations management (Havranek, 2017). 
 
3.1 The discipline and its main approaches 
What we know today as the discipline of change management is considered to 
have its origins almost sixty years ago with the work of Kurt Lewin (Burnes, 1996, 
2004a). Lewin’s work resulted in research on group dynamics, leadership, culture 
and subsequently on how to change these, as Burnes (2004a) illustrated in a 
detailed description of his work and life. The result of Lewin’s work is nowadays 
considered the first main approach to change management and resulted in the 
model of action research (Lewin, 1951) and the three step model (Lewin, 1958) as 
well as field theory and group dynamics (Burnes, 2004a). Lewin’s thoughts have 
led to other models that further refined his planned approach to change, e.g. the 
seven phases of Lippitt, Watson, and Wesley (1958), the 8 phases of Cummings 
and Huse (1989), and the phases and processes of Bullock and Batten (1985). A 
more comprehensive overview is given by Cameron and Green (2015). 
 
In the planned approach, change is seen as moving from an initial state to a new 
and desired state and thus as a process that has a beginning and an end 
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(Bamford & Forrester, 2003). Consequently, the environment is seen as relatively 
stable, change is triggered by the organisation in a top-down process where the 
manager is in control, and ‘one best way’ of performing the change process exists 
(Burnes, 1996). 
 
In contrast to this planned approach, emergent change, puts more emphasis on 
the changing environment, which has to be constantly analysed in order to be 
understood (Dawson, 1994). In this approach the environment is seen as complex 
and as a source of uncertainty, which in contrast to the planned approach now 
triggers change as a result of external effects which are not necessarily 
understood completely by the organisation (Stickland, 1998). 
Therefore, the rapid and complex pace of change does not allow senior 
management to recognize everything and plan all needed actions accordingly, 
which is why the emphasis changes from ‘top down’ control to ‘bottom up’ actions 
(Bamford & Forrester, 2003). The authors have further argued, that since the 
manager cannot react quickly enough his role shifts from being a controller to 
becoming a facilitator. Furthermore, there is no beginning and no end because 
change is seen as a continuous journey of learning and further need for change 
might come up spontaneously in the process (Burnes, 1996). The resulting models 
of this approach from authors such as Kanter, Stein, and Jick (1992), Hinings, 
Greenwood, Ranson, and Walsh (1988) and Pettigrew (1985) consider the 
dynamics, the processes, the context and the content of change, and as 
mentioned before the complexity of the environment. The planned and the 
emergent approach are also known as episodic and continuous change 
(McClellan, 2011). 
 
The 1990’s saw the development of another approach which could be seen as 
spanning the space between the two poles of planned and emergent change 
rather than naming it a third discrete approach. This is because some types of 
change, e.g. long marches, where change is slow but long lasting, and bold 
strokes, where change is sudden and drastic, could not be properly explained or 
described by the existing theories (Kanter et al., 1992). These two types of change 
are also called incremental and fundamental (Cameron & Green, 2015; Decker et 
al., 2012). 
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By aligning the internal and the external environment, the focus in the contingency 
model or contingency approach of change shifts to the specific situation and 
context, which are different for each organisation and require careful analysis to 
achieve optimal results as Dunphy and Stace (1993) have argued. 
In a similar fashion, Burnes (1996) used the phrase ‘one best for each’ and stated 
that systemic thinking is required and that the relation to organisational culture has 
to be considered. In a more recent and very broad overview about organisational 
development (OD), which Burnes and Cooke (2012) described as strongly 
intertwined with change management, the authors elaborated on complexity and 
see it as a reason that the contingency approach is the successor of emergent 
change theory. Complexity has indeed received considerable attention within the 
field of change management in the past years. Cameron and Green (2015) in their 
book “Making sense of change management” have added a chapter on complexity 
as well as on uncertainty following the second edition from 2009. Newer 
approaches such as larger systemic change (LSC) have even began melding 
complexity with systemic perspective (Waddock, Meszoely, Waddell, & Dentoni, 
2015).  
 
3.2 Managing change in organisations 
How can change be explained in a comprehensive or holistic manner and which 
advice should be given to organisations and people involved in change initiatives? 
 
Within the development of the discipline, complexity has become a topic with 
increasing relevance for science and practitioners alike (Collins & Porras, 1996; 
Duck, 1993), but has only recently been labelled as a complexity shift (Grady 
& Grady, 2013). The discipline itself and the proposed methods and models that 
help to manage change are in themselves complex and difficult to oversee. Al-
Haddad and Kotnour (2015) have therefore integrated the existing literature of 
organisational change, resulting in a taxonomy that includes types (long, short, big 
or small), methods (systematic change methods and change management 
methods) and also results of change initiatives (see Figure 6). 
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Figure 6: Taxonomy of organisational change literature (Al-Haddad & Kotnour, 2015) 
The taxonomy is open and indications for further research are given (Al-Haddad 
& Kotnour, 2015). The change types for example, could also be expanded by 
naming the subject of change like structural change, specific projects, mergers or 
a change in strategy and culture (Cameron & Green, 2015), which ultimately are 
subcategories of scale and duration. 
 
Al-Haddad and Kotnour (2015) differentiated between systematic change 
methods, that contain processes and tools for managerial decision making, and 
change management methods, which are broader, more conceptual and include a 
range of intervention strategies where alignment of the change initiative with the 
overall mission, the organisational strategy and its culture shall be achieved. Both 
overviews are found in appendix G for further comparison. 
 
Even though a broad range of methods and models exist, Todnem By (2005) has 
described the discipline of CM as only having consensus and agreement on two 
aspects, that the pace of change has never been greater (Carnall, 2007; Okumus 
& Hemmington, 1998) and that it comes in all shapes and sizes while potentially 
affecting all organisations across all industries (Balogun & Hailey, 2008; Luecke, 
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2003). Apart from those, many disparities exist that do not provide a clear picture 
of how to explain or approach change, but instead highlight several gaps and 
topics without agreement. They will be described in the next section.  
 
3.3 Research gaps and practitioner problems 
Moran and Brightman (2000) have defined change management as a process 
where the organisation’s direction, structure and capabilities are continually 
renewed due to the constantly changing needs that are provided by external and 
internal customers. According to Burnes (2004b), change is present all the time 
and cannot be regarded as separate from organisational strategy. Furthermore, 
the ability to manage change is a fundamental skill for managers (Senior & 
Fleming, 2006). 
 
While this is understandable and would suggest that much emphasis and effort 
goes into building such skills and abilities, there are several gaps and problems 
within the field of CM that draw a different picture. The paradox of the distance 
between theory and practitioners (Appelbaum et al., 2012), the challenge of 
increasing complexity (Grady & Grady, 2013) which is related to the struggle of 
finding a valid or systemic framework (Todnem By, 2005), inadequately addressed 
people-related issues (Maheshwari & Vohra, 2015) and the limited understanding 
of implementation failure (Schwarz et al., 2011) are some of the gaps and 
problems within the discipline. They are described in the following subsections. 
 
3.3.1 Distance between practitioners and theory 
There have been differences, sometimes even called boundaries, between the 
theoretical approach to organisational change and the practitioner side 
(Appelbaum et al., 2012; Buchanan, 1993; Pollack & Pollack, 2015; Saka, 2003). 
There is very little research on the effects of how practitioners approach change, 
even though a large amount of literature exists with advice on how to do it 
(Raineri, 2011). Bamford and Forrester (2003) found that managers tend to ignore 
the popular change literature because it is too simplistic and does not account for 
the complexity and uncertainties involved with emergent change in organisations. 
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One reson for this is, that what happens in organisations is seldom self-evident, 
clearly visible nor fixed (Pettigrew & Whipp, 1993). 
 
The work of John Kotter has been widely applied (Cameron & Green, 2009, 2015) 
and is probably the best known model or set of advice. Hughes (2015) critically 
remarked that Kotter’s advice for leading change lacks empirical evidence but at 
the same time has been cited over 5500 times and had a severe impact on the 
empirical debate. Some authors even described the surprisingly huge academic 
reliance on non-empirically tested findings as an enigma (Appelbaum et al., 2012). 
Pollack and Pollack (2015) examined the use of the 8 steps within a large 
Australian company facing major changes. Their findings revealed that instead of 
a linear approach, interventions had to happen at different levels and turned out to 
possess a higher complexity than expected These findings support Bamford and 
Forrester’s (2003) arguments concerning the increasing importance of complexity 
and uncertainty of emergent change. 
 
3.3.2 The complexity challenge 
The challenge of providing advice for practitioners and making sense of change 
has become a new and challenging facet with the shift towards complexity (Grady 
& Grady, 2013). Change initiatives not only fail to achieve intended outcomes but 
can also produce outcomes that were never intended (Balogun, 2006; Hughes, 
2015). One reason for this, as Karp and Helgo (2008) argued, is that the 
complexity of change projects is underestimated by the very same managers who 
have to lead those projects. The majority of models follow a linear approach, 
mostly in the shape of defined steps that the change manager should follow (Al-
Haddad & Kotnour, 2015). However, it is the linearity which is heavily criticized 
(Hughes, 2015). This critique extends to most of the existing change models as 
Thomas et al. (2016) pointed out. 
 
3.3.3 Lack of systemic approaches 
It is argued by Burnes (2004b) that many confusing and contradictory approaches 
and theories are available for practitioners and academics. Todnem By (2005), 
therefore suggested more research on the nature of change and how to manage it 
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because he critically pointed out the lack of a valid framework as a guideline for 
implementing and managing change. However, change management is beginning 
to include broader systemic changes, because our technological and human 
systems have developed a high level of complexity and humans have become 
more vulnerable to simultaneous and constant changes in their environment 
(Waddock et al., 2015). Unintended outcomes and the influence of different 
change initiatives on each other can only be understood from a systemic 
perspective (Hughes, 2011), since linear approaches fall short of providing 
explanations for such phenomena (Thomas et al., 2016). Ala-Laurinaho, Kurki, 
and Abildgaard (2017) therefore characterized the systemic nature of change as 
being dynamic, interrelated and non-linear. 
 
Change implementation is a complex process with only a few predictive models 
and a general lack of holistic understanding via existing models (Decker et al., 
2012). On top of this it is difficult to evaluate outcomes in the face of complexity 
because one can never be sure if all the relevant indicators or aspects were 
actually measured, and depending on what is measured the evaluation is likely to 
provide different results (Hughes, 2011).  
 
3.3.4 People-related issues inadequately addressed 
Sense-making and culture are aspects that have been researched with regards to 
change and point towards the role of humans within change projects and initiatives 
(Ala-Laurinaho et al., 2017; Mallinger, Goodwin, & O’hara, 2009; Saran, Munoz, & 
Kalliny, 2008). Research indicates an impact of culture on different organisational 
variables (Caramelli & Briole, 2007), but the concrete relations are under-
researched (Decker et al., 2012). In the literature there is much more focus on 
tools, strategy and structure than on the influence of human beliefs on change 
projects (Karp & Helgo, 2008). Several researchers complain that ‘people issues’ 
are not addressed adequately or that they are even partly neglected (Maheshwari 
& Vohra, 2015; Shum, Bove, & Auh, 2008). This is why Grady and Grady (2013) 
demanded to refocus research efforts and perspectives back on humans and their 
role within change initiatives. 
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3.3.5 Failure of change initiatives 
A number of approaches exist which provide guidance on leading change 
initiatives towards a successful outcome (Al-Haddad & Kotnour, 2015). However, 
unsuccessful or failed change initiatives are not explored nor understood to the 
same degree (Schwarz et al., 2011). The question why this area has only attracted 
limited attention has been raised (Buchanan et al., 2005), but so far not answered 
in a satisfactory way. Inconsistencies exist within studies regarding definitions of 
failure, judging criteria, investigated industries, quality of the method and the unit 
of analysis e.g. project or strategy implementation (Cândido & Santos, 2015; 
Hutzschenreuter & Kleindienst, 2006). 
 
Since failure is not only a central gap but also the central topic of this research, the 
next section provides an overview of this.  
 
3.4 Failure and its reasons 
When speaking about failure and success a common understanding of the 
meaning behind these evaluations cannot be assumed. Moreover, there is a need 
to investigate which definitions exist in the literature together with the reasons for 
failed change and how organisations deal with failure or how they try to avoid it. 
 
3.4.1 The definition of failure (and success) 
When investigating failure and success of change initiatives, one might think that 
success is the opposite of failure, that the dimension is bipolar. Since failure is not 
explored and understood to the same extent in the literature (Sandage, 2005), 
such an assertion remains to be confirmed and both dimensions have to be 
defined. 
 
First of all, a project has to be finished, it has to have an end result in order to 
define the change project outcome (Al-Haddad & Kotnour, 2015). If that outcome 
is successful, predetermined objectives have been completed, e.g. to stay within 
budget and schedule, satisfy stakeholders, and fulfil customer requirements 
(Kendra & Taplin, 2004; Nicolas & Steyn, 2008). Miller (1997) defined successful 
implementation as completion of what was intended within the envisaged time, 
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that the intended performance was achieved and that the implementation method 
as well as the outcome find acceptance within the organisation. Nevertheless, 
Cândido and Santos (2015) remarked that different degrees of performance might 
be achieved and the acceptability within the organisation could also vary. 
 
The above suggests an ambiguous understanding of success where a threshold is 
necessary in order to define where success is diminished and gradually turns into 
failure, in case different degrees of performance are assumed. This in turn would 
require clearly verbalized criteria at project start and not just a rough wish list, but 
research indicates that such a clear representation of envisaged goals are not 
always given (Schwarz et al., 2011). 
Failure on the other hand offers two mutually exclusive definitions. Implementation 
failure has been considered by Cândido and Santos (2015) as a project that 
provided poor results or one that was formulated but not implemented. This line of 
thought was also followed by Decker et al. (2012) who understand failure as the 
opposite to the above definition of success by Miller (1997). The second definition 
refers to the process of poor or flawed execution and is defined by Schwarz et al. 
(2011) as not adapting adequately to change project pressure in spite of existing 
plans to do so. 
 
3.4.2 Failure rates and the inconsistent evaluations of outcomes 
Change projects do fail, there is no doubt about this fact in the literature, and for a 
long time the magical number of 70% was widely taken for granted as the rate at 
which it does (Beer, M., & Nohria, N, 2000; Keller & Aiken, 2009; Kotter, 2008; 
Senturia, Flees, & Maceda, 2008). When Hughes (2011) took a closer look and 
clearly demonstrated how this number developed and that it is in fact not grounded 
on solid research, a lack of understanding about failed change became visible. 
One review of the literature about failure rates has led to a range between 28% 
and 93% and the authors conclude that: 
“No one really knows what the true rate of failure is in implementation of 
projects and strategies and there is no clear model of how to avoid failure.” 
(Decker et al., 2012, p. 42) 
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However, any estimation of the rate will have to be based on an evaluation 
process of either the outcome, the process or both. Since many inconsistencies 
exist in these evaluations (Cândido & Santos, 2015; Hutzschenreuter 
& Kleindienst, 2006) and failure in general is an under-researched topic, a wide 
range of different rates are a logical consequence. Moreover, it is not the intention 
of this research to provide a definitive rate but rather to understand how failure 
actually happens and how the evaluation process happens. The research of 
Thomas et al. (2016) ties in well to this perspective as it suggests that evaluation 
of failed change implementation is not consistent over time, affected by values and 
not always related to the result. The authors assume that the perception of failure 
or success changes over time through negotiation and is, among other variables, 
affected by sense-making and by exercising power (Thomas et al., 2016). 
The process of evaluation can also vary within one single organisation due to 
competing perceptions about failure and success (Hughes, 2011). Evaluators 
might have different and competing perceptions (Carnall, 1986), but also the 
personal interpretations and meanings that individuals have or give can greatly 
vary (Doyle, 2001), leading to the concept of ‘perceived failure’ introduced by 
Schwarz et al. (2011).  
 
In summarizing the literature, it can be stated that an exact failure rate cannot be 
defined, that if it were defined it would be rather high (Cândido & Santos, 2015), 
that many change projects fail, and that what constitutes failure is based on 
volatile evaluations (Burnes & Jackson, 2011). To shed further light on these 
questions, reasons for failure have to be investigated and the next section 
provides an overview of what the literature has identified as leading to failed 
change. 
 
3.4.3 Reasons for failure 
The literature gives a wide variety of reasons and it is remarkable how many are 
the ‘main’ or the ‘primary reason’ but the main gap, as Decker et al. (2012) stated, 
is the absence of a systemic view on implementation failure that could incorporate 
all the existing knowledge on reasons for failure. A valid framework has been 
missing in the past (Todnem By, 2005) and so far none has been found.  
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Investigating the change process itself is one approach to make sense of the 
reasons for failure. Some researchers see poorly designed change initiatives as 
the reason, partly because they are designed with a closed system perspective 
(Cascio, 2005; Raelin & Cataldo, 2011). Other authors focus on the process of 
planning or execution in the search for reasons (Dent & Goldberg, 1999; Hoag, 
Ritschard, & Cooper, 2002; Huczynski & Buchanan, 2001).  
Raelin and Cataldo (2011) further differentiated between a micro perspective, that 
includes values and motivation, and a macro perspective, with the focus on culture 
and climate. The interface between both is the middle manager and failure of 
change initiatives is attributed to the missing empowerment of these managers 
(Raelin & Cataldo, 2011). This perspective ties in well with the micro- and 
macroergonomic perspective of STS theory. 
 
Seeing the role of humans as a cause for failure or as a contributing factor is a 
second aspect named by many authors as substantial. Rogiest, Segers, and van 
Witteloostuijn (2015) see the attitude of employees as a critical factor, others focus 
on a lack of competence and commitment (Boddy & Buchanan, 1992; Caldwell, 
2003, 2007; Kirkman & Shapiro, 1997). Effects on humans, for example initiative 
fatigue, are also named (Bamford & Forrester, 2003). 
 
The spectrum of possible behavioural reactions to change was outlined by 
Coetsee (1999), building on the work of Judson (1991), as ranging from active 
resistance to commitment. Some of the underlying assumptions of both Judson 
and Coetsee are the mutual exclusivity of both extremes and that people respond 
in a synchronic way along that continuum concerning emotions, behaviours and 
cognition. These assumptions on resistance have been challenged by several 
authors as too simplistic (Latta, 2006; Latta, 2009; Meyer, Hamilton, Oreg, Michel, 
& By, 2013). McDermott, Fitzgerald, and Buchanan (2013) for example, have 
argued to replace the dichotomy of acceptance-resistance with different responses 
to mandated policy that happen along a continuum. Furthermore, several 
researchers (Ford, Ford, & D'Amelio, 2008; Piderit, 2000) have started to view 
resistance from different perspectives: where it does not necessarily impact 
change negatively, where employees can have multidimensional attitudes towards 
change, and where their behaviour cannot be traced back to a specific attitude. 
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A third view on failure relates organisational and human properties. Latta (2015, 
p. 1020) for example has demanded the scientific community to leave what she 
called a ‘fixation on resistance’ and adopt a view that considers the complex ways 
in which organisations respond to change. In a theoretical framework, she linked 
resistance and facilitation to organisational culture while considering the different 
effects of cognition, emotion and  behaviour (Latta, 2015). Reactions to change, 
according to her approach, comprise cognitive/affective facilitation or resistance on 
the change initiative side (content) and behavioural facilitation or resistance on the 
implementation strategy side (process). In her view it is cultural alignment or 
misalignment that determines the employee reaction to the way content or 
implementation is introduced by the organisation, so that failure happens “when a 
culturally consonant change initiative is paired with an implementation strategy 
that fails to accord with tenets of organisational culture.” (Latta, 2015, p. 1028)  
 
The three views (design of the process, human aspects and organisational effects) 
all address different facets. A valid framework (Todnem By, 2005) would have to 
incorporate them all in order to be holistic, and additionally it would have to provide 
guidance for the practitioner. Decker et al. (2012) stated that change 
implementation is a complex process with only a few models that provide guidance 
and have a predictive approach; their research has identified six perspectives in 
the literature for the purpose of predicting success and failure: decision making, 
risk analysis/assessment, organisational culture, organisational alignment, 
readiness to change and change management. Based on the concept of ‘critical 
failure factors’ (CFFs) by Wong, Scarbrough, Chau, and Davison (2005) and a 
broad literature review about failure, they have defined more than 60 CFFs in 17 
proposed dimensions (see 
Figure 7) which “involve the individuals themselves, the processes and 
communication in the organisation, or the organisation itself.” (Decker et al., 2012, 
p. 45) The authors state that a complete predictive model or taxonomy that 
explains change success/failure and incorporates different organisation types and 
situations does not exist, but they see the possibility of constructing some sort of 
marker analysis which uses employees and managers opinion to predict failure 
and success (Decker et al., 2012). 
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PROCESS CFFs ORGANISATIONAL CFFs COMMUNICATION 
CULTURE CFFs 
PEOPLE CFFs 
Goals, Metrics and 
Rewards 
Bureaucracy and Politics Culture Poor Community for 
Change 
Low Care Horizon 
 No clear state of 
requirements, goals, 
objectives 
 No clear vision & 
objectives 
 Little role definition & 
presence of conflict 
 No metrics/ monitoring/ 
feedback or not aligned 
 Rewards not aligned to 
change 
 Little interdepartmental 
cooperation/bureaucrac
y  
 Too much bureaucracy 
and politics 
 
 Unsupportive culture - grp 
& balanced  
 Not flexible/inability to 
adjust to changes 
 
 Little 
interdepartmental 
cooperation 
 Little executive 
management support  
 Few project 
champions perceived  
 Lots of bureaucracy 
and politics 
 Poor implementation 
manager's reputation 
 Low commitment/ 
involvement 
 Turnover of team/ 
leaders 
 Don't see the change as 
real/ Not needed 
 Unrealistic expectations 
from 
management perceived 
by employees 
 Poor alignment of 
people's and org.'s 
values  
 Little mgt. support 
Perceived 
 Little individual 
readiness for change 
Knowledge Transfer Initiative Overload 
 Lack of training/poor 
knowledge transfer 
 Inappropriate CM 
processes/strategy 
 History of failed initiatives 
 Too many competing 
initiatives 
Decision Making & 
Planning 
Staffing Alignment Poor 
Communication 
Culture 
Low Motivation to 
Change 
 Poor decision making 
 Continual changing 
customer requirements 
 Poor project 
management 
competence/plan, 
schedule 
 Little user involvement 
in DM or planning 
 Overreliance on 
customization  
 Improper Planning i.e. 
cost and time estimate 
 Poor strategy/project fit 
 Lack of competent staff 
 Inadequate staffing  
 Poor IT/ERP system 
misfit 
 Poor consultant 
performance  
 Not commercially 
profitable for the 
contractor 
 No alignment - 
org./vertical & horizontal  
 No alignment of supply 
chain 
 
 Poor communication 
and connection 
 Unrealistic 
expectations of 
Employees 
 Conversation/particip
ation not 
allowed 
 Employees cannot 
express doubt 
 High sense of 
vulnerability 
 No clear & consistent 
expression of vision & 
objectives  
 Transparency & trust 
 Prior negative 
experiences 
 No transparency  
 Recent change of 
leadership/managem
ent 
 Lack of trust 
 
 Interpersonal resistance 
 Too much change 
coming 
 Little motivation to 
change 
 Little buy-in/passion 
 Large status change 
expected from change  
 No fun/hard work 
expected 
 User resistance 
Infrastructure/Structure 
 Inadequate infrastructure 
 Inadequate resources and 
funding 
 Inadequate CM 
Process Issues Leadership Low Ability to Change 
 Processes not in place 
 Mechanistic processes  
 Poor business process 
reengineering 
 Poor leadership (general)  
 Leadership pays  
 too much attention to 
financial Issues 
 Lack of support from 
leadership 
 Unrealistic expectations of 
leadership 
 Lack of emotional 
Intelligence  
 Lack of change 
champions 
 Avoidance of 
accountability 
 High need for control 
 High need for 
predictability 
 Little personal flexibility 
 
 
Figure 7: Critical Failure Factors (Decker et al., 2012) 
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3.4.4 Summary 
This chapter started with a basic description of organisational change 
management. The complexity shift (Grady & Grady, 2013) has become a 
challenge and little overall agreement exists (Todnem By, 2005), but would be 
needed to face such challenge effectively. With regard to the failure of change 
projects the image does not become brighter as many gaps and practical 
problems have been identified. Apart from the high rate of failure, it is obvious that 
much potential for improvement exists in the field. However, how to approach that 
challenge is not at all obvious.  
 
Three views on failure became apparent which focus on the design of the process, 
on human aspects and on organisational effects. From a safety related HFE 
perspective they could be understood as a micro perspective, due to the view on 
humans and its lack in CM failure literature, and a macro perspective, where 
organisational effects come into the focus. In addition the systemic design 
orientation of HFE (Dul et al., 2012; Wilson, 2014) could be applied when 
investigating change failure. 
 
Chapter four explores the potential of HFE and RE by contrasting them with the 
gaps and challenges in the area of organisational change. The work of Decker et 
al. (2012) provides a starting point for a more holistic and systemic understanding 
of change failure via the identification of critical failure factors, whereas the RE 
focus on ‘why things go right’ could provide additional insight and continue their 
research efforts. 
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4. Bringing the disciplines together 
This chapter contrasts the results of chapter two and three and outlines how a 
safety perspective in general and RE and HFE approaches in particular might 
provide more insight into failed and successful change. A combined three-step 
perspective of explorative research is suggested to explore these insights. It 
considers failed and successful change along the four cornerstones of resilience 
under a micro-ergonomic and macro-ergonomic STS theory perspective.  
 
4.1 Considering safety thinking for Change Management 
If we compare the very low accident and incidents rate in safety-related high-risk 
environments, e.g. aviation with only five fatal accidents in 2017 as reported by the 
ICAO on their homepage (International Civil Aviation Organisation – 
www.icao.int/safety/safety reports), with the comparably high rates of 
organisational change failure, safety-related HFE thinking would be embraced by 
CM, but this has only sporadically been the case (Buchanan, 2011). While there 
are legal and institutionalised approaches in safety-related areas, none exist in 
CM. The transfer of insights of HFE and safety science to other fields is not as 
obvious as it would appear at first sight and medicine is witness to this, as the 
research of Parker (2015) has indicated. She pointed out that unlike disasters in 
other industries, where they happen on a large scale, in medicine they are local 
and personalised, such that  
“[t]his relative isolation has led to difficulties in understanding systemic 
contributions to error, because incidents tend to be seen as the failure of an 
individual and not the failure of some other element, such as inadequate 
equipment design or procedural shortcomings.” (Parker, 2015, p. 392) 
In the field of organisational change, the consequences of failure neither result in 
large-scale disasters nor human victims according to the literature review. The 
high failure rate and the under-researched topic of failure (Schwarz et al., 2011) 
suggest including safety 1 approaches (Hollnagel, 2014d). The work of Decker et 
al. (2012) on predictive CFF can be regarded as an initiative in such a direction. 
However, complexity puts a limit to identifying all relevant variables, a challenge 
that could be addressed by RE and safety 2 because of their specific focus on that 
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challenge (Lay et al., 2015). Although complexity has also become an important 
topic in change-related research (Grady & Grady, 2013), existing research in 
safety-related areas could be used to inform this direction (Grant, Salmon, 
Stevens, Goode, & Read, 2018; Waterson et al., 2015). Therefore, the benefit of 
complexity theories for CM needs more research to be applicable and useful for 
improving organisational change (Burnes, 2005). By addressing the existing gaps, 
this research contributes to this issue.  
 
4.2 Addressing the gaps 
The challenges that complexity provides are probably the main reasons for 
systemic approaches in HFE (Dul et al., 2012) and RE (Branlat & Woods, 2010), 
together with the limitations of linear approaches of error causation in the tradition 
of safety 1 (Haavik, 2014; Hollnagel, 2014b). This insight is beginning to emerge in 
CM as well (Hughes, 2015; Thomas et al., 2016), which is why RE and HFE have 
the potential of improving the success rate of organisational change (Kantur, 
2015). 
 
The design orientation of HFE under a systemic perspective (Dul et al., 2012) and 
the STS focus on design principles (Clegg, 2000; Davis et al., 2014) offer 
promising tools to address the problems of poorly designed change initiatives and 
could also address the shortcomings in planning (Cascio, 2005; Huczynski 
& Buchanan, 2001; Raelin & Cataldo, 2011). Are they considered in successful 
projects and neglected in the failed ones? 
 
The distance between practitioners and science is advocated as smaller in HFE 
and safety science (Appelbaum et al., 2012; Karwowski, 2005, 2012; Raineri, 
2011). Moreover, RE puts a special focus on reducing the gap between work as it 
is imagined (WAI) and work as it is done (WAD) (Hollnagel, 2014d; Lay et al., 
2015). In challenging different assumptions about how change happens, Jansson 
(2013) required to put more focus on the context in which it happens. This line of 
thought relates to the contingency approach (Cameron & Green, 2015; Dunphy 
& Stace, 1993) The research focus of RE on work as done (Woltjer, Pinska-
Chauvin, Laursen, & Josefsson, 2015b) could therefore provide momentum for 
understanding success and failure of change initiatives. 
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The micro-ergonomic and macro-ergonomic perspectives of STS theory in HFE 
specifically address human issues which are said to be neglected in organisational 
change (Maheshwari & Vohra, 2015). By exploring change failure and success 
from such a perspective the call for refocusing on human aspects (Grady & Grady, 
2013) and hence the gaps described in sections 3.3. and 3.4.3 could be 
addressed. Such an approach would be in line with recent research by Durand, 
Decker, and Kirkman (2014), who emphasised the benefit of crowd knowledge, as 
well as with Latta (2015), who put the focus on the positive contribution of people 
instead of the problems they cause. Moreover, seeing people in an organisation as 
an asset for pro-active behaviour instead of a cause for failure is a central 
consideration of safety 2 and RE (Hollnagel, 2014d). The micro and macro 
perspectives are not new to CM. To a certain extent, they also appear in the 
research of Ala-Laurinaho et al. (2017) and with regards to failure and success 
also in Raelin and Cataldo (2011). However, the explicit application of safety 
related HFE and RE thinking to such perspectives is yet missing. 
 
Much has been written on the notion of organisational culture (Schein, 2010) and it 
has also been addressed by some authors with regards to failure and success 
(Bamford & Forrester, 2003; Latta, 2006; Latta, 2009, 2015). In safety science, the 
term safety culture has become famous since the Chernobyl incident and has 
increased the awareness of safe behaviour within organisations (Buerschaper, 
2008). The concept has received criticism and safety climate is seen as a more 
tangible concept (Murphy et al., 2014), but many different definitions of both 
concepts exist (Hopkins, 2006; Reiman & Rollenhagen, 2014; Wiegmann, Zhang, 
Thaden, Sharma, & Gibbons, 2004). Comparing the understanding of culture in 
RE, HFE and CM is not within the scope of this research. However, it will be of 
interest whether interviewees elaborate on the topic and that way provide 
indications for further research. 
 
All of the above ties in well to what Buchanan (2011) has described as a novel and 
challenging research agenda, that among other aspects should seek more 
understanding on the context of change initiatives, the theory-practice gap and 
how the process evolves over time and is affected by other events and 
circumstances. This relates to the paradigm change in safety science where so-
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called concurrences are seemingly unrelated aspects that can affect each other 
and lead to unforeseeable effects (Hollnagel, 2007). 
 
To investigate change initiatives over time would mean putting the focus on 
preparation or design, communication to employees, execution and the final 
evaluation of the outcome, which also includes the chance of learning from that 
result. The literature review on failed change has identified reasons for failure 
which could be allocated along such a timeline or process. Regardless, the view 
on success also plays a major role, as RE suggests, and applying both micro and 
macro perspectives should also contribute to a more holistic understanding of 
change processes.  
 
4.3 Conclusion for the research 
Based on the literature and the identified gaps and overlaps, there is a need to 
explore failure and success of organisational change along the four cornerstones 
of resilience in a three-level approach as shown in Figure 8.  
 
 
Figure 8: Conceptional model of this study 
This approach allows to investigate failure and success in relation to the four 
cornerstones and via considering the differentiation between micro-ergonomic 
(individual) and macro-ergonomic (organisational) aspects. Assuming this 
perspective, this thesis addresses the following questions: 
 How do successful projects differ from failed ones? 
 To what extent are systemic aspects considered? 
 Which topics emerge on the macro and on the micro level? 
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 To what extent are design aspects considered? 
 What insights does the research provide as far as the difference between 
work as it is done (WAD) versus work as it is imagined (WAI) is concerned? 
 
Chapter five explores what methodological approaches were appropriate in 
understanding research into these questions.  
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5. Research Methodology 
Since research is dedicated to creating new knowledge, Saunders, Lewis, and 
Thornhill (2012) have argued that what is consider acceptable knowledge will 
determine the design of research projects. The design of this study was based on 
an interpretative stance and hence a qualitative methodology. This chapter 
describes the underlying decisions for that choice, what the considerations were 
for data collection, sampling, research quality, data analysis and ethical 
considerations.  
 
5.1 Research philosophy and research approach 
Johnson and Clark (2006) have argued that reflecting on philosophical choices 
and being able to explain or defend them adds to the rigour of a solid research 
project. In this study, it is the paradigm change in safety science which has mainly 
determined these choices. Niglas (2010) sees research philosophies as continua 
rather than as fixed positions and the decision for a specific philosophy will 
therefore depend on the ‘best fit’ because all positions have their supporting 
arguments. The best fit for this study is an interpretative stance because its 
epistemological position is mainly determined by the paradigm change of safety 1 
towards safety 2 and hence a shift from a positivist towards an interpretivist 
philosophy. There are several reasons for this argument: 
 
1. HFE research has been dominated for a long time by a positivist or reductionist 
approach (Nathanael & Marmaras, 2012). Examples of this are the search for root 
causes and the Domino model (Waterson et al., 2015), which belong to the safety 
1 paradigm (Hollnagel, 2014d). In positivism, hypotheses are tested rather than 
new areas explored, mostly quantitative research approaches are used and the 
focus rests on an observable reality as well as on causal relationships (Gill & 
Johnson, 2010). Nathanael and Marmaras (2012) suggested leaving this practice 
because of the HFE research shift to a systemic perspective (Dul et al., 2012) 
where positivism would fit with the search for a root cause but not with concepts 
like emergence (Wilson, 2014) (see Table 1) or the RE focus on the intractable 
nature of complex systems (Hollnagel, 2014d). Haavik (2014) added that a 
fundamental feature of RE ontology is a constructivist stance, which according to 
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Saunders et al. (2012) relates to the philosophical position of interpretivism, in 
which the world is seen from the point of view of the research subject, where the 
world is complex and each situation unique. 
 
2. The paradigm change in safety (see section 2.5) puts emphasis on ‘how work is 
done’ (WAD) and on how humans adapt their performance in order to make ‘things 
go right’. Knowledge that is acceptable from an epistemological point of view is 
therefore knowledge about how work is done and is a preferred approach since 
the lack of adequate vocabulary of performance adjustments is described as an 
important gap by Hollnagel (2014d, p. 156). 
 
The philosophical and methodological aspects of safety 1 and 2 are compared by 
Hollnagel (2014d, p. 128) with regards to ontology (the nature of things), aetiology 
(why and how they work) and phenomenology (their representation in the world) 
by stating that “the aetiology is the way of explaining the phenomenology in terms 
of the ontology”. Table 2 
 provides a summary of this extensive comparison. 
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Description Safety 1 
(Best fit: Positivism) 
Safety 2 
(Best fit: Interpretivism) 
Phenomenology 
The observable 
characteristics or 
manifestations. The 
safety phenotype. 
Adverse outcomes and 
situations where things go 
wrong, e.g. incidents, near 
misses and accidents. Safety is 
present when nothing 
unwanted happens. 
As many acceptable and 
intended outcomes as 
possible while succeeding 
under expected and 
unexpected conditions. Safety 
is present when things go right 
and can be examined by 
observing normal work. The 
adequate vocabulary of 
performance adjustments is 
missing. 
Aetiology 
The origin or cause 
of the observable 
phenomena. The 
safety genotype. 
Assumptions about causality. 
Results (manifestations) can be 
explained by decomposition 
and referring to characteristics 
of components. Represented 
by models, e.g. Swiss cheese 
model. 
Emergence serves as an 
explanation to make sense of 
how something happens 
because linear causality does 
not work. Emergence arises 
from unintended combinations 
of performance variability. 
Resonance replaces pure 
causality as a concept. 
Ontology 
The nature and 
essential 
characteristics of 
safety. What ‘really’ 
goes on. 
The nature of failure includes 
several assumptions: 
- Systems are 
decomposable. 
- Function of components 
can be described in 
bimodal terms. 
- The order in which 
events develop can be 
determined in advance. 
Human performance is 
variable, making the 
bimodality principle obsolete. 
In STS, work situations can be 
intractable and require 
performance adjustments 
while accepting performance 
variability as the norm, not as 
failure of humans or human 
error. 
 
Table 2: Comparing safety 1 and 2 from a research philosophy perspective based on Hollnagel (2014d) 
(summary by the author of this study) 
3. The decision to adopt an interpretative stance can also be explained because 
the two remaining options do not provide the best fit. On the one hand, realism 
would be problematic because it sees reality as independent of the mind (Crotty, 
1998), while this study puts the emphasis on how the research subject sees the 
world. Pragmatism on the other hand would fit the ‘work as done’ (WAD) concept 
of RE, the design orientation of HFE and it could further consider complexity by 
stating that multiple realities allow for different interpretations to exist because 
none gives the entire picture (Kelemen & Rumens, 2008). However, Kelemen and 
Rumens (2008) have also highlighted that pragmatism allows research to move 
between positions like positivism and interpretivism, as e.g. a mixed method 
research can. Considering the above mentioned continua (Niglas, 2010), 
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pragmatism could be used for research with rather unclear borders. However, the 
previous table shows that in this research the borders were not unclear. Moreover, 
this study was approached from the point of view of the change manager (see 
section about population and sample) and as such was based on their 
understanding and experience. Therefore, the best fit was an interpretive stance. 
 
5.1.1 Research approach 
This study did not work inductively, with data as a starting point to build new theory 
(Ketokivi & Mantere, 2010), but incorporated existing knowledge from HFE and RE 
and examined it for application or possible testing in order to explain outcomes of 
change initiatives and at the same time add to or modify existing theory in the field 
of CM. It put emphasis on the context and allowed different views, as an 
interpretivist research framework does, and hence elements of an inductive 
approach were used (Easterby-Smith, Thorpe, & Jackson, 2008). Likewise, it also 
did not work purely deductively by for example comparing and testing premises in 
relation to the collected data (Blaikie, 2009). One reason for this is that 
reductionism is a central principle of a purely deductive approach (Saunders et al., 
2012) and one that RE rejects because of its shortcomings in considering systemic 
aspects like, for example, emergence (Nathanael & Marmaras, 2012). 
 
Therefore, this study adopted an abductive approach containing both deductive as 
well as inductive elements. Instead of moving from theory to data as in deduction 
or from data to theory as in induction, moving between both is a characteristic of 
an abductive approach (Suddaby, 2006). Hence, when the borders appear blurred, 
such an approach seems reasonable and as Saunders et al. (2012) argued, it fits 
research where existing knowledge from one domain is applied to another. 
 
5.2 Methodological choice and research strategy 
Methodological choices do not just refer to a chosen method, as the words might 
suggest, but also to the underlying ontological and epistemological assumptions 
(Jamal & Hollinshead, 2001). One characteristic of good social science, according 
to Flyvbjerg (2006), is a problem-driven methodology. The problem on which this 
study was based is a high rate of failed change initiatives. Seeing this problem in 
the new light of safety 2 and RE meant shifting the focus from just failure to 
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everyday work and ‘how things go right’ and exploring the dynamics of 
performance adjustments. If research intends to investigate dynamics, Bowen 
(2005) argued that a qualitative approach is needed because it is highly sensitive 
to context (Gephart, 2004) and looks into how respondents interpret and make 
sense of situations and in that way construct their reality (Taylor & Bogdan, 1998). 
Hence, because of the selected subjective philosophical position of interpretivism 
and the explorative nature of the research question, a qualitative methodology was 
indicated. 
 
In order to explore failed and successful change projects and also being able to 
further investigate unexpected topics that come up during the research, semi-
structured qualitative interviews seemed appropriate because they combine the 
flexibility of exploration with the rigour of following identified topics from the 
literature review in each interview (King, 2004). 
 
5.3 Population and sample 
Change managers were the population for this study because they are the 
interface between those affected by change and the organisation, while at the 
same time coordinating activities within the change initiative (Raelin & Cataldo, 
2011). As the explorative nature of this research suggested adopting a broad 
perspective, the focus was not limited to a single industry but rather was as wide 
as possible. It was assumed that change projects would be different in each 
industry as far as the content or project type was concerned, but the process of 
change and its challenges, e.g. resistance, might be similar. 
 
Following the conceptual framework of this study, the managers should be able to 
talk about a successful and a failed project. Hence, they should have experience 
with both outcomes and be willing to talk about them. For the analysis to contrast 
‘what goes wrong’ with ‘what goes right’, this criterion was the most important. 
With regard to failure of change, the work of Raelin and Cataldo (2011) suggested 
focusing on middle managers. It was therefore favourable to aim for experienced 
managers because they were likely to have been in the position of a middle 
manager at the time of the projects as opposed to at the time of the interview.  
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Buchanan, Boddy, and McCalman (2013) have suggested that research should be 
opportunistic because even though as a researcher one strives to obtain an ideal 
sample, the reality of business and organisational constraints often dictates 
otherwise and requires lowering one’s sights. Hence and because it has obviously 
been impossible to identify the complete population, convenience sampling 
(Quinlan, Babin, Carr, Griffin, &  , 2015) was selected initially. However, not every 
project seemed suitable, which shifted the focus from the interviewees to the 
projects and extreme or deviant case sampling was used (Patton, 2002). This 
method is used when no typical cases exist and researchers look for ‘what not to 
do’ and for ‘best practice’ (Etikan, Musa, & Alkassim, 2016). This is not only meets 
the demands of an explorative approach but also ties in well with investigating 
failed and successful projects. Those projects, a failed and a successful one from 
each interviewee, should pose sufficient challenges to allow their investigation 
based on the research questions of this study. Therefore, the manager should 
have had enough leverage on design, enough interfaces between micro and 
macro-level needed to be present, complexity and systemic aspects must have led 
to decision making under uncertainty, and project failure should have or did have 
unpleasant consequences. Overall, aspects of organisational resilience and 
adaptiveness could have made or did make a difference, as this is the lens 
through which those projects are investigated. Hence, several interviewees had to 
be excluded due to their projects being inadequate.  
 
In order to derive relevant topics or identify phenomena with relevance, Jansen 
(2010) argued that a sample should consist of at least ten interviewees. This study 
fulfils that requirement, using twelve, but since the focus is on the projects, those 
should be representative. Based on the above described criteria it is argued that 
24 projects or 12 pairs provided the required density to allow a thick description of 
relevant phenomena. To achieve this, the sample size will also be determined by 
saturation, which in the context of this research means that there are no new or 
just isolated random new codings when in addition other topics and codings are 
repeatingly mentioned (Padgett, 2016). The interviews were conducted between 
December 2016 and July 2017. All interviewees were native German speakers, 
allowing the interviews to be conducted in German.  
Table 3 describes the sample in more detail.  
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No. Industry Position, age at time of interview and 
background 
Project type and outcome 
1 Chemical, US 
corporation with 
several sites in 
Germany. At the time 
of the interview one 
small site was to be 
closed and a 
restructuring process 
was about to start. 
Quality Manager (54), had different 
positions in the company over last 
twenty years, was in charge of quality 
department for several years while also 
going through a merger, received 
training on lean and six sigma but would 
have liked more on change 
management 
Successful: Introduction of a new 
technology to become innovation leader 
Failed: Changing cost structure/prizing with 
the consequence of losing important 
customers 
2 Automotive, large 
German enterprise.  
Managing Partner in a Consulting Firm 
for leadership coaching (67), former 
Senior Manager in the automotive 
industry while company was going 
through structural change of 
management system and staffing, got 
more and more interested in training on 
human issues and change which was 
reported as not provided at career start 
(end of 70’) 
Successful: Removing one hierarchical 
/management level  
Failed: Implementation of a new time 
tracking system for employees 
3 Defence; Electronics, 
aviation and security 
division of a 
multinational 
corporation. The 
organisation was 
recently sold to an 
American investor 
and many processes 
had to be adapted. 
Head of Quality Department (57), spent 
last 10+ years in the company, which 
went through several restructuring 
processes and was being sold at time of 
interview, had several management 
positions before being appointed as 
quality manager, reflected much on 
additional training which managers 
apparently have not enough time for 
nowadays, values experiences and 
theory to be balanced 
Successful: Restructuring of order 
management for the entire production 
Failed: Changing processes and reducing 
number of employees 
4 Airline, subsidiary for 
cargo/transportation 
of goods. 
Organisation of about 
150 employees. The 
management 
structure was entirely 
changed two years 
before the interview 
took place. 
CEO of subsidiary (46), while company 
was going through financial difficulties 
all management positions were 
reassigned with the help of an external 
consulting firm, based on their 
assessment he went from head of sales 
to CEO and had to deal with several 
internal conflicts from other managers 
but was backed up by shareholders, 
received additional training e.g. 
intercultural training in preparation for a 
project and coaching, which was much 
valued, would have liked training for 
more holistic leadership competencies 
and best practice  
Successful: Business Reengineering due to 
continuous decrease of revenue 
(subproject)  
Failed: Large cooperation project with 
several competitors (confidential topic and 
content) 
5 Defence; Electronics, 
aviation and security 
division of a 
multinational 
corporation. The 
organisation was 
recently sold to an 
American investor 
and many processes 
had to be adapted. 
Senior Quality Manager (57), spent 
several years in this position and 
experienced same developments as R3, 
was provided with regular training over 
the last years and throughout his 
career, this was to a large part due to 
proactively demanding training and 
actively searching the market for 
adequate courses fitting the needs and 
interests 
Successful: Reduction of quality cost for 
production-wide deviations/faulty products 
Failed: Restructuring of department 
organisation involving replacement of 
employees 
6 Defence, Aviation, 
large corporation 
Senior Manager, Vice President (55), 
several positions in higher management 
including head of business unit and 
head of site, was in charge of some 
critical projects with political 
implications, did not receive specific 
training on change management but 
rather for manging projects but has 
been using consultants as advisors and 
values their contribution as far as 
experience is concerned  
Successful: Organisational change 
(confidential topic and content) 
Failed: Organisational change (confidential 
topic and content) 
7 Defence, Aviation, 
large corporation 
Senior Manager, Vice President (58), 
several positions as senior manager 
including change projects in different 
countries, has received senior 
management training program but 
would have preferred more specific and 
theoretical content on change  
Successful: Integration of two systems into 
firm’s portfolio (confidential topic and 
content) 
Failed: Reorganisation of several divisions 
into a new corporate structure 
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8 IT, multinational 
corporation 
Senior Manager, Vice President (55), 
from a senior management position he 
was appointed to the board of a 
subsidiary/business unit abroad and 
during an economically hard time, from 
there two sites on other continents had 
to be managed, company has provided 
extensive training and much was done 
on soft skills and human issues, R8 has 
a strong emphasis on cooperation and 
ethical considerations  
Successful: Turning a business unit of a 
large corporate into an independent firm 
listed at the stock market 
Failed: General account of difficulties in 
several projects – respondent stated during 
the interview that he has no specific failed 
project to talk about, however, he provided 
many in depth-descriptions of problematic 
projects (longest interview of all) 
9 Financial, large 
national bank. The 
interviewees 
department is one of 
several regional 
business units, 
coordinating the 
branches in those 
regions. The bank 
was in the process of 
closing branches in 
order to adapt to the 
changing financial 
business. 
Senior Manager (VP) in charge of 
business unit (56), has spent his career 
in the bank accessing different 
management positions, much 
experience with change projects which 
led R9 to be convinced of the need to 
consider human issues and subtle 
aspects in their behaviour  
Successful: Change of entire structure of 
the organisation including mergers and 
closing of branches  
Failed: Large reorganisation of process 
structure within a business unit with 
significant involvement of an external 
consulting firm 
10 Automotive, 
multinational German 
based supplier. The 
plant had around 400 
employees and 
rumours existed about 
closing it. It was in 
fact closed 2 years 
after the interview 
took place. 
Plant Manager (54), has received much 
training in preparation for the different 
management positions, no training was 
specifically focused on change, R10 
would have put more emphasis on CM 
and mainly on the consideration of 
human issues and corresponding tools  
Successful: Implementation of lean-
management methods in one plant 
Failed: Reducing sickness absence rate 
11 European Agency. 
Large organisation of 
the EU that went 
through a 
restructuring process. 
Manager (41), has led different projects 
and called own preparation as ‘over-
qualified’ due to extensive training 
history on project management and soft 
skills, senior management is critiqued 
for neglecting human issues while R10 
put much emphasis on cooperation with 
others to counter structural constraints 
Successful: Implementation of changed 
legal framework 
Failed: Reorganisation and cultural change 
12 Defence, Aviation, 
large corporation 
Senior Manager (51), after managing 
different critical projects and not 
receiving any kind of change 
management training during their career 
R12 concluded that such skills and 
knowledge should be a standard 
training with specific focus on managing 
conflicts of interest 
Successful: Reorganisation of a department 
while retaining key personnel 
Failed: Reorganisation of 20 central 
business processes 
 
Table 3: Sample of this study 
 
5.3.1 Context of the study 
All the organisations of the sample are located in Germany. All of them either have 
branches in other countries or belong to large multinational enterprises or conduct 
business on an international level. However, the cultural background of the 
interviewees is German even though many international interfaces exist within the 
projects. A larger scope would have been difficult to achieve within the time frame 
of a DBA programme and due to a then increased challenge of gaining access 
(Buchanan et al., 2013). Table 3 provides background about the organisations. 
Most of them were undergoing larger systemic changes at the time of the interview 
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or had to deal with the effects of recent change, which had significant effects on 
organisation structures and business situations. As a result, within all of the 
change projects, multiple internal and external interfaces had to be considered 
because they affected the project or were expected to do so. Systemic effects and 
complexity could therefore be observed in all projects. Project failure therefore had 
the potential of significantly affecting business or the organisational structure. This 
was most dramatically observed in the case of R10. His plant was closed two 
years after the interview took place. A common characteristic for all projects was 
that with regard to safety and resilience, no respective legal aspects or regulations 
had to be followed. 
 
5.4 Data collection 
The structure of the interviews followed the four cornerstones of resilience in the 
same order for the successful as well as for the failed project. The whole interview 
was introduced with a warm-up question, asking what the managers associate 
with change projects in general. Then specific questions concerning the four 
cornerstones were asked. These questions first addressed general aspects in a 
very open way. Such an approach also allowed making use of the flexibility of 
semi-structured interviews by asking follow-up questions (Corbin & Strauss, 2008).  
 
The cornerstones were addressed in the opposite way as they are usually 
described by starting with learning and then going backwards to responding, 
monitoring and anticipating. This approach was cognitively more demanding and 
did not allow for one topic to be followed from beginning to end in a consistent 
way, countering confirmation bias (Kahneman, 2011).  
 
The last interview question closed the loop by going back to learning again and 
allowed for a summary by elaborating on received training, how useful this training 
was for the two projects in general and what the managers would have needed 
additionally in their role at the time of running the project. Appendix Q lists all 
questions in German language (as they were asked) and in their English 
translation. 
 
 
57 
 
Acknowledging framing effects, but also to overcome possible reluctance to share 
negative details about their failed project, it was decided to start with the 
successful project. However, the interviewees were surprisingly open with regard 
to their failed project. One reason for this could be the confidentiality provided by 
an ethically supervised and clearly documented research process in addition to a 
consistent demonstration of responsible data handling and a visible effort to create 
mutual trust. Another reason could be the interest of interviewees in understanding 
failure and seeking insight for further projects. This argument is supported by the 
fact that most interviewees not only asked for the finished thesis but also for a 
chance to discuss the results.  
As a result of the above, no objections towards audio recording of the interviews 
came up. The total duration of the recordings ranged between 38 and 114 
minutes, with most of them lasting between 60 and 80 minutes. Transcription of 
each interview was performed by a professional service with eighteen years of 
experience at the time and following transcription rules as laid down by Dresing 
and Pehl (2011). Each audio file was sent for transcription within 36h of its 
recording and transcribed not later than five days after receiving the file.  
 
5.5 Quality of the research 
Raimond (1993) pointed out that at the end of a research project results like 
evidence or conclusions will have to stand up against a test of scrutiny, therefore 
every researcher has to allow the critical question of how he or she actually knows 
that what was found is not affected by how he or she sees the research subject. It 
is the aim of this section to show which criteria were used to assure the quality of 
this research project and to describe how these criteria have been applied. 
 
Reliability and validity serve the above purpose but are applied differently in 
qualitative and quantitative research (Quinlan et al., 2015). According to Corbin 
and Strauss (2008) these terms cannot be applied well to qualitative research and 
therefore other concepts should be used. Lincoln and Guba (1985) suggested 
credibility instead of internal validity, transferability instead of external validity and 
dependability instead of reliability. An interpretivist approach might use these 
alternative criteria but could also adapt reliability and validity (Saunders et al., 
2012), which is the position of this study and in line with the suggestion of 
 
58 
 
Peräkylä (2011), that the nature of the research determines which qualitative 
methods are appropriate to test its quality.  
 
5.5.1 Aspects of reliability 
According to Kirk and Miller (1986), reliability refers to the level of independence of 
findings from accidental circumstances of the research. This makes reference to 
the rigour of the research process. If other researchers were to repeat the 
procedure they should obtain consistent results (Quinlan et al., 2015). One 
element that determines the quality of interpretivist research in particular is the 
transparency of the process and design (Leitch, Hill, & Harrison, 2010). Providing 
a detailed description of how data collection was  undertaken as well as a detailed 
account of the data analysis procedures serves that purpose. All of the above 
circle around a consistent point of reference, which are the four cornerstones of 
organisational resilience and its underlying micro- and macroergonomic aspects of 
safety, against which a phenomenon (failed change) in a different field (CM) is 
being explored. This point of reference is also reflected in the coding scheme 
which adds to the transparency criterion by clearly illustrating how sense was 
made of the raw data, a relevant aspect of assessing reliability of a study 
according to Easterby-Smith et al. (2008). 
 
Robson (2004) has warned of threats to reliability of which three were of relevance 
for this study: participant error and bias as well as observer bias. To avoid falling 
victim to participant error, careful emphasis was placed on scheduling time slots 
when the interviewee was not under tension due to preceding or following periods 
of high workload. This also meant avoiding any time constraints that would have 
made the participant want to rush through the interview questions. To counter 
participant bias via saying what interviewees think their bosses want them to say 
or that which is socially accepted or expected, carefully following guidelines of 
ethical scrutiny was paramount. Finally, the countermeasures for observer bias 
included not relying on notes but only the recorded spoken word and following the 
consistent point of reference provided by the four cornerstones of resilience. 
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5.5.2 Aspects of validity 
According to Saunders, Lewis, and Thornhill (2009), validity is present when the 
findings are really about what they intend to be about. Other authors have asked if 
what the researcher is measuring is actually called by the right name (Kirk & Miller, 
1986; Peräkylä, 2011; Silverman, 2015). Explorative research that tries to make 
sense of accounts from respondents and interpret their meanings will therefore 
have to define categories first, and another researcher might come up with 
different categories while describing the same phenomenon.  
Qualitative research also has to overcome the criticism of not being generalisable, 
which in the case of small samples can be done by demonstrating that judgements 
are transferable to other contexts (Guba & Lincoln, 1994). This is achieved by 
developing a ‘thick description’ of experiences within the social world (Geertz, 
1973). The task of a qualitative researcher is therefore to provide “credible, i.e. 
truthful and authentic, accounts of the experiences of research participants” 
(Quinlan et al., 2015, p. 259). In order to provide such a thick description, this 
study made use of communicative, pragmatic and transgressive validity, which 
was meant to justify knowledge that was produced with an interpretive approach 
(Sandberg, 2005). 
 
5.5.2.1 Communicative validity 
A first aspect of communicative validity refers to what Apel (1972) described as a 
community of interpretation and is achieved in the first phase of the interview 
process when the relation with the respondent is being built. When a relation is 
established which is not one-sided, but where an openness to the project exists, 
this criterion is present. In this study almost all respondents were business 
contacts of the researcher’s firm and a professional relationship of trust was 
present in combination with full transparency about the research project. This 
turned out to be a huge asset and added to establishing a community of 
interpretation. All the participants showed interest in the project and most of them 
asked for the opportunity to read the finished result. 
 
A second aspect of communicative validity is coherent interpretation (Sandberg, 
2005). This criterion would for example not be fulfilled if isolated quotes were 
used. In such a case, conflicting interpretations might come up if the context of any 
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preceding dialogue is ignored by the researcher. What happened in some of the 
interviews of this study was that some questions were understood differently by 
the interviewees. This was due to a different meaning that the respondent 
attributed to a certain term e.g. ‘preparation for change’ or what they consider ‘a 
problem’ in their understanding. Consequently, the question was answered from a 
different perspective, a perspective that made sense for that particular person. 
Awareness of such a meaning is of course sought, since the approach is 
interpretative. However, the coherence within the statements has to be assured in 
order to not interpret quotes in isolation based on one’s own method of sense-
making. The semi-structured approach allowed the interviewer to clarify such 
questions immediately. Nevertheless, conflicting interpretations came up and had 
to be compared to the situational context described in the interview. The focus on 
the criterion of coherent interpretation therefore increased the awareness for the 
situational context and clarifying questions were asked. 
 
The last aspect of communicative validity that Sandberg (2005) mentioned is the 
discussion with other researchers and relates to Gadamer (1994), who sees truth 
as something that is achieved through dialogue with people and via the discussion 
with different interpreters in order to allow intersubjective meanings to emerge and 
validate results. Thus, the research findings were discussed with a group of DBA 
students from the same cohort as the researcher and with researchers from other 
fields, for example psychology. 
 
5.5.2.2 Pragmatic validity 
The fact that interviewees often report their experience in a distorted way led 
Alvesson (2003) to see discrepancies between interviewees’ accounts and their 
actual experience as a threat to validity. Therefore, knowledge that has been 
produced in action can be tested by using the concept of pragmatic validity (Kvale, 
1989). One possibility for this is to ask follow-up questions (Sandberg, 2005), 
which as has already been argued above, is a strength of using semi-structured 
interviews. 
 
Kvale (1989) suggested a second method to achieve pragmatic validity via 
confronting interview partners with an interpretation of a particular statement and 
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then observing their behaviour in order to check that statement. The following 
excerpt, translated by the researcher from German to English, belongs to 
respondent R6 and illustrates how this technique was applied and thus served to 
clarify statements and seek coherence: 
“R6: ….and the constant wondering at year’s end was nothing new at that 
time, but then usually safety margins were used, well this was not ‘face to 
reality’. 
I: Do you mean that buffers were used instead of the real numbers? 
R6: Yes exactly. And everyone used such a buffer, which was not 
transparent to the others. 
I: Because of fear that one would not get enough or why was that? 
R6: No, buffers are used to, let me put it this way, have options, well 
actually mitigating risks, but, if everyone does that the buffer adds up and 
gets too large.” 
Sandberg’s (2005) third way of validating interpretations, observation, could not be 
applied in this research. 
 
5.5.2.3 Transgressive validity 
The focus on communicative and pragmatic validity includes the risk of 
overlooking aspects of complexity, ambiguity and multiple meanings within the 
investigation of peoples’ lived experience (Sandberg, 2005). Transgressive validity 
therefore looks for inconsistencies and contradictions, allowing the researcher to 
become aware of the taken-for-granted framework of respondents and their 
resulting assumptions and interpretations (Lather, 1995; Richardson, 1993). Thus, 
follow-up questions in the interviews strove not only for coherent interpretation 
(communicative validity) but also for inconsistencies in order to access 
respondents’ view of the world from a different perspective. 
 
In addition to the search for inconsistencies, Lather (1993) suggested emphasising 
female perspectives where possible because in the author’s opinion producing 
scientific knowledge in western culture is to a large extent primed by male 
 
62 
 
influence. This, as a consequence, has motivated the researcher of this study to 
look for a female interviewee because initially all of the participants were men. 
 
5.6 Data analysis 
The data analysis of this study is presented in chapter six and seven, and contains 
the description and interpretation of findings (chapter 6) as well as the conclusion 
and theorisation (chapter 7), which together comprise the analytical framework as 
proposed by Quinlan et al. (2015). The research uses qualitative content analysis 
to make sense of the interview data in a systematic way, a procedure that allows 
flexible adaptation since it is not bound by rigid techniques (Mayring, 2014). This 
approach offers an understanding of social reality in a subjective and yet scientific 
manner where valid inference and interpretation condense raw interview data into 
categories or themes (Zhang & Wildemuth, 2009). 
 
Qualitative content analysis allows making use of inductive as well as deductive 
reasoning (Mayring, 2008) and therefore seems the best fit for the abductive and 
explorative nature of this study. The degree to which inductive reasoning is 
involved in a study’s analysis has been discussed by Hsieh and Shannon (2005) 
with three different approaches (conventional, directed and summative), from 
which the directed approach best describes this study. In this approach categories 
are not just emerging via careful analysis of the content (conventional approach) 
but are deductively based on existing theory (of the four cornerstones) while at the 
same time staying flexible for inductive reasoning when new categories emerge or 
existing ones are changed (Zhang & Wildemuth, 2009). 
 
This study followed the eight steps for qualitative content analysis described by 
Zhang and Wildemuth (2009), starting with preparing the data (step 1) as 
transcripts and defining the units of analysis (step 2) as quotes consisting of single 
words, sentences or even paragraphs as long as they are expressing an idea 
(Minichiello & Aroni, 1990). The initial categories and coding scheme (step 3) have 
emerged from the literature review or the theoretical framework (Quinlan et al., 
2015), which are mainly the four cornerstones of resilience and the safety 2 
perspective with its focus on success and failure. The directed approach uses 
existing theory or research as coding categories (Potter & Levine‐Donnerstein, 
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1999) and has thus been called deductive category application by Mayring (2008). 
The initial categories for this study together with the coding scheme are described 
in  
Table 4 and were based on Hollnagel (2011a). 
Category Sub-category Coding scheme 
Learning [ L ]  
The ‘factual’. How the organisation or its members create 
knowledge about what has happened  
 
Individual (success) 
[ L-1-S ] Evaluation of the change project from the individual 
perspective of the interviewee.  Individual (failure) 
[ L-1-F ] 
 
Organisation (success) 
[ L-2-S ] How the organisation gets insights from change initiatives e.g. 
how reporting works in general/ this project or consequences 
for processes and organisational structure. Organisation (failure) 
[ L-2-F ] 
Responding 
[R] 
 
The ‘actual’. The competencies of the organisation on what to 
do, e.g. activate ready-made responses, have the resources 
to do it and adjust the way things are done. 
 
Organisation,actions  
 (success) [ R-1-S ] What was done by the organisation, why there was a need to 
act and how it was triggered. Organisation, actions 
(failure) [ R-1-F ] 
 
Individual, actions  
 (success) [ R-2-S ]  What was done by the change manager, why there was a 
need to act and how it was triggered. Individual, actions  
 (failure) [ R-2-F ] 
Monitoring 
[M] 
 
The ‘critical’. The competencies of the organisation to know 
what to look for. 
 
Organisational indicators 
(success) [ M-1-S ] Institutionalized indicators determined by processes, rules, 
procedures and organisational structure indicators and how 
they are measured. Organisational indicators 
(failure) [ M-1-F ] 
 
Individual indicators 
(success) [ M-2-S ] Indicators based on individual experience or of significance to 
the interviewee. Individual indicators 
(failure) [ M-2-F ] 
 Anticipating 
[A] 
 
The ‘potential’. The competencies of the organisation to know 
what to expect e.g. perception range of the organisation 
concerning threats, hazards and risks. 
 
Organisational 
awareness for the future 
(success) [ A-1-S ] 
Which procedures exist to identify future events, 
developments and changes of state that affected the system 
in a positive or negative way and how were they applied 
(independent of the result)? 
Organisational 
awareness for the future 
(failure) [ A-1-F ] 
 
Individual awareness for 
the future (success) 
[ A-2-S ] How did the interviewee approach and anticipate future 
developments and how did this contribute to the project 
result? Individual awareness for 
the future  
(failure) [ A-2-F ] 
 
Individual preparation 
[ P-1 ] 
Competencies or training activities beneficial for managing 
change initiatives. 
 
Organisational  
preparation [ P-2 ] 
Application of organisational support and resources. 
 
Table 4: Initial categories and coding scheme 
The coding scheme was tested (step 4) on a sample, which in this case was two 
complete interview transcripts, a procedure that ensures coding consistency (Miles 
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& Huberman, 1994; Weber, 1990), before all remaining interviews were coded 
(step 5) and then checked again for coding consistency (step 6). The last two 
steps are presentation and discussion of findings (step 7) and finally reporting the 
method together with the result of the study (step 8) (Zhang & Wildemuth, 2009). 
Zhang and Wildemuth (2009) see step 7 as most critical and depending heavily on 
the reasoning abilities of the researcher, this is mainly because step 7 makes 
reference to all four parts of the analytical framework of Quinlan et al. (2015). 
 
Hsieh and Shannon (2005) argued that the directed approach can refine, extend 
or enrich existing theory when the findings are discussed in the light of prior 
research or theory. The coding procedure therefore needs careful consideration as 
existing theory might bias the coding process. So instead of directly using the 
initial coding scheme, which is one of two methods described by Hsieh and 
Shannon (2005), a second method was used in this study where quotes were 
marked or highlighted first and then coded when the transcript was read for the 
second time while any text that did not fit the existing categories would then be 
assigned with a new category. This procedure adds to neutrality or confirmability 
of trustworthiness which according to Lincoln and Guba (1985) corresponds to the 
concept of objectivity in quantitative studies. 
 
The resulting structure of research, based on steps 4,5 and 6, is shown in  
 Table 5. This structure differentiates between individual and organisational 
aspects of failed and successful projects along the four cornerstones. The quotes 
within these sixteen different bo  xes were then analysed by an open coding 
approach to identify themes for the different combinations e.g. individual 
responding in failed projects. Several categories of themes emerged, e.g. 
“adaptive behaviour”, and some of the themes within them could be further 
grouped. Step 6 (checking for consistency) had to be applied to all the themes as 
well, which resulted in several iterative cycles until a level of consistency was 
achieved that allowed comparing successful and failed projects as well as 
identifying patterns of similar themes along the four cornerstones. 
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 Successful projects Failed projects 
Monitoring 
Individual aspects Individual aspects 
Organisational aspects Organisational aspects 
Responding 
Individual aspects Individual aspects 
Organisational aspects Organisational aspects 
Anticipating 
Individual aspects Individual aspects 
Organisational aspects Organisational aspects 
Learning 
Individual aspects Individual aspects 
Organisational aspects Organisational aspects 
 
 Table 5: Final research structure 
 
The description of data, as the first part of the analytical framework, presents the 
findings about failed and successful projects from a safety perspective. These are 
then interpreted in the second part via the identification of patterns among failed 
and successful projects as well as between them. The contents of chapter six are 
the findings and their interpretations. The conclusion (part three of the analytical 
framework) intends to answer the research question and is found in chapter seven 
together with the contribution to theory (part four). 
 
5.7 Research ethics 
Lee (2008) argued that ethical considerations have to underpin all research in 
order to not hurt participants nor anyone else, which is why research has to be 
undertaken in an open and honest way. In order to gain insights about outcomes 
and processes of change projects from managers that were in charge of these 
projects, ethical issues were a central consideration. Aspects like consent, 
anonymity, organisational data and confidentiality play an important role if the 
results of these projects are circulated.  
 
The study sought consent from all interviewees as well as their organisations. 
Each interviewee was given background information as well as an invitation letter 
(appendix R) and a copy of the consent form. Copies of these consent forms have 
been retained. Since the study is interested in the general aspects of failed and 
successful change initiatives under a safety perspective, no need exists to identify 
individuals nor organisations. Some of the projects, however, deal with a 
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significant economic dimension as well as security related aspects. For this 
reason, careful emphasis was placed on making it impossible to identify specific 
project or organisational knowledge from the presentation of research findings. 
Consent was formally granted in writing by the ethics committee of the University 
of Portsmouth on 12th December 2016. The ethics application can be found under 
reference number E418 (appendix T). 
 
5.8 Summary 
The paradigm shift occurring in the field of HFE leading away from the safety 1 
approach towards the safety 2 approach, such as RE, suggests a field in flux. 
Given this, the resulting lack of coherent scientific vocabulary, the tradition of 
constructivism in HFE and the focus on lived experience (work as done), a 
qualitative approach was determined to be most effective for this study. In light of 
the theoretical grounding offered by the four cornerstones of RE, a purely inductive 
approach appeared suboptimal, but the aforementioned lack of clear scientific 
terms as well as the desired systemic approach precluded the use of deductive, 
reductionist methods, leading to an abductive approach for the current study.  
 
Twelve semi-structured interviews were conducted with change managers on the 
subject of one failed and one successful past project each. The resulting interview 
text was analysed for content matching to the four cornerstones of RE per project, 
which was in turn categorized as either from an organisational (macro) or 
individual (micro) perspective, resulting in a total of sixteen subcategories. 
Thereafter, the individual contents of each subcategory were further analysed 
using an open coding approach to generate themes pertaining to the respective 
subcategory. The process was iterated until all themes were consistent. Finally, 
patterns in the presence or absence of themes for the subcategories were sought 
out and interpreted with a view to the stated research questions. 
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6. Findings 
This chapter presents the findings of the research and constitutes the first part of 
the analytical framework. The findings within the four cornerstones (monitoring, 
responding, anticipating and learning) are described and interpreted. The 
differences and similarities between failed and successful projects from two 
perspectives, the individual and the organisational, are highlighted.  
 
The themes that were found for each cornerstone are organized into categories of 
themes that support analysis and are all explained in respective tables 
(appendices I - P). In addition, similar themes within those categories were 
grouped to further identify patterns between failed and successful projects and 
between the individual and the organisational perspectives.  
 
In cases where interviewees were asked about the organisational perspective but 
responded by taking the individual one, or vice versa, the themes resulting from 
their responses are presented under the section fitting to that perspective, rather 
than the one the interviewer asked about. 
 
6.1 The Monitoring Perspective 
The monitoring cornerstone focuses on the awareness of relevant changes in the 
environment and the organisation. This awareness can have an effect on the 
development and the outcome of a change project. The monitoring perspective is 
concerned with the question of what needs to be looked at and the indicators of a 
positive or negative project development. It also looks at how those indicators are 
used and acted upon by the organisation or the change manager. The combined 
analysis of failed and successful projects also allowed a focus on aspects that 
were not perceived, not examined or actually ignored. 
 
Appendix H shows the breakdown in distribution of quotes and themes, analysed 
by project outcome. Several quotes were assigned to more than one theme 
because they were sometimes intertwined and therefore hard to separate.  
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The distribution to either failed or successful projects reveals a tendency to focus 
on success at the organisational level. As interviewees were open about both 
kinds of projects, it is unlikely that active attempts to conceal failure are 
responsible for this tendency. It could be due to an unconscious aversion to failure 
or an unconscious attraction towards success, or post-hoc rationalization 
(Kahneman, 2011).  
 
6.1.1 The individual monitoring perspective 
The themes identified within the individual perspective are organized into five 
categories ( 
Table 6). Four of these describe indicators that relate to the manager themselves 
(individual aspects), as well as other people (human aspects), the organisation 
including higher management (organisational aspects) and the project itself 
(project aspects).  
 
These four represent the ‘what’ and symbolize what was of relevance for the 
interviewees and hence, what they were looking for. The fifth category has a 
dynamic or systemic orientation and describes the processes or ‘how’ things and 
indicators were monitored and made sense of by each interviewee. The numbers 
in brackets behind the themes indicate how often each theme was found.  
 
While exploring the monitoring aspects, three findings surfaced that unveil new 
facets about some of the gaps discussed in the literature review. These findings 
concern (i) change managers’ unbalanced view about outcomes, (ii) their ability to 
consider people issues for monitoring and (iii) their limited ability to self-criticise. 
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Table 6: Themes identified within the individual monitoring perspective 
 
The first finding relates to an imbalance in the negative aspects of successful 
projects and the positive aspects of failed projects. Interviewees were asked which 
indicators they were looking for. Indicators that refer to outcomes dominate while 
those that refer to the process appear much less often. In addition, the 
interviewees had a strong tendency to mention negative aspects of failed projects 
and positive aspects of successful projects. Since the interviews refer to events in 
the past this can be due to a simple case of outcome bias that could be clarified 
via research during an actual project. However, there are some indications for 
additional effects related to this phenomenon: (i) lack of monitoring competencies 
and (ii) delayed effects which are difficult to monitor. 
 
Lack of monitoring competencies. One of the few comments about negative 
indications in a successful project that showed a lack of monitoring competencies 
came from R12, who had difficulties in recognizing information conveyed by 
means of rumours:  
“As far as the problematic aspects of this project are concerned, rumours 
were actually the only indicators. This is bad because you have to react to 
Monitoring (Individual perspective) 
Individual  
aspects 
Human aspects 
(others/staff) 
Organisational 
aspects 
Project  
aspects 
Monitoring process 
and interpretation 
aspects 
Successful projects 
Low stress (1) 
 
Limited awareness 
of human aspects 
(1) 
Active participation of 
staff (7) 
 
Visible competence (2) 
 
Lack of knowledge 
(1) 
Confirmed planning (1) 
 
Difficulties overcome (1) 
 
Increased KPI  
measurement (1) 
 
Rumours about 
difficulties (1) 
Open communication (1) 
 
Perceived cooperation (4)  
 
Seeking regular 
feedback/exchange (6) 
Failed projects 
Self-critique (1) 
 
Difficulties not  
recognized (1) 
 
Take for granted  
attitude (1) 
Human limitations (2) 
 
Humans as indicators for 
difficulties (3) 
 
No active reporting (1) 
 
Reduced participation 
(3) 
Lack of knowledge 
(1) 
Inappropriate design (2) 
 
Lack of strategic focus 
(1) 
 
Target(s) not reached (1) 
Delayed negative effects 
(3) 
 
Insufficient implementation 
(1) 
 
Lack of cooperation and  
communication (4) 
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them and they came up because we were unable to deal with setbacks and 
difficulties in the first place.” 
Delayed effects. The second aspect relates to the delayed effects of 
interventions, surfacing at a time when a simple cause-effect relationship was hard 
to identify or when the lag was very long. R9 named an example involving delayed 
effects of consultants:  
”...after some time, at least one year after the consulting firm left, we noted 
that sustainability was missing.“  
This quote shows an example of the gaps described in section 3.3. It is illustrative 
of the long-term effects of intervention, in combination with an underestimation of 
the complexity involved in systemic thinking. This goes beyond mere cause-effect 
relations. 
 
The second and most surprising finding surrounds change managers’ ability to 
monitor people issues and by doing so, gain access to predictive information. It 
was interesting to note descriptive rather than blaming language when 
interviewees were referring to other people and employees, mainly as far as their 
performance and limitations were concerned. One of the interviewees (R7) 
described behaviour of employees, in retrospect, as the most important indicator 
for difficulties. One should be wary of the outcome bias when seeing past 
behaviour as an indication for failure. However, the above suggests that 
employees can serve as early warning indicators, allowing management to 
become aware of existing difficulties within change projects.  
 
With regard to the managers’ ability to perceive people aspects, two themes 
recurred throughout the individual monitoring aspects of the dataset: (i) 
participation of employees and (ii) their level of cooperation as perceived by the 
managers. It seems that both can serve as predictive indicators for success as 
well as for failure.  
 
Participation of employees. On the one hand active participation was described 
by R5 in his successful project by saying:  
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“... that the colleagues were present every Friday afternoon in the meeting 
… that they took the topic seriously and that they pushed the change 
forward within their departments.”  
On the other hand, it was reduced participation that indicated to the then senior 
manager R6 that the project was heading in a negative direction:  
“You perceive it via the enthusiasm during meetings … when only two or 
three show up … than you are just about to bury that topic.” 
Level of cooperation. A positive example of cooperation was mentioned by R7 
who described becoming aware that a project suddenly seemed to have positive 
flow:  
“Me and my team sat down early, and we defined roles and responsibilities 
and an overall project plan. It was this moment when I realised, ok, trust is 
present”  
A contrasting effect was experienced by R5 in a failed project, when he had to shift 
employees between departments and was confronted with a lack of cooperation 
the moment he tried to get qualified staff from another unit: 
“...the department which had to provide those people constantly had 
excuses about why it was not possible ... “ 
Participation of employees and their level of cooperation seem to have indicative 
potential for positive as well as for negative outcomes of projects. In addition, 
managers have been shown to possess the skills or the potential ability to 
recognize such aspects. 
 
The last finding in this section highlights a discrepancy. The respondents reported 
their experience about both types of projects openly, yet only put a limited focus 
on their own negative contributions. R3’s quote was one of only two were 
managers expressed a critical view of their own performance, perception or 
attitude. In his position as senior quality manager he appeared to have a ´take for 
granted´ attitude that things would work out. He assumed that his decision would 
be implemented correctly and that kept him from monitoring events. The project 
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involved changing processes while also cutting the workforce. After explaining the 
situation and being asked if he had realised what was going on, he said:  
 
“No absolutely not. Because there was one thing I did not do, continue 
considering this aspect. I mean, I initiated the whole thing by launching the 
project and did not check on it afterwards but only realised weeks or even 
months later, that it is absolutely not working.” 
It cannot be deduced from the interview data why managers apparently lack a 
critical monitoring focus on themselves or why they did not speak about it. The 
high rate of failure, however, suggests that there is more to this. 
 
Findings within the individual monitoring perspective 
1. Change managers’ focus rests mainly on outcomes. Two difficulties 
seem related to this observation: (i) indicators that are available but not 
within their scope of monitoring and (ii) long-term effects and relations 
are sometimes overlooked. 
2. Change-managers are sensitive to human performance and the 
limitations of staff with two striking aspects that seem to serve as bi-
directional predictive indicators for both success and failure: cooperation 
and active participation of staff. 
3. Change-managers talk openly about projects but do not apply much 
self-criticism. 
 
Table 7: Summary of findings within the individual monitoring perspective  
 
6.1.2 The organisational monitoring perspective 
The themes of the organisational monitoring perspective are organized into three 
categories. They are presented in Table 8 and Table 9 below (split in two tables 
for better comprehension). The previous distinction between the ‘what’ and the 
‘how’ was also used for the organisational perspective, but only two categories of 
indicators (for the ‘what’) seemed appropriate, those that were institutionalised as 
key performance indicators (KPI) and those which were not (perceived aspects). 
Some categories contain themes surrounding similar ideas. Those themes were 
grouped e.g. into soft and hard KPI. As some KPIs were mentioned as positive 
factors in successful projects and as negative factors in failed projects depending 
on their specific values, a (+) or (-) behind some KPI indicates a positive or 
negative evaluation of that KPI.  
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The findings of the organisational monitoring perspective show (i) what 
organisations are monitoring, (ii) that qualitative indicators are often neglected and 
(iii) that a shared understanding contributes to project success. 
 
Monitoring in successful projects (organisational 
perspective) 
Measured indicators 
(institutionalized) 
The “What” 
Perceived indicators 
(non-institutionalized) 
The “What” 
Process and interpretation 
The “How” 
Planning confirmed (1) 
Targets reached/positive 
results (5) 
Significant positive external  
feedback (2) 
Active participation of staff (2) 
 
Focus on opportunities (1)  
Follow standards (1) 
KPI (hard) Social processes 
Absence rate (+) (1) 
Break-even (+) (1) 
Cost (+) (3)  
Economic non-specified (+) 
(5) 
Milestones/deadlines (+) (4)  
Number of customers (+) 
(1) 
Quality of data (+) (1) 
Regulation adherence (1) 
Revenue (+) (1)  
Stock (+) (1) 
Aim for SMM (3) 
Regular/high rate of exchange (3)  
Seeking feedback (2) 
Aspects of higher management 
Management support (1)  
Open upward reporting (1) 
Insufficient information/support mgt. (1) 
KPI (soft) Measurement and process 
Customer satisfaction (+) 
(2) 
Passion score staff (+) (1) 
Automated measurement/interpretation (1) 
Improved measurement tool (1) 
Increased rate of measurement (1) 
 
Table 8: Themes within the organisational monitoring perspective (successful projects) 
 
Monitoring in failed projects (organisational 
perspective) 
Measured indicators 
(institutionalized) 
The “What” 
Perceived indicators 
(non-institutionalized) 
The “What” 
Process and interpretation 
The “How” 
KPI (hard) Culture/goal misalignment (2) 
Difficulties not recognized (3) 
Informal/semiformal reporting 
(1) 
Limited social awareness (1) 
Aspects of higher management 
Absence rate (-) (3)  
Economic non-specified 
(-)(3) 
Insufficient information/support mgt. (2) 
Targets not reached/ 
insufficient results (5) 
Measurement and process 
Ignoring discrepancies (2)  
KPI/Indicators without enough 
interpretation (3) 
 
Table 9: Themes within the organisational monitoring perspective (failed projects) 
 
 
74 
 
The first major finding of the organisational monitoring perspective relates to what 
is being measured by the organisation. Both types of projects showed a set of 
common and different monitoring aspects: (i) the type of indicator and (ii) the 
project outcome. 
 
Type of indicator. Leading indicators, those that show in what direction a project 
is heading, are significantly scarce and were hardly mentioned at all. Basically, all 
indicators that were mentioned by the interviewees were lagging indicators with 
varying lags between events in the past and the moments of measurement. It is 
very interesting to note that of these indicators, some were perceived but not 
formally measured.  
 
A good example of a concurrent but not formally measured indication is active 
participation of staff. This example was mentioned by R11, who works for a 
European agency: 
“…we had people, who identified themselves with the project to such a 
degree that we had to send them home when they were ill...”. 
Another indication that was not formally measured was cultural misalignment, 
described in the quote of R9, a senior manager in a large financial institute:  
“I could see how the desired speed and the envisaged rate of new contracts 
and revenue caused much trouble among employees. This relates to the 
culture. Every branch has a different one and also a unique understanding 
of how to position themselves in the market. A project like this can have a 
huge effect on that. But nobody wanted that. Sure, they had the will to 
become better but not at the cost of their culture.” 
If a formal measurement had been available, these aspects would have allowed 
concurrent (real time) and even predictive assertions about the project. 
The second interesting observation about indicator types is the tendency towards 
hard facts in successful projects. Six times more hard KPIs were named there. 
Organisations seem to be better at measuring success or they rather are looking 
for success and its confirmation.  
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Project outcome. The focus on the project result seems to be equally important 
regardless of whether it was successful or failed. An equal number of quotes 
addressed the result for both types of project outcomes. However, R3, a senior 
quality manager in the defence industry, literally stated that success has many 
fathers but failure has only one. What is echoed in this quote seems to be a 
general aversion to failure as far as monitoring its’ development is concerned. A 
potential negative project outcome seemingly reduces the monitoring intensity. 
This is evidenced by twice as many quotes, three times more KPIs and six times 
more different themes in successful projects.  
 
An explanation for the low intensity of measuring negative indications could be that 
they are being supressed or even repressed. However, it seems more likely that 
organisations have limited awareness or inadequate detecting instruments for 
perceiving difficulties and threats of failure within change projects. This argument 
is supported by the fact that many different KPIs were mentioned in successful 
projects, but none indicated negative or critical elements. Interestingly, no positive 
indicators were mentioned in the failed projects.  
 
The overreliance on lagging indicators ties in well with the strong focus on results 
because both refer to the past. The generally low number of perceived aspects 
indicate yet unexploited potential for recognizing difficulties within change projects. 
This study has shown a low emphasis on this type of monitoring function. 
Organisations could benefit from exploiting the potential of perceived aspects if 
they were to be measured by any means. The following table summarises the 
above findings. 
 
Successful change projects Failed change projects 
No focus on negative indicators No focus on positive indicators 
Overreliance on outcomes 
Overreliance on hard facts (KPIs) and lagging indicators 
 
Table 10: Common and different aspects of organisational monitoring functions 
 
The second finding of this section sheds light on some organisational 
shortcomings. They refer to the ability to recognize difficulties and the will to act 
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upon them. In some of the failed projects, relevant indications were noticed but not 
interpreted or acted upon. Talking about this issue, a senior manager in the 
defence industry (R12) said:  
 
“The risks of this project were indeed identified correctly, also the mitigation 
actions, but they were not put into practice … So, everybody was pleased 
that it was dead calm, and all of them have interpreted that silence, 
knowingly or unknowingly or even in spite of knowing better, as if saying all 
is going well, isn’t it?” 
R12 does not explicitly mention reasons for this behaviour except for one 
comment about not being politically adequate. This could imply conflicting goals or 
sparing additional effort. 
 
The data set provided a second explanation why indicators are not interpreted and 
that is a lack of competencies. This is condensed into a short quote by a plant 
manager in the automotive industry (R10) who noted: 
“So, there actually were indicators, but I think they could not be grasped 
well.“ 
This view of lacking competencies also surfaced in the project of R7, a senior vice 
president who faced a corporate restructuring project that never delivered the 
desired results and was finally stopped:  
“If anyone would have taken a close look into the information about risks 
and opportunities, implying of course that one could even read or interpret 
them correctly, and then combine this with the results that did or did not 
come, it was obvious that this structure will fail due to economic reasons.” 
Both aspects mentioned above, ignoring indicators and lack of competencies, are 
to some extent named as critical failure factors by Decker et al. (2012) e.g. ‘lack of 
competent staff’ and ‘alignment’ but are not made explicit as an organisational 
phenomenon. 
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The third and final finding of the organisational monitoring perspective describes 
the positive effects of a high rate of communicative exchange in combination with 
the effort to achieve a shared mental model (SMM) of the project. Given that the 
appropriate aspects are being monitored, two preconditions are required to trigger 
activities: (i) exchange and (ii) shared understanding. One of the interviewees (R4) 
was confronted in his new position as sales director with a series of internal 
conflicts and declining revenue while having to restructure the business model. He 
pointed out the combined need for exchange and shared understanding: 
“We had many regular meetings, a meeting structure and regular exchange. 
Twice per year there was a worldwide meeting for all of us, to talk about 
problems, new directions, what goes wrong and what goes right. We put 
much effort into face to face meetings even though it consumed time that 
cannot be spent with customers. But all of this was much needed because 
we had to bring people back together and give them a shared 
understanding of the situation.”  
Findings within the organisational monitoring perspective 
1. The awareness of negative aspects in successful projects and positive 
aspects in failed projects is low. Organisations have an overreliance on lagging 
indicators, hard facts (KPIs) and outcomes but no formalised monitoring 
function for considering some aspects that are perceivable by employees. 
2. Organisations seem to have a tendency of neglecting and not addressing 
qualitative indicators for difficulties even though they were correctly identified. 
Those indicators have the potential to predict a negative project development. 
Two reasons were found: (i) ignoring due to conflicting political interests and (ii) 
a lack of monitoring ability. 
3. The effort of creating a shared mental model (SMM) via project related 
communication seems to be a factor for predicting project success. 
 
Table 11: Summary of findings within the organisational monitoring perspective  
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6.1.3 Summary  
Roughly dividing this cornerstone into the ‘what’ and the ‘how’ has helped to 
describe the monitoring function of an organisation as one element of its adaptive 
capacity. The main finding seems to be that humans and human activity, mainly 
through the rate of participation and cooperation, has a large potential to indicate 
the direction that a project is taking. However, the organisation seems to focus 
much more on hard and formalized indications and their measurement neglects 
the potential that people have in recognising difficulties or in serving as indicators 
for difficulties. Part of this stems from the seemingly unexploited capacity that the 
change manager seems to have of recognising what is going on as far as ‘people 
issues’ are concerned. While the literature review about CM failure has shown that 
such irregularities exist, no tool nor method seems to exist to grasp or 
operationalise this phenomenon. Furthermore, the idea of having success factors 
together with relations and interdependencies among them shall be investigated 
within the remaining cornerstones, particularly with regard to their potential as a 
contributor to the concept of critical failure factors. 
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6.2 The responding perspective 
The responding cornerstone is about detecting the need to act and taking 
adequate actions. The responding perspective in a change project is concerned 
with the adaptive capacity of both the change manager and the organisation. 
Responding can be triggered by a disruptive event or when monitored aspects 
suddenly become critical.  
 
This cornerstone delivered a high number of quotes and themes (Appendix H). 
Although adaptive activities can in principle be present in failed projects and non-
adaptive ones in successful projects, the tendency to focus towards success seen 
in the monitoring perspective was observed here as well.  
 
6.2.1 The individual responding perspective 
The themes within the individual perspective are organized into three categories 
(Table 12, Table 13). The first two contain themes describing adaptive and non-
adaptive behaviour of interviewees. The third category contains themes describing 
the relation of the interviewees towards their management. 
 
The findings of this section cover (i) management support, (ii) what managers are 
aware of, (iii) the proactive attitude of the change manager, (iv) the consideration 
of other people and (v) design-oriented adjustments. 
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Responding in successful projects (individual 
perspective) 
Adaptive behaviour/capacity 
Non-adaptive 
behaviour/capacity 
Relation to 
management 
Awareness Positive effects 
Re-evaluate current approach (2) 
Awareness of social dynamics (7) 
Awareness of own emotions (1) 
SMM on difficulties (2) 
Awareness on human resources (1) 
Long-term thinking (1) 
Lack of awareness of social 
dynamics (1) 
Request direct management 
support (1) 
Open upward reporting (3) 
Top management support 
(1) 
Direct management support 
(2) 
 
Coordination and leadership 
Pursue goals determinedly (3) 
Active participation (hands on) (2) 
Seek lateral cooperation (1) 
Managing needs of stakeholder (2) 
Establish shared vocabulary (1) 
Adapting structures and processes (10) 
Realise failure and take corrective 
action (2) 
Proactive adjustment (competent risk 
taking) (3) 
Cooperative decision making (1) 
Lack of lateral 
coordination/cooperation from 
others (1) 
Proactive adjustments but risking 
negative outcomes (1) 
Management of staff Negative effects 
Show trust to employees (1) 
Empower staff (2) 
Competence based allocation of staff (3) 
Keep staff updated (2) 
Direct interaction with affected staff (8) 
Culture of fear (1) Lack of direct management 
support (2) 
Helpful activities and support 
Objective approach (1) 
External help (coaching) (3) 
Accepting and dealing with uncertainty 
(2) 
 
 
Table 12: Themes within the individual responding perspective (successful projects) 
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Responding in failed projects (individual perspective)  
Adaptive behaviour/capacity 
Non-adaptive 
behaviour/capacity 
Relation to 
management 
Awareness 
 
Positive effects 
Awareness of social dynamics (2) 
Re-evaluate current approach (1) 
Awareness of failure /not reaching 
goal (1) 
Awareness/management of negative 
emotions (1) 
Lack of awareness of social 
dynamics (1) 
Lack of awareness of culture (2) 
Not understanding 
dynamics/problem (1) 
Negative emotions (3) 
Direct management 
support (1) 
 
Coordination and leadership 
Realise failure and take corrective 
action (1) 
Seek coordination with affected parties 
(2) 
Keep going attitude (perseverance) (2) 
Lack of lateral 
coordination/cooperation 
from others (4) 
Keep going attitude (firefighting) (3) 
Management of staff Negative effects 
Direct interaction with affected staff (4) 
Support cooperation within team (2) 
Consider needs of staff (1) 
 Lack of direct 
management support (2) 
Lack of top management 
support (1) Helpful activities and support 
Motivation and proactive behaviour (1)  
 
Table 13: Themes within the individual responding perspective (failed projects) 
 
The first finding in this section concerns management support, a recurring topic in 
the CM literature. Themes about support were found independently of the project 
result. Management support was consistently described as having positive effects 
when present and negative effects when missing, unsurprisingly the former more 
in successful projects and the latter in failed. 
 
However, the surprising finding is that the change manager can activate that 
support by adopting an active role. An example of this is how R12 actively 
requested support and concluded: 
“…because many stakeholders are not aware of their role and the influence 
they have, right? They, for whatever reason, do not see the need for 
it…They underestimate their effect to reinforce and amplify.” 
This active role of the manager is reflected in open upward reporting. R4 describes 
the relationship to higher management in a critical business reengineering project: 
“Well, I always had a large forum and could report directly to the 
shareholders, they could ask direct questions in return and there was no 
whispering down the lane.”  
 
82 
 
Although the lack of management support may cause failure, an active change 
manager can influence whether such support occurs. Blaming upper management 
alone is short-sighted. 
The remaining findings in this section are all related to adaptive responding as 
reflected in the first two categories. A general observation is that ‘adaptive 
behaviour/capacity’ significantly predominates in the successful projects as 
compared to the failed ones. The opposite relationship can be observed for failed 
projects. A good example is group ‘coordination and leadership’ for successful 
projects. While the total count for adaptive behaviour is 25, it is only 2 for non-
adaptive behaviour (see appendix Q for detailed breakdown). 
 
The second finding shows how awareness contributes to adaptive responding. 
The first aspect, the awareness about social dynamics, was described as 
beneficial when present and detrimental when missing. Unsurprisingly, it is 
mentioned more often in successful projects, seeming most effective when linked 
to subsequent action. R6’s quote illustrated the above: 
“It was obvious that there would be a clash of hardened fronts, and it was 
necessary to dissolve them.” 
The second aspect of awareness indicates that dealing with negative emotions 
seems to be a challenge for change managers, having negative consequences 
like frustration, as described by R7: 
“We focused on the daily work. On the goals we wanted to reach and had to 
reach. But the external motivation got lost, for example to acquire new 
business.”  
The third and final aspect about awareness to some extent contradicts the 
expectation of the researcher that project-related aspects would be more in focus, 
instead it was social dynamics as described above. Social dynamics-related 
themes were mentioned at least twice as often, independent of the result. 
 
The third finding highlights the proactive attitude of the change manager. Several 
themes characterize their responding activities: pursuing goals determinedly, 
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having a hands-on approach and proactively adjusting activities which involved 
competent risk-taking. The latter is illustrated by R1, who reduced safety margins 
in a production process in spite of a general fear about producing waste: 
”We literally forced them to lower the margins. We had to convince them to 
take that risk even though there was a remote chance that a series of let’s 
say twentyfive parts could be wasted, but that never happened. Instead we 
were optimizing the process in a calculated way and based on our 
experience. Actually, there was never really any relevant risk.” 
A ‘keep going attitude’ that was exclusively observed in failed projects contrasts 
the above described proactive behaviour. While one would assume that not giving 
up when facing difficulties is a positive characteristic, the failed projects paint a 
different picture. R10, a plant manager in the automotive industry, described an 
arduous process towards success with many difficulties but the project finally 
failed: 
”Disillusionment, partly also helplessness and asking what else should we 
do. And yes, also a lack of understanding, but to give up was no option. 
There is always a way. A little bit of hope here and there helps to regain 
some motivation and indicates a step in the right direction. But after all it 
was a very tough process.” 
This keep going attitude did in some cases manifest as reactive fire-fighting. For 
example, in the project of R4 where several organisations had to be coordinated to 
realise a joint business model, new difficulties emerged on a regular basis: 
”In my area of responsibility we tried to somehow identify those newly 
upcoming problems. We then found that there were problems with access 
to transportation capacity as well as with the distribution of revenue. For the 
problems that we could identify, we tried to find solutions that everybody 
could agree on. In the mean time we came up with some sort of auction-
model to distribute transport capacity among partners, when we realised 
that those planes were full anyway. So, we thought about pricing and how 
to generate more revenue by selling that capacity to one of the partners 
instead. Our intention was trying to develop and establish such procedures, 
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so that we could identify those areas that will definitely turn critical and at 
least stop the fire there.” 
Whether it manifests as firefighting or as perseverance, the keep going attitude in 
failed projects stands in contrast to the proactive attitude in successful ones. 
 
The fourth finding illustrates that considering other people’s concerns and 
viewpoints pays out for the success of the project. Managing their staff and 
coordinating with other people were both positively affected when change 
managers made the effort to consider others. R5 had to consider the different 
interests of stakeholders when he reorganized an entire production facility: 
”Yes, we realised how the different manufacturing units had their particular 
concerns. They all put their focus on different aspects. Components 
manufacturing has a different focus than those from integration or logistics. 
All of them were arguing to get their interests covered.” 
Consideration for others also led to the development of a shared vocabulary in the 
project of R11. That shared vocabulary set the scene for successfully coordinating 
activities during the project: 
”I think, having the opportunity for discussions at the beginning, almost like 
small conflicts, is highly beneficial in the long run. Defining terms is a good 
example. We had many communication problems at the start, forcing us to 
establish definitions and to create our common glossary. It went well after 
that and even though there were challenges, we managed them by 
discussing them critically and with a focus on solutions. There was no 
fighting nor were there any conflicts later on.” 
With regard to the management of staff, it was expected that managers would 
perform significantly worse in failed projects, but apparently this is not the case. 
The analysis showed a high count of the theme ‘direct interaction with affected 
staff’ in both types of projects (8 vs 4). Thus, it can be stated that consideration for 
staff is not lacking in failed projects. However, there is a qualitative difference. The 
successful projects contain a series of themes that describe how the potential of 
staff was activated. This includes trust and empowerment as well as an adequate 
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use of their skills by means of competence-based allocation and providing relevant 
knowledge about the project through updates. Hence, what makes the difference 
is not only to consider staff and to pay attention but additionally to act in a 
supportive way. To interact in such ways can be described as a competency of 
managers. This is for example illustrated by R12 in her critical but successful 
project where empowerment was beneficial but the challenge consisted of 
overcoming the tendency to exercise more direct control: 
“...it was helpful for me to allow more self-organisation within the project but 
that wasn’t easy at the same time, because normally in a crisis people react 
by looking for more control.”  
Apparently, staff have to be provided with competencies and the freedom to act, 
whilst mere interaction and even consideration of needs as well as fostering 
cooperation within the team is not sufficient. 
 
It is interesting to note that several interviewees mentioned external support to 
improve their competencies of interacting with others. In particular they named 
consulting and coaching. In the case of R3, coaching was explicitly named as one 
of the keys to success and for R2, coaching provided the necessary competencies 
for social interaction and understanding: 
“For the project it was coaching that helped me to deal with those difficulties 
that I just described, that way I learned to handle the social aspects and 
relationships.” 
The fifth and final finding shows that successful projects differ significantly from 
failed ones as far as adjustments are concerned and several themes refer to this 
central topic of RE. Examples are ’realise failure and take corrective actions’, 
‘proactive adjustments and ‘adapting structures and processes’ which came up 
with a total count of ten. When managers have the authority or the competency to 
perform such adjustments, it seems that dealing with difficulties in change projects 
becomes more successful. This finding indicates that successful change benefits 
from design activities. To design the interface between humans and systems, as 
advocated in HFE, seems to have much relevance for change projects. Having the 
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flexibility to adjust structures and processes alike was reported by R3 as beneficial 
and illustrated how such interfaces are considered: 
“We actually trained around 300 employees and that had very positive 
effects. Most important was sustainability. It was crucial to keep those 
changed processes flexible. We did not have the attitude of saying, now we 
have a stable but rigid system. Instead, we were convinced and prepared 
for constant adaptation during the introduction stage. The moment 
employees showed criticisms, we immediately converted those into 
implementation and training activities.” 
A further example was provided by R6: 
”The results were changed processes, some partially others completely. A 
positive side effect consisted of facing reality and saying goodbye to what I 
would call dreams and fantasy ideas. Simply putting the whole construct on 
solid ground and basically opening our eyes to the fact that individual 
performance of some employees is high, but frustration is too. Because the 
acknowledgement got completely lost in daily fire-fighting and in order to 
consider that in the future, we also developed measures.” 
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Findings within the individual responding perspective 
1. The change manager can influence management support by means of 
requesting it as well as by open upward reporting. 
2. Adaptive responding predominates in successful projects. 
2a. The managers’ awareness mainly focuses on social dynamics, their 
own emotions and project related-aspects. The role of the latter is 
surprisingly small. 
2b. Proactive actions and attitudes, e.g. competent risk-taking, are often 
found in successful projects whilst a keep going attitude (perseverance and 
constant reactive fire-fighting) is often found in failed projects. 
2c. Considering others is an important aspect of adaptive responding. It 
relates to coordination via shared vocabulary and consideration of interests, 
and also to the management of staff. The latter is a competency that was 
also present in failed projects but is performed in a more supportive and 
activating way in the successful projects. 
2d. A significant difference in successful projects is the amount of 
adjustments, including design activities, as long as the manager has the 
competence and the authority to perform them. 
 
Table 14: Findings within the individual responding perspective 
 
 
6.2.2 The organisational responding perspective  
The themes within the organisational perspective are organized into three 
categories (Table 15, Table 16). The first two are equal to those of the individual 
perspective and describe responding behaviour and capacity, which are either 
adaptive or non-adaptive. The third category describes the behaviour and 
reactions of staff. 
 
The findings of the organisational perspective cover (i) the behaviour of staff and 
different aspects of adaptiveness: (ii) systemic understanding, (iii) adapting 
structures and processes, (iv) the management of staff and (v) the provision of 
resources. 
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Responding in successful projects (organisational 
perspective) 
Adaptive behaviour and 
capacity 
Non-adaptive behaviour and 
capacity 
Behaviour and 
reactions of staff 
Awareness Positive effects 
SMM of difficulties (2)  Cooperative attitude (1) 
Increased cooperation (1) 
Pressure experienced as 
positive (1) 
Motivation and proactiveness 
(4) 
 
Coordination and leadership 
Pursue goals consistently (9) 
Proactive external 
communication (1) 
Adapting structures and 
processes (6) 
End and restart without redesign (1) 
Reactive adaptation (firefighting) (4) 
Decision process too slow (2) 
Management of staff Negative effects 
Just leadership (1) 
Flexible reduction of staff (2) 
Empower staff (1) 
Competence based allocation 
of staff (4) 
Direct interaction (2) 
Keep staff updated (3) 
Inadequate allocation of staff (1) 
Ignoring feedback and competence 
(1) 
Lack of commitment (1) 
Resistance (loss of privileges) 
(1) 
Culture of low engagement (1) 
Frustration (3) 
Helpful activities and support 
Provide resources (5) 
Cooperative attitude (3) 
Not providing enough resources (1) 
 
Table 15: Themes within the organisational responding perspective (successful projects) 
Responding in failed projects (organisational 
perspective) 
Adaptive behaviour and 
capacity 
Non-adaptive behaviour and 
capacity 
Behaviour and reactions 
of staff 
Awareness 
 
Positive effects 
 Lack of analytical action and 
systemic awareness (6) 
Keep motivation up (1) 
Initial supportive attitude (2) 
Coordination and leadership 
Realise failure and take 
corrective action (3) 
Re-evaluate actual approach 
(2) 
Adapting structures and 
processes (1) 
Disruptive event not compensated 
(1) 
Single non-systemic intervention (5) 
Reactive adaptation (firefighting) (1) 
Non-goal-oriented activities (1) 
Repeat failure without adjustment (1) 
Passive behaviour (14) 
Inadequate coordination with others 
(1) 
Management of staff Negative effects 
Keep staff updated (1) Not responding to social dynamics 
(2) 
Competencies not understood (1) 
Blaming culture (1) 
Frustration (3) 
Lack of commitment (1) 
Egoistic protective actions (1) 
Biased by past negative 
experience (2) 
Resistance (2) Helpful activities and support 
 Inadequate structures (3) 
Not providing enough resources (1) 
 
Table 16: Themes within the organisational responding perspective (failed projects) 
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The first finding of the organisational perspective shows that successful outcomes 
cloud the view on negative aspects and that how outcomes are achieved needs to 
be better investigated. A general observation is that more positive themes were 
identified in successful projects and more negative themes in the failed ones, but 
the themes are similarly independent of the project outcome. Positive aspects are 
cooperation, proactiveness and motivation. Negative aspects are frustration, lack 
of commitment and resistance. However, when the outcomes are contrasted more 
indications for motivation and proactiveness were found in successful projects. 
And while the negative aspects in failed projects are very high, it has to be 
critically remarked that the number of positive and negative themes are the same 
for successful projects and their total counts are almost equal (8 versus 7). This 
finding reflects the inconsistent evaluation of project outcomes and the strong 
focus on results, which were both identified as gaps in the literature on failed 
change. Hence, when a project is classified as successful it cannot be concluded 
that the result was achieved in a positive fashion. 
The remaining findings all relate to the organisations’ adaptive capacity, where the 
distinction between success and failure is much sharper than on the individual 
level (see appendix Q for breakdown of themes). It seems that those themes 
relating to adaptiveness have the potential to indicate in which direction a project 
is heading and seem to be success factors.  
 
The second finding brings up a central topic of OR and HFE, and a gap in CM. In 
contrast to the individual perspective there seems to be a general lack of systemic 
understanding and approaches on the organisational level as far as responding to 
difficulties is concerned. R12 illustrates how this observation was reflected in her 
failed project when the organisation tried to solve problems by spreading funds 
instead of first understanding the dynamics of the problems: 
“A lot of money was injected. In hindsight I think that was not helpful but 
rather problematic and we did not have the possibility to change the course 
as we did in the other project, to analyse in small groups or with certain 
individuals why this project is not working. We were rather distracted from 
the problems.” 
The theme ‘single non-systemic intervention’, receiving a count of five in the failed 
projects, can be seen as a consequence of missing system understanding. 
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The statement of R12 reveals that such an intervention was performed without 
system understanding beforehand. In addition, the effects of that intervention were 
not properly understood afterwards. This exact same combination was also found 
in the projects of R6 and R1. Several further themes in both project types indicated 
a lack of system understanding, e.g. ‘end and restart without redesign’ and ‘lack of 
analytical action and system understanding’.  Yet, no theme explicitly focuses on 
efforts to achieve a better understanding. 
 
In most cases activities were reactively triggered, for example by severe 
difficulties, as R6 explains:  
”It was helpful that this project had a very critical status. That resulted in the 
awareness of the need to change. The famous ‘pain’, as I would call it, was 
definitely there. Because of how we tried to manage it, it worked out and no 
department opposed or resisted. In theory, if one unit or department resists, 
we have a huge problem, and in this case for once no one did.” 
The third finding suggests that the capacity to adapt requires flexible structures 
and processes, as well as a clear will to reach the set goal. Two themes emerged 
where successful and failed projects significantly differed: ‘pursue goals 
consequently’ and ‘adapting structures and processes’. Both themes came up in 
combination in one quarter of the successful projects. 
 
R5 describes how structures and processes were adapted by the organisation, 
partly as a consequence of the change project content but also to support 
implementation: 
”The responsibilities were reduced and it was clearly defined who would be 
responsible for specific topics. The processes were simplified and the 
employees received the appropriate qualifications. Above all we made sure 
that all aspects would be considered early enough in the future.” 
The aim of the project was reducing the cost of poor quality and as such was not 
just an intervention but a change in how the system was functioning as a whole. 
This finding ties in well to the prior finding about system understanding. Together 
they emphasize that to change structures, system understanding is beneficial, and 
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if we consider the gaps found in the CM literature (lack of system understanding, 
complexity challenge) it is probably a conditio sine qua non. The above two 
themes were found in both perspectives, but while reaching the goal fast and 
determinedly seems more important for the organisation, flexible processes and 
structures were of higher relevance for the interviewed change managers. The 
most striking aspects of this third finding are the negative versions of those two 
themes. Passive behaviour and inadequate structures were found to a significant 
extent in failed projects. The theme ‘passive behaviour’ has the highest count (14) 
of the entire study. R7 describes how inactivity was the result of a very complex 
restructuring project that caused much confusion among employees: 
”And as a result nothing was moving forward. You could neither see 
corrective measures nor any improvements. That was the moment when I 
realised that this will not function. Meaning, we have actually been burning 
money. Every day. And that was painful.” 
Passive behaviour was also experienced by R5, who described it the following 
way: 
“It is constantly being delayed. Will be done next week, then the week after 
that, and it has been going like this for half a year now.” 
The reason for passive behaviour in his project were conflicts of interests, as the 
organisation had to switch employees between units and one department 
apparently did not want skilled people to leave. Instead of arguing, they just 
became passive. 
 
Difficulties with inadequate structures were a problem for R11 who passionately 
described how competencies of individuals were not understood in his project, 
hindering organisational adaptiveness:  
“We had three project phases before and it worked out. The difference then 
was a flat hierarchy. One group of people were responsible for coordinating 
that and they always said to us: ‘we are there for you, so that you can have 
an ideal environment to work in’. That way one always had direct access to 
talk to a specialist. After the last phase, four out of six of them retired and 
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additional hierarchical levels were introduced. Now, if you need them, you 
first have to fill out a form.” 
The fourth finding shows that staff was managed differently by the organisation 
when the project had a positive outcome. That group of themes (management of 
staff) contains many positive themes whilst focus on staff and interactions seems 
absent in failed projects. It appears as if the passive behaviour from the previous 
finding is also an issue for how organisations manage their staff. This is for 
example evidenced by the two themes ‘not responding to social dynamics’ and 
‘competencies not understood/used’, and vividly described by R12: 
” I call them energy dementors, like in Harry Potter, because they suck the 
energy out of employees. They started early, while the project started late. 
At that stage an unhealthy dynamic was already reached among employees 
and could not be recovered.“ 
The final finding highlights that the provision of various organisational resources 
can help ensure success. Five interviewees mentioned this aspect as relevant. In 
the case of R8 that support consisted of financial resources: 
“The clear commitment of the parent company made sure that we started 
with no debts on day one. Indeed, we went into the market in a healthy 
state.”  
Another set of quotes mentioned coaching and consulting. One example is 
provided by R8 who was adding to the above quote that providing consultants was 
another organisational response to project difficulties. Several interviewees were 
provided with coaching and one of the interviewees who spoke about its positive 
effects was R4: 
”What they did was to give me a coach. I could discuss with him many of 
the challenges that I have mentioned so far (…) So this was done 
additionally, to not leave me alone with those challenges but to provide 
professional support, and that was good.” 
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Findings within the organisational responding perspective 
1. Negative reactions of staff were very common in successful projects and 
suggest evaluating results more critically. 
2. The distinction between failed and successful projects, as far as adaptive 
responding is concerned, is much sharper on the organisational level than on 
the individual. 
2a. Organisations often displayed a general lack of systemic understanding 
in failed projects, which caused side-effects and unintended outcomes. 
2b. Adapting structures and processes and pursuing goals determinedly 
contribute to positive project outcomes. Inadequate structures and passive 
behaviour significantly affect outcomes negatively. 
2c. While successful projects are characterized by adaptive and proactive 
management of staff, failed projects are characterized by the absence of 
such behaviour. 
2d. Providing expertise via coaching and consultants are effective methods 
of organisational support. 
 
Table 17: Findings within the organisational responding perspective 
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6.2.3 Summary 
This second cornerstone investigated the ability of managers and organisations to 
detect the need to act within change projects. It also looked at the way responsive 
actions were performed and what those actions revealed about adaptive response 
capacity. 
 
It was found that adaptive capacity generally predominates in successful projects 
and that the spread between failure and success is not as wide in the individual 
perspective. Adaptive capacity in the individual perspective was mainly reflected in 
two central topics. The first is the consideration of others, which is something that 
managers equally do in failed projects, but, considering others is a competency 
that could be better exploited by organisations. The second topic is related to 
adjustments that often require the manager to successfully perform design 
activities. A precondition for those competencies to have an effect is 
empowerment by the organisation. However, the support that managers need from 
management is based on a bi-directional relationship and requires the manager to 
provide sufficient information and actively request such support. 
 
Another aspect that mainly surfaced in the organisational perspective was to 
understand how systems function. This would allow adequate responses without 
obtaining unintended side-effects. There is also evidence that organisations can 
profit from critically evaluating positive results.  
 
Hence, non-adaptive responding of an organisation can be characterized by not 
understanding or not making the effort to understand systemic dynamics in 
combination with passive behaviour and not following goals determinedly enough 
while having inadequate structures and processes. Adaptive responding behaviour 
of an organisation can be described as consistently following goals with flexible 
structures and processes while avoiding passive and non-systemic behaviour. 
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6.3 The anticipating perspective 
This anticipating cornerstone allows to look into a more distant future than 
monitoring does, identifying possible events and conditions that could affect 
change projects. The combined analysis of failed and successful projects also 
allowed a focus on those aspects that were anticipated but not acted upon or not 
anticipated although all information to do so was present.  
 
The tendency to focus towards success was not clearly delineated for the 
organisation but for the individual perspective (see respective tables in appendix 
H). Two aspects, however, are different to the other cornerstones. The first relates 
to a very similar structure of themes and findings in both perspectives, which is 
why they are examined in one section. Second, some statements by the 
interviewees were very general and could not be allocated to either a successful or 
a failed project. Since they offer much insight about general preparations for 
change of managers and organisation, they are presented in the second sub-
section of this chapter. 
 
6.3.1 Individual and organisational anticipation perspective 
Three categories have been identified within both perspectives. The first two 
describe actions and behaviours that were either helpful or not helpful and the 
third category is named ‘warning signs and anticipated risks/difficulties’. It was 
surprising that the allocation of themes is also very similar in both perspectives 
and the challenges of predicting future difficulties are seemingly the same, which 
is reflected in several similar findings. 
 
Two findings emerged equally in both perspectives: (i) risks were perceived 
differently depending on the outcome and (ii) anticipation competencies were 
lacking in failed projects. Additional findings of the individual perspective relate to 
(iii) the attitude of the change manager and (iv) those aspects that were beneficial 
for anticipating difficulties. Finally, for the organisational perspective, one 
additional finding covers (v) the role of safety in anticipating.  
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Anticipating in successful projects (individual 
perspective) 
Helpful (proactive) actions 
and behaviour 
Non-helpful actions 
and behaviour 
Warning signs and 
anticipated risks, difficulties 
Awareness and assessment Internal 
Analyse/plan before acting (3) 
Evaluation of own competencies (5) 
Compare with past figures (2) 
Project evaluated as useful (1) 
Large perception range (1) 
Wrong assumptions about 
SMM (2) 
Management pressure/unclear support 
(3)  
Inadequate structure/design (2) Project 
not attractive (1) 
Social/human challenges (4) 
Uncertainty (2) 
Warning signs based on experience 
(1) 
 Actions External 
Request support (1) 
Communicate/manage social 
acceptance (3) 
 
 Volatile environment (1) 
 
 
Attitude 
Positive attitude (4) 
Management commitment (2) 
Critical perspective (9) 
Resourceful perspective seeking 
opportunities (1) 
Positive perspective but 
not enough preparation 
(1) 
 
 
Table 18: Themes within the individual anticipation perspective (successful projects) 
 
Anticipating in failed projects (individual perspective) 
Helpful (proactive) actions 
and behaviour 
Non-helpful 
actions and 
behaviour 
Warning signs and anticipated 
risks, difficulties 
Awareness and assessment Internal 
 
 
Recognized but doubted 
(1) 
 
Inadequate structure/design (2) 
Inadequate process (1) 
Lack of experience/system knowledge 
(3)  
Not enough resources (1) 
Passive behaviour of staff (1) 
Hidden agenda (2) 
Lack of need to act (3)  
Scope too large (2) 
 Actions External 
 Recognized without 
enough relevance to act 
(3) 
 
Attitude 
 Concerns not 
considered by others (2) 
 
Table 19: Themes within the individual anticipating perspective (failed projects) 
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Anticipating in successful projects (organisational 
perspective) 
Helpful (proactive) actions 
and behaviour 
Non-helpful 
actions and 
behaviour 
Warning signs and anticipated 
risks, difficulties 
Awareness and assessment Internal 
Use expert knowledge (1) 
Consider different perspectives (1) 
Consider uncertainty/complexity (2) 
Request feedback (2) 
Allow emergence of people 
knowledge (1) 
Active awareness of risk/threat (8) 
 Fear of mistakes/failure (2) 
Minor risks/precautions (1) 
Not able of managing complexity (1) 
Not meeting target (2) 
Reduced cooperation (1) 
 Actions External 
Provide enough resources (1) 
Contingency planning (3) 
Competent risk taking (1) 
Proactive communication 
(internal/external) (6) 
 Loss of customer (1) 
Threat of unemployment (1) 
Attitude and context 
  
 
Table 20: Themes within the organisational anticipating perspective (successful projects) 
 
Anticipating in failed projects (organisational perspective) 
Helpful (proactive) actions 
and behaviour 
Non-helpful 
actions and 
behaviour 
Warning signs and anticipated 
risks, difficulties 
Awareness and assessment Internal 
Good perception range (1) 
 
Lack of experience 
about system dynamic 
(2) 
No system/forward 
thinking (3) 
Inadequate structure/design (3) 
Inadequate tools/approach (2) 
Not enough system understanding (1) 
Overambitious goals (1) 
High level of difficulty (1) 
No contingency planning (1) 
 Actions External 
 Risks and concerns 
ignored (2) 
Recognized without 
enough relevance for 
action (10) 
 
Attitude and context 
  
 
Table 21: Themes within the organisational anticipating perspective (failed projects) 
 
The first finding provides some surprising facts about how risks are perceived, and 
they seem to mainly originate from internal sources.  From the organisational 
perspective they are more widespread in successful projects and no real pattern 
emerges, whilst in failed projects they mainly address inadequate structures and 
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approaches. A good example for inadequate design became apparent in the joint 
venture project of R4. That cooperation was flawed right from the start because 
the three participating companies were aiming for different goals: 
”And that is why little by little the different goals were not reached. During 
the project many occasions allowed that conclusion. It would have actually 
been possible to say stop, reconsider and realise that something does not 
fit.” 
The risks in the individual perspective cover organisational structure, management 
support, staff and the competencies of change managers, which are dealt with 
individually in the following paragraphs. The interviewed managers, independent 
from the outcome, focused more on the way projects were managed than on 
external conditions. 
 
Organisational structure. Inadequate structure, a recurring theme from the 
responding cornerstone, was anticipated for both type of projects as a possible 
risk. R6 named organisational silos as a threat for project success:  
”On the other hand, there was that very obvious risk of having to unite 
different organisational silos. Generally, most people prefer to work in silos 
instead of working in a transversal structure. Also, because nobody really 
liked that program, it was having massive impact on the firms’ financial 
situation.” 
A further example is the failed project of R7 described by him as ‘designed to fail’. 
The new structure of the organisation was anticipated as problematic by R7 
because it led to unclear responsibilities. 
 
Management support. Pressure from management or unclear support was 
anticipated as a risk in some cases but nevertheless did not convert into difficulties 
for any of the managers who considered it as a risk. The individual responding 
perspective revealed that change managers can influence support. In the failed 
projects however, missing support was not anticipated even though it came up as 
a negative aspect in the individual responding perspective. Consequently, 
predicting it might require additional competencies. 
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Staff. A very interesting difference was found in the way that staff-related risks 
were handled. The successful projects only contained descriptions of anticipated 
challenges that the managers faced in order to achieve cooperation by or amongst 
staff. R8 for example described the challenge of asking employees to perform far 
above the average to succeed with the project, whilst being forced to inform them 
about planned layoffs at the same time. In contrast, the anticipated difficulties and 
risks within the failed projects were described as problems of the people. R5 
named their ‘hidden agenda’ and R11 their ‘lack of need to act’. One possible 
explanation is that the previously identified tendency to focus towards success 
caused managers to fall for the bias of externalising difficulties. 
 
Competencies of change managers. Some interviewees, e.g. R2 and R11, 
named their own lack of experience and system knowledge as a constraint in their 
failed projects. It was very interesting to see that when this was the case in 
successful projects, the managers had assessed their lack of competencies early 
enough to compensate. This is evidenced by the theme ‘evaluation of own 
competencies’ receiving a count of five. One example came from R3, who 
described how he critically evaluated his abilities and drew a conclusion for his 
approach: 
“You will be in front of 600 people receiving 600 arguments the first day and 
you have to deal with them, that requires some skill. Then you have to think 
realistically, and also consider that you are a technical person and not a 
psychologist.” 
The failed projects contain no such accounts. 
 
The second finding illustrates an interesting distinction between themes about 
helpful and non-helpful aspects of anticipation. This distinction was found to be 
highly bipolar in both the individual and the organisational perspective. It seems 
that anticipation is performed effectively in successful projects whilst negative 
projects are full of difficulties. These difficulties seem to be more intense on the 
organisational level because the total count of themes is much higher there (see 
appendix Q). The above is in strong contrast to the previous findings about 
monitoring and responding, because in those cornerstones positive aspects were 
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found in failed projects and negative aspects in successful projects. Competencies 
for anticipation, however, seemed to be either present or absent. 
Apparently, it was difficult for the managers in the failed projects to anticipate and 
then act upon what was recognized. Several quotes illustrate how managers 
sometimes do not believe or act upon what they recognised. This is evidenced by 
the themes in the second category of failed projects. R9 described such a situation 
where hints where found but did not trigger further action: 
”Maybe in some areas. But when you have a project like this, it will be split 
in several sub-projects. Based on experience you would say, well that sub-
project over there is very demanding as many difficult things are happening, 
but the others are ok, maybe demanding too but can be done relatively well. 
Otherwise you would not engage, right? And then there were some that 
needed careful tracking. But finally, it failed across all segments.” 
Such passive behaviour was similar for the organisational perspective and 
reflected in themes like ‘risks and concerns ignored’ and ‘recognised without 
enough relevance to act’. Both add up to a total count of twelve. R9 also described 
that phenomenon on the organisational level: 
“It was identified that these results are very ambitious but nobody was 
against ambitious targets. That should be a given. From that perspective, 
yes, it was anticipated as a project with a large impact - but should that 
have triggered any action?” 
Rather than ignoring facts, one explanation seems to be that not acting in spite of 
difficulties is a matter of missing competencies to make sense of what was 
perceived. Several themes in the successful projects indicate what type of 
competencies would be needed: ‘analyse/plan before acting’, ‘compare with past 
figures’ and ‘large perception range’.  
 
One recurring aspect within the quotes that contained those themes was 
understanding how the themes relate to each other, which was well illustrated by 
R6, who described a mechanism causing large and unneeded inventories: 
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“It was practiced like this for many years and towards the end of the year 
everybody was wondering why, again, it did not work out. Finally, all parties 
had to realise how they jointly contributed to that effect. So, we had to 
change it, and in that way match the real needs of the project with our 
expectations.”  
To grasp such relations requires systemic understanding, a competency that is 
needed for anticipative behaviour and this is one reason to allocate experienced 
managers to change projects. 
 
How the lack of systemic understanding became problematic on the organisational 
level was explicitly commented on by R11: 
“Foresight or an understanding of the relations were not there, not at that 
level of the organisation where an impactful decision could have been 
made.” 
Understanding relations as an organisational competency manifested in themes 
like ‘use expert knowledge’, ‘consider different perspectives’, ‘request feedback’ 
and ‘allow emergence of people knowledge’. 
 
Shared understanding on the organisational level can apparently counter passivity, 
which is evidenced by the themes ‘proactive communication’ and ‘active 
awareness of risk/threat’. Both have a high count and emphasise the relation 
between awareness and becoming active, a combination present in the projects of 
R3 and R8. Furthermore, R9 illustrated how proactive communication created 
activity: 
”Yes, that could have become an obstacle, if we had not done a lot of 
persuading. Indeed, we started very early to inform employees, let them 
participate, include their ideas. The result was that they adopted that 
position and defended it out of their own belief.” 
The third finding concerns attitudinal prerequisites of change managers for 
anticipating developments. It was found that a ‘critical perspective’ and a ‘positive 
attitude’ supported successful anticipation. Those two themes together reached a 
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total count of thirteen in projects with a positive outcome. Half of the sample 
showed this critical perspective and all interviewees who showed a positive 
attitude also adopted a critical perspective at the same time. That the two themes 
‘critical perspective’ and ‘positive attitude’ apparently should be balanced, is 
echoed in a quote of R4: 
“There was a lot of respect from my side about facing this task and at the 
same time I was looking forward to getting things moving.” 
The fourth finding highlights a behaviour that supports anticipation, which is 
sharing concerns and risks with employees because it seemingly activates 
employees’ potential. This is illustrated by R8 in a socially very demanding project 
involving lay-offs: 
”Those that stayed did not react by saying ‘thank God’. Instead, their wish 
was for the leaving colleagues to be treated fairly. The fact that this was the 
case increased motivation for the remaining employees. I think it would 
have been inhuman to tell them that they should just be happy to keep their 
jobs or that someone else had to leave and not them.” 
The final finding shows that safety considerations, from the moment that 
organisations were dealing with identified risks, were identified only in successful 
projects. This is evidenced by the themes ‘contingency planning’ and ‘competent 
risk taking’, and also in the consideration of R10:  
“When changing production lines and processes, there was always a test 
done beforehand and stock was built in order to assure that the customers 
would get their deliveries.” 
Contingency planning is based on classical risk management and therefore a 
critical element of any safety 1 approach. However, the failed projects show that 
the threshold for taking action is high and therefore these themes did not appear. 
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Findings from both anticipating perspectives 
1. Almost all anticipated risks (in both perspectives) relate to internal risks, 
e.g. inadequate structure and design. Individual difficulties with staff were 
often seen as problems of the people in failed projects, while regarded as a 
challenge when projects were successful. Assessing necessary 
competencies (of the interviewees) was also more effective when the 
outcome was positive. 
2. Passive behaviour can to some extent be explained by not understanding 
underlying relations of anticipated difficulties. Positive outcomes seem more 
likely when change managers have developed system understanding and 
organisations shared an understanding of constraints and risks. 
3. Individual anticipation seems to benefit from a positive attitude combined 
with a critical perspective. 
4. A positive outcome from the individual perspective is more likely if 
concerns are shared with employees, since the will to address constraints is 
increased. 
5. Safety considerations at the organisational level were not found in 
anticipative activities of failed projects. 
 
Table 22: Findings from both anticipating perspectives 
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6.3.2 General preparation by individuals and organisations  
Some quotes describe aspects that were anticipated without referring to a specific 
project. Interviewees spoke for example about what they usually do or what they 
experience as a general difficulty. Those quotes contain valuable insights about 
preparation for change and address what the literature denominates as change 
readiness (Decker et al., 2012). The ideas expressed in those quotes can be 
regarded as unspecified anticipation or general precautions. 
 
Three interrelated findings emerged: (i) how preparation is evaluated, (ii) how the 
organisation uses and provides expertise and (iii) how all of the above are affected 
by structural design. 
 
General preparation (individual and organisation) 
Individual (Manager) Organisation 
Training 
Helpful aspects: 
Dense training history (8) 
Will for continuation training (2) 
 
Non-helpful aspects: 
Not enough adequate training received (4) 
No training received (1) 
Helpful aspects: 
Adequate amount of training provided (2) 
Adequate amount of training provided to 
management (2) 
 
Non-helpful aspects: 
Lack of adequate amount of training (10) 
Expertise/Experience 
Helpful aspects: 
Past experience available (4) 
Availability of experts (1) 
Availability of coaching (1) 
Helpful aspects: 
Availability of external experts (2) 
 
Non-helpful aspects: 
Lack of management expertise (2) 
Experts not used (1) 
Approach 
 Non-helpful aspects: 
Lack of lessons learned (4) 
Lack of awareness/attitude (5) 
Structure 
 
 
Helpful aspects: 
Framework/support provided (3) 
 
Non-helpful aspects: 
Lack of framework/support (5) 
 
Table 23: Themes about general preparation (individual and organisation) 
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The first finding highlights that there is a strong discrepancy in how managers 
evaluated their own preparation versus the one of the organisations. Two thirds of 
the interviewees described their own preparation as adequate but that of the 
organisation as not sufficient. There are very few quotes about organisational 
expertise. 
 
The second finding shows that organisations apparently prefer external help over 
internal experts when preparing change projects. R7 for example mentioned that 
the availability of internal experts was helpful for him but critically remarked that 
the organisation did not make use of them. As far as the expertise of change 
managers is concerned, it seems that organisations do rely on that expertise, but 
they fall short of providing that expertise by means of training. Apparently, 
organisations do not see a strong need for this as the quote of R11 shows. He 
requested certain qualifications and additional training in a change project, based 
on his lessons learned from another project, but management denied him: 
“…and this is why I said that for the next project we need ‘this and that’ as 
well as the following qualifications. And they said no, and that happened 
several times.” 
R12 is of the opinion that whoever has the authority in a project should provide all 
necessary resources. With regard to management, she then critically added: 
“…and finally, from an executive perspective, this responsibility should not 
be delegated to anyone within the project.” 
The third finding unveils that organisational structure contributes to what the above 
two quotes describe. R4 commented how the structure of his organisation does 
not provide the framework for thoroughly anticipating the needs of change 
projects. He explicitly named training and lessons learned as something that such 
a framework should provide. Finally, for R11, decision-makers lacked the 
necessary expertise to provide adequate preparation and with a smile he added: 
”…and my biggest wish at that point, was having the decision-makers sitting 
in those courses … to actually get them trained.” 
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Findings about individual and organisational preparation for change 
1. Individual preparation for change (change readiness) seems to be adequate 
in the majority of projects while organisational preparation apparently is not. 
2. Organisations prefer external expertise over internal. At the same time 
organisations do rely on the expertise of change managers while failing to 
develop those competencies by means of training. 
3. One reason why organisations do not provide enough training seems to be 
structural (design) deficiencies when having to identify required change 
competencies. 
 
Table 24: Findings about individual and organisational preparation for change 
 
6.3.4 Summary 
This third cornerstone investigated the ability of managers and organisations to 
look into a more distant future and showed that there is a sharp contrast between 
successful and failed projects. The most interesting finding is that the identified 
risks mostly related to internal aspects. This weakens the anticipation capacity of 
the organisation. Inadequate structures and processes were named to a significant 
extent across all perspectives and outcomes.  
A phenomenon in failed projects, mainly from the organisational perspective, is 
passive behaviour. It could be traced back to a lack of system understanding and 
confirms what has been identified as a gap in the literature. The themes illustrating 
discrepancies between recognising and acting reached a total count of twentysix 
from half of the sample. It has also been shown as generally beneficial to draw on 
different sources of information. They support shared understanding and maintain 
a critical, safety-oriented attitude. 
 
Finally, from what has been reported about general preparation, it seems that 
expertise and individual competencies are a principal precondition for successful 
change projects. Additional evidence for the important role of the middle manager 
was found. The organisation benefits from them but apparently does not provide 
adequate training. The structure that is needed for developing competencies is 
seemingly insufficient. 
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6.4 The Learning perspective 
The learning cornerstone focuses on understanding what has happened. The 
learning perspective looks at how change managers and organisations make 
sense of outcomes. This perspective also considers that positive and negative 
learning experiences are independent of the project result. A learning process 
requires more than the simple acknowledgment of the result. As a consequence, 
structures, processes, procedures and approaches can be changed. The learning 
perspective does not simply repeat the content from the other cornerstones. 
Instead it aims to understand what is learned, how learning takes place, which 
conclusions are drawn for future projects and how those are put into practice. It is 
also important to understand how and why difficulties may not lead to a learning 
process. 
 
In general, it can be observed that learning from success happens more often 
(Appendix H) while failure leads to more drastic changes. 
 
6.4.1 The individual learning perspective 
Four categories emerged after analysing the accounts of the interviewees about 
how they make sense of what happened in their project. Learning of the change 
managers concerned reasons for the project outcomes (first category), helpful and 
non-helpful aspects (second and third category) and conclusions about how to 
handle future projects (fourth category).  
 
The large number of themes and quotes indicates that the interviewees obviously 
tried to make much sense of the results and frequently adapted their activities. 
However, when asked explicitly about which aspects were helpful in failed 
projects, only ‘self-critique’ and ‘past negative experiences’ were named. It seems 
that once a project is labelled a failure it is hard to find positive aspects, whilst the 
opposite seems easier because descriptions of non-helpful aspects were more 
equally distributed. 
 
Six findings were identified and cover what was learned about (i) management 
support, (ii) use of consultants, (iii) reaching a shared understanding, (iv) system 
understanding, (v) management of staff and (vi) pursuing goals. 
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Learning in successful projects (individual 
perspective) 
Reason for result 
Evaluation of 
aspects as 
helpful 
Evaluation of 
aspects as not 
helpful 
Conclusions for 
future projects 
Attitude and behaviour 
Knowledge about WAD 
(1) 
Competent risk-taking 
(1) Proactiveness (1) 
 
 
Adequate preparation (2) 
Better perception range 
(1) Competent risk taking 
(1) Seek system 
understanding (4) 
Maintain open/adaptive 
attitude (3) 
Coordination and communication 
Adapt process to 
humans (1)  
Decisive 
leadership/pursue 
goals consequently (5) 
Internal cooperation (1) 
Open internal/external 
communication (3) 
Stop project (1) 
Decisive leadership (3) 
SMM (1) 
Base success on result (1) 
Lack of SMM (1) 
Project too big (1) 
Reactive adaptation (1) 
Inexperienced 
management (1) 
Communicate content 
and benefit (9) 
Communicate method 
(2) 
Develop SMM (1) 
Use expertise of staff (3) 
Staff 
Active participation of 
staff (10) 
Broad/shared 
acceptance of project 
(6) 
Visible commitment of 
management (7) 
Autonomy/controversy 
in teams (2)  
Active participation of 
staff (2) 
Direct interaction (3) 
Evaluate engagement 
(3) 
Visible commitment of 
management (1) 
Negative effects on people 
(1) 
Active participation of 
staff (4) 
Direct interaction (4) 
Show visible 
commitment (2) 
External or project 
Consultant support (4) Trusting experts (3)   
 
Table 25: Themes within the individual learning perspective (successful projects) 
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Learning in failed projects (individual perspective) 
Reason for result 
Evaluation of 
aspects as helpful 
Evaluation of 
aspects as not 
helpful 
Conclusions for 
future projects 
Attitude and behaviour 
Not realizing/accepting 
failure (1) 
Self-critique (1) 
Experience from past 
negative project (5) 
Passive behaviour (1) 
History of 
failure/difficulties (1) 
 
Success starts with humans 
(2) 
Relate theory to practice (1) 
Apply self-critique/evaluation 
(3) 
Coordination and communication 
Inadequate 
structure/process (4) 
Wrong assumptions (3) 
Lack of system 
understanding (4) 
No visible 
management 
commitment (3) 
 
 
No understanding of 
context (1)  
No management 
support (2) 
Seek system understanding 
(4) 
Smart use of resources (1) 
Seek resources/support (6) 
Seek management support 
(1) 
 
 
Staff 
Project not accepted 
(4) 
Resistance (1) 
Not addressing needs 
(3) 
No reporting by staff 
(1) 
 No direct interaction 
with staff (1) 
Seek direct interaction (6) 
Create commitment through 
sense-making (5) 
External or project 
Inadequate use of 
external support 
(consultants) (2) 
Lack of cooperation 
towards partners (1) 
 Poor consultant 
performance (1) 
Increased complexity 
(1) 
 
 
Table 26: Themes within the individual learning perspective (failed projects) 
 
The first finding reiterates the importance of management support. Beyond what 
the findings in the responding cornerstone would suggest, five interviewees 
discussing successful projects and two interviewees discussing failed projects saw 
management support as a key factor in their respective outcomes. Management 
support is seemingly a success factor if it is there and a failure factor if it is 
missing. 
 
The essence of this finding is that not much was said about how to approach this 
aspect in future projects. Instead, some managers reflected about their own role. 
R6 resolved to make sure that managers working under him support their 
respective teams: 
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“It did only work because people were backed by their bosses. So, what 
actually makes the difference? You have to really take on board all those 
levels that are of any relevance for a project, right.” 
The second finding relates to the use of consultants, which was named as a 
reason for successful and also for failed projects by several interviewees. R10, the 
plant manager of a large automotive supplier, drastically changed his evaluation 
from being sceptical towards commenting how much value was added by 
consultants: 
”We started with external support. A consultant came in and based on my 
experience I thought... well, just another one. But now, I have to admit he 
was well worth his price. I would even say he was one of the top three I 
ever knew in my career. He set the right course for us, with his attitude, with 
his performance, with his train-the-trainer approach, quickly enabling us to 
do everything on our own.” 
A negative experience with consultants was reported by R9. Inadequate off-the-
shelf solutions caused the project to fail:  
“This project was not only supported by external consultants, but they 
basically dictated the desired result based on benchmark studies. The 
assumptions they used were not correct and because they were unaware of 
many documents they didn’t realise (…) My understanding is, that they just 
applied an approach that maybe has been successful in several other 
cases, but because the basic assumptions were not correct, the desired 
result did not happen and acceptance was very low.” 
Even though the interviewees see consultants as receiving strong organisational 
support, as discussed in the responding section, they themselves remain 
sceptical. However, they neither internalise the benefits of a good consultant nor 
the drawbacks of a bad consultant sufficiently to draw explicit conclusions for the 
future. 
 
The third finding is about two seemingly related ideas, which are reflected in 
several themes. On the one hand it is the acceptance of the projects, that can 
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determine the degree of resistance (‘broad shared acceptance of project’, ‘project 
not accepted’, ‘resistance’). On the other hand, several themes describe how 
shared understanding is affected by the quality of communication and cooperation 
(‘shared mental model’, ‘open internal/external communication’, ‘internal 
cooperation’ – ‘lack of SMM’, ‘lack of cooperation towards partners’, ‘no reporting 
by staff’). Several themes illustrated respective conclusions that the interviewees 
drew: ‘communicate content and benefit’, ‘communicate method’, ‘create 
commitment by sense-making’ and ‘develop SMM’. 
 
All but one interviewee mentioned at least one theme concerning either 
acceptance or shared understanding. One third spoke about both. The 
interviewees seemingly learned and concluded that those two ideas are success 
factors, illustrated by R11 for example:  
“The individual motivation of many people who took part was helpful. They 
were having that will because they had identified themselves with the cause 
and made it their own, also because they realised that the idea behind is 
good.” 
R9, the bank manager, commented how shared understanding about the project 
allowed a smooth start: 
”But if the whole organisation sees this, how important these topics are, that 
they make sense, that they leave basically no alternative and everybody 
knows he is allowed to participate. That’s when you have the big chance.” 
As far as the shared understanding is concerned, comments on communication, 
cooperation, and coordination were strongly intertwined in the quotes.  
 
R3, a head of quality, further linked shared understanding with the way an idea is 
convincingly communicated: 
“That is another conclusion. To convince my team and have these middle 
managers convince their own teams. That is an insight for me, if the leader 
communicates convincingly, and has the desire to get there too, the 
employees will make the same effort.” 
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The fourth finding provides concrete touchpoints for system understanding, which 
emerged in the preceding cornerstones, but has so far only been vaguely defined. 
R11 for example named discrepancies between ‘work as done’ and ‘work as 
imagined’:  
“A mature organisation needs many steps to get from the actual state to a 
desired state, and you need time for that. The current maturity level and 
what is happening in the environment are often very different to what 
management imagines. Of course, everybody wants the ideal result 
immediately but normally you need more steps than that.” 
More specifically, wrong assumptions were seen as a reason for failure by several 
interviewees. While R3 referred to assumptions of stakeholders, R9 focused on his 
own. The following conversation about a large reorganisation project took place 
during the interview: 
“R9: I just joined the organisation and did not have a reliable gut-feeling for 
the numbers yet, but then I realised what was going on and this is an 
experience I will carefully consider in future projects. 
I: Do you mean the gut-feeling? 
R9: Well, actually to question existing assumptions about what is going on.” 
The ability to question existing assumptions therefore appears to be one element 
that makes up system understanding in change projects. A second element is 
reported by R2. He spoke about understanding the dynamics involving his own 
role, how others perceive it and then act: 
“You are on a stage and you are playing your role while you speak. Then 
you leave and the role changes. I only realised afterwards that as managers 
we are playing a role for some time. There is no director and there is no 
script. We are interpreting ourselves and have to play that role well, so that 
the audience for whom we play accepts our part. It took a while for me to 
realise this.” 
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The fifth finding illustrates that interviewees were seemingly concerned about 
putting more emphasis on direct interaction with staff and more active participation 
of employees at all stages of a project. Several quotes illustrated what they 
learned and concluded. 
 
Direct interaction. Directly interacting with those affected by change was reported 
as beneficial and convinced R4 to seek more: 
”It is about being with the people, not just making statements about how 
important that is. You have influence by empowering them and motivating 
them to do what is needed. You need to be there and not sit somewhere in 
an office or on the upper floor. You have to go out there, to the people or 
have them come to you. This is something I can do well and I enjoy doing 
it.” 
It was in retrospect that R12 learned that the biggest challenge in her project was 
to become aware of underlying tensions: 
”Looking back I am not sure if we could have become aware of the fact that 
we needed one-to-one interactions and that we had to look out for 
commitment again. This is a big ‘what if’. Looking back at all the money that 
was used, it feels like paying an extra round on the rollercoaster for 
everybody while sitting on an active volcano.” 
The monitoring function of staff and the resulting benefits were identified in the 
respective cornerstone. R6 concluded that direct interaction is a precondition to 
make use of employees’ abilities to detect critical aspects in change projects: 
”You always have to feel the mood of employees and get their perspective. 
Are they seeing it positively and have the will to engage or are they of the 
opinion that this matter will just pass by on its own? Because then you are 
heading in the wrong direction and you should react immediately. But what 
you need to become aware of is to have enough interaction with them.” 
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Active participation. From how the interviewees evaluated their projects, it 
seems as if active participation triggers competencies of staff which would 
otherwise remain unused. For R9, this turned out to be the key for project success: 
“The main reasons were, first of all that we allowed those employees 
concerned to contribute to the conceptual planning. Right from the first draft 
with the first brainstorming. It was all based on how much they wanted to 
commit themselves, and the big asset was that the most important topics 
that were of relevance in the market, were identified by them and not by 
external sources.” 
An important precondition for R9 was to assure the staff had the chance to actively 
participate throughout the whole project: 
”And the second critical point is to make sure that they stay until the project 
is finished and to not replace them with consultants at any point.” 
That active participation also contributes to shared understanding is evidenced by 
a quote of the plant manager R10: 
“I am absolutely confident that we have right from the start included all 
employees. We did not just inform and communicate but had all employees 
take part in a two-day training session where they could literally touch and 
also comprehend everything. This simulation was done with all people from 
all hierarchical levels. And every time since then, if a problem occurred or 
anyone had a good but critical argument why something should not be 
performed as planned, they had a common basis to refer to. They reminded 
each other of the success factors they encountered in that simulation where 
everybody participated.” 
This quote in particular ties this finding to the last finding on shared understanding 
and emphasises further possible relations between the themes. 
 
 
The sixth and last finding confirms what has already surfaced in the individual 
responding perspective regarding the determined pursuit of goals and a decisive 
leadership-role. Five interviewees named those as reasons for positive outcomes 
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and three described them as helpful. R8, for example, described making hard 
decisions as helpful: 
”A main reason was that we got clear decisions from management. Mainly 
painful decisions that hurt but also quick decisions, fast implementation and 
integration of affected employees. To win people over and include them. 
Especially for the tough aspects of change that affected employees. This 
relates for example to cutting jobs or shifting them to other places. For this, 
the foundation is obvious, honest and early communication.” 
However, as the example of R3 illustrates, such processes need time: 
”Starting from day one, when we stood around that planning chart with the 
employees, until now, almost two years have passed. So, you really need a 
sustainable and strong breath.” 
It is interesting to note that again, no specific conclusions on the above were 
drawn for future projects. The managers have clearly understood what has 
happened, which is the emphasis of the learning cornerstone, but a reason for not 
mentioning specific conclusions was not found.  
 
Findings within the individual learning perspective 
1. Management support was found to be an impactful factor when it was 
present and also when it was missing. Yet no explanation was found why 
interviewees did not explicitly conclude anything for future projects. 
2. The managers learned that consultants are beneficial for change projects if 
they are properly used, but managers did not take away specific conclusions 
for future projects from their use. 
3. The two themes acceptance of the project and shared understanding 
emerged as strongly intertwined. 
4.  A lack of systemic understanding is a significant factor for project failure. 
Two preconditions for systemic understanding were identified: questioning 
assumptions and the effort of understanding the dynamics of a situation. 
5. Management of staff in successful projects is characterised by direct 
interaction with affected staff and by fostering their active participation. 
6. Decisive leadership and pursuing goals determinedly contributes to positive 
project outcomes.  
 
Table 27: Findings within the individual learning perspective 
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6.4.2 The organisational learning perspective 
The analysis of the organisational learning perspective provided three categories 
of themes. The accounts of the interviewees contain their observations of 
organisational adaptive behaviour (first category), what conclusions the 
organisation drew (second category) and their critical evaluations (third category). 
The themes mainly focus on what was done and how change was approached.  
 
A general observation in the learning perspective is that individual and 
organisational learning is very different. This is reflected in the number and variety 
of themes shown in Table 28 and Table 29 below as well as in the three findings 
that surfaced. The first two concern (i) how failed change triggered more activities 
as well as new approaches for making sense of outcomes and (ii) how structures 
and processes were changed afterwards. The third finding is about organisational 
learning and was completely unexpected because at first sight it contradicts the 
previous findings. Further analysis has revealed a very illuminating contrast 
between reactive short-term adaptation and long-term sustainable learning. 
 
Learning in successful projects (organisational 
perspective) 
Observed adaptive 
behaviour (due to 
learning) 
Observed conclusion Critical evaluation 
Approach 
Competent risk taking (2) Understand problem first (1) 
Competent risk taking (1) 
Know when to stop (1) 
Not considering critical feedback 
(2) 
No lesson learned (6) 
No lesson learned/selective 
confirmation (1) 
No lesson learned (frustrated 
staff) (2) 
Activities 
Adapt structures and processes 
(10) 
Seek SMM (1) 
Trust experts about WAD (2) 
Repeat successful procedure 
(2) 
Request external feedback (1) 
Accept/consider uncertainty (1) 
Define role/task of consultants (2) 
Restart without redesign (1) 
Documented but not evaluated 
(1) 
No documentation (2) 
Difficulties with change from 
within (1) 
 
Table 28: Themes within the organisational learning perspective (successful projects) 
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Learning in failed projects (organisational 
perspective) 
Observed adaptive 
behaviour (due to 
learning) 
Observed conclusion Critical evaluation 
Approach 
Change of approach/mindset 
(2) 
Change mindset to constant 
unease/forward thinking (4) 
No lesson learned (3) 
Mindset of arrogance (1) 
Activities 
More direct interaction with staff 
(2) 
Change of structures/processes 
(3) 
Increased perception range (1) 
Analyse failure (1) 
Critically evaluate external 
support (1) 
Communicate/act visible and 
consistent (1) 
Not using 
resources/support/experience 
(2) 
 
Table 29: Themes within the organisational learning perspective (failed projects) 
 
The first finding in the organisational perspective indicates that it is mainly the 
failed projects that triggered changes in approach and mindset. Their total number 
of quotes, however, is much lower. These changes led to more long-term thinking 
and to generally seeking better understanding of the change situation. Almost all 
of the themes in the first two categories are evidence of this. One reaction to a 
recently failed project is of particular interest because it illustrates the monitoring 
function of employees. R10 described how the organisation tried to adapt by 
increasing interaction with employees with the intention of deepening general 
understanding: 
”Yes, definitely, it seems silly but we could have come up with that idea 
earlier. To work closer to the people and closer with the people. Of course, 
we had conversations but how we are conducting them, that is what we 
want to change and what we are changing at the moment.” 
The common idea reflected in the above and similar quotes is that after disruptive 
events, organisations see a need to understand what has happened and how to 
adjust. R9 commented for example how external support was being reconsidered 
and referred to a more adequate use of consultants in the future. The successful 
projects barely contain quotes where activities are critically reflected or 
questioned. To deal with positive outcomes in such a way could lead to better 
learning from what went right, as safety 2 advocates, but the quotes do not contain 
much evidence for this taking place. 
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The second finding relates to the recurring theme of adapting structures and 
processes, occurring three times more often in the successful projects because 
the organisations realised the need for adaptation. The purposes behind structural 
changes are often connected to other themes. Coordination and shared 
understanding are some of those important themes and the organisation of R10 
tried to improve them by adapting related structures and processes: 
“In daily business we now have much more of those small gatherings. I 
would not call them meetings but rather organized gatherings where anyone 
can raise their hand and point out problems. That person can then initiate a 
process for understanding that problem and then for developing solutions.” 
Some of these changes had long-lasting positive effects. This may be due to 
structural changes triggering other changes, for example causing employees to 
change their routines or the way they perform their work. Such a cascading effect 
was described by R9: 
”The project that I am thinking about right now involved changing the whole 
structure of the organisation. It was reduced, several sites have been 
combined and we reduced costs. But we also opened new doors for new 
businesses, new activities, and that has much to do with change, like 
changing the mindset of employees for instance. Especially when they have 
been working with a certain topic for years, to then start going in new 
directions with a positive attitude like saying yes, ok, this topic is relevant for 
the whole organisation and I will actively support it.” 
It is noteworthy that the majority of structural changes, mentioned by the 
interviewees, were reactive adaptations to sometimes critical events. One example 
is portrayed by R6. His organisation was confronted with problematic and critical 
events beforehand: 
”Looking back at those drastic experiences we launched the first joined 
cooperation with the armed forces. We had that severe incident before, 
right. In a coordinated move, basically in secret but with authorization by the 
next level, we did incorporate those XXX [note: confidential]. Many were 
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involved on both sides. So, we simply said, that there is a necessity, we 
have to adapt. And that is what we did, against all odds.” 
Almost all of these changes are based on a problem, a challenge or even previous 
failure. In contrast, adaptation with a forward-looking perspective is not so 
common.  
 
The investigation of positive outcomes unveiled the final and most relevant finding 
about organisational learning. It was found that one aspect was critically evaluated 
above all others: that the organisation does not engage with lessons learned, and 
especially not in projects with a positive outcome. Almost all the themes in the 
third category refer to this topic. Expressed in numbers, there are seven themes 
about a lack of lessons learned in the successful and two in the failed projects, 
and they received an overall total count of fifteen and four. Some of the quotes 
expressing these themes are general statements about the project while others 
address specific aspects. A general comment from R12 provides reason for this 
lack of learning, and that is cost-cutting: 
”We have similar projects where lessons learned from change management 
were often sacrificed to save costs. It is in the work packages of change 
projects where the cutting starts. We have repeatedly included this as a 
lesson learned, telling top management that doing the lessons learned in 
change projects should not be affected by cost-cutting. But it is always the 
first thing that is sacrificed.” 
R12 also reported that documentation to prepare lessons learned was done but an 
evaluation never happened and hence, learning could not take place. Common to 
most of the quotes is that attitude and approach are the main elements being 
criticised. Hence, it seems that proactive behaviour and adaptation is mainly a 
matter of awareness and will. This is evidenced by R11 who describes how 
feedback is being ignored: 
”The lessons learned, our individual ones, were presented and underpinned 
with facts and reasons for why their implementation is necessary. But two 
management levels further up, it was evaluated as being too work-intensive. 
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The aftermath of a change project, the lessons learned, is the preparation 
for the next project. In my opinion. But nobody wants to do it.“ 
 
Findings within the organisational learning perspective 
1. Changes in attitudes and the effort to understand what has happened is 
mainly found in learning that takes place as a consequence of failed projects. 
Successful projects contain little evidence for such organisational behaviour. 
2. Adapting structures and processes was a learning effect in many 
successful projects. Despite the positive results, learning was mainly a 
reactive and not a forward looking and proactive activity. Conclusions were 
drawn and structures adapted to prevent similar problems in the future. 
3. The successful projects contain a surprisingly high number of critically 
evaluated lessons learned, that were either not adopted, not documented or 
were even ignored. 
 
Table 30: Findings within the organisational learning perspective 
 
6.4.3 Summary  
The individual learning perspective has revealed several connections between 
themes and they all emphasise system understanding. This mainly concerns the 
relations between two pairs of success factors: acceptance of the project and 
shared understanding as well as direct interaction with staff and their active 
participation. The individual perspective has also revealed more insight into three 
elements that contribute or partly constitute system understanding and could serve 
as advice on how to develop such an understanding: to question assumptions, to 
make the effort of grasping the dynamics within a change situation, and to reflect 
on one’s own role in relation to others. The latter is related to self-critique which 
has been identified as a competency of change managers even though it did not 
lead to sustainable conclusions for future projects. In general, the managers 
reflected much about their projects in order to understand what has happened (RE 
definition of learning cornerstone), however, conclusions for the future were not 
always drawn. 
 
It seems to be an organisational phenomenon that critically reflecting on attitudes 
and approaches is mainly triggered by negative results, whilst positive outcomes 
are often followed by a lack of lessons learned. This happened in spite of 
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structures and processes being changed and successful outcomes being 
achieved. This appears to be a paradox of successful change outcomes. Hence, 
these changes cannot be described as adaptive behaviour of an organisation in 
the sense of RE because they had the focus on ‘what goes wrong’ (safety 1). The 
proactive and forward-thinking focus of safety 2 would reflect an understanding of 
‘what goes right’, but lessons learned from successful projects were not performed 
to a significant extent. Learning from successful projects seems to be the 
bottleneck for sustainable CM success and offers large potential for increasing the 
success rate of change projects. 
 
6.5 Summary of findings 
This chapter, by applying the perspective of the four cornerstones to change 
projects, has revealed that differences do exist in how managers and 
organisations deal with projects, and how results come about. These results now 
need to be contrasted with existing theory and practical challenges. 
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7. Contribution to theory and practice 
Failure and success of change projects are the principal subjects of this study. 
While exploring them from a safety science and HFE perspective, several links to 
the research gaps and practitioner problems of CM have emerged (see section 
3.3). This chapter answers the research question and illustrates how the research 
objectives were accomplished. It has to be noted that aspects concerning failure 
and success (outcome), the four cornerstones (stages), human (micro) and 
organisational (macro) aspects are much intertwined and cannot be dealt with 
entirely separate. Therefore, the first two sections will describe the central 
contribution of this study, which set out with the aim of exploring the potential of 
RE to impact change success. It is therefore argued that the combined perspective 
of HFE and safety science via the four cornerstones and safety 2 has the potential 
to contribute to the valid framework Todnem By (2005) has argued is missing from 
CM. 
The remaining sections will focus on those aspects that could be identified via the 
lens of the four cornerstones and relate to both research objectives. It will be 
shown how organisational design benefits from system understanding and 
improves the interface between humans and the organisation, all of which is 
related to a set of critical competencies. While all of the above is closely 
intertwined, the last cornerstone, learning, provides some unique insights into 
successful and failed projects on the organisational level.  
 
It is finally argued that the results of this study contribute to the body of knowledge 
in CM, namely to the research of Raelin and Cataldo (2011) and Decker et al. 
(2012), and that practitioners can profit from the research results by considering 
critical failure and success factors along the different stages of a project. Those 
stages are reflected in the four cornerstones, which can serve as a structured 
approach similar to checklists in aviation.  
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7.1 Successful change is safe change  
When projects fail, an active process of trying to understand what happened is 
usually initiated. In contrast to an accident investigation, where causes and 
recommendations are sought, no structured approach is found in CM. Moreover, 
that process is often found to happen rather intuitively and with huge qualitative 
differences. CM can therefore profit from structured reactive approaches like those 
based in safety 1. In that context it can be concluded that consistent guidelines, a 
universal terminology and best practice for investigating failure are lacking in CM. 
The research results have largely confirmed what the literature review revealed to 
be gaps. 
 
The weaknesses of not having universality of approaches in CM, shown in the lack 
of consensus on all but the high pace of current change that comes in all shapes 
and sizes while triggered by external and internal factors (Todnem By, 2005), 
could be addressed by safety 1 approaches. Several aspects to be addressed 
were identified: the fixation on monitoring mostly lagging indicators and hard facts, 
inadequate organisational preparation, reluctance in changing structures even 
though that is anticipated as a potential constraint, and finally not performing 
lessons learned. The central challenge as opposed to e.g. aviation is that universal 
regulations do not exist in CM. A plane would for example never depart without 
enough fuel for the planned journey. This is because of regulated safety measures 
and the existence of a safety attitude that originates in specific training, neither of 
which is present in CM. It is therefore suggested that a future research agenda 
could investigate how the lack of regulation might be compensated for with other 
measures. 
 
Beyond the issue of universal standards for CM, the strong focus on outcomes 
was found to be a weakness in the monitoring functions of organisations. The 
outcome clouds the view on the process in cases of failed projects and often leads 
to ignoring the process in cases of successful projects. That same weakness can 
also be found in high risk environments and has been criticized as the so-called 
bipolar perspective of safety 1 (Hollnagel, 2014d), where only the dichotomy of 
safe/unsafe counts. The perspective of safety 2 and RE, in contrast, focuses not 
only on the outcome but specifically on the process, with a view to examining the 
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variability of human behaviour to find out when and how things go right. Making 
use of this, valuable insights into both successful and failed change projects were 
obtained. It has been shown how successful aspects of failed projects and 
problematic elements of successful projects are often ignored.  
 
Furthermore, most insight was gained from researching successful projects 
through the lens of safety 2. In those instances, difficulties were overcome and as 
a result of learning from them processes and structures were changed. But, similar 
to the failed projects, this mostly happened as a reactive process of learning and 
adaptation. Subsequently, sustainable learning on the basis of lessons learned 
was rarely observed, which is further discussed below.  
Finally, it is suggested that a shift of emphasis away from an over-reliance on 
results in favour of better understanding the process would be beneficial. This is 
mainly related to aspects that go wrong in successful projects since the study 
found that interest in those is very low once the desired results are obtained. And 
that cannot be considered as safe from the perspective of RE. 
 
7.2 Extending the concept of critical failure factors 
An important additional contribution of this work comes from its focus on predicting 
success using a safety 2 approach. Up to now, the most influential framework for 
the prediction of project outcomes in CM comes from the work of Decker et al. 
(2012). They list so-called critical failure factors (CFF) in an attempt to formulate 
leading indicators for change project failure. As has been discussed in this 
research, this approach is inadequate from an HFE perspective, especially when 
adopting the framework of safety 2 and its corresponding focus on ensuring 
positive outcomes. As this study has shown, there are indeed critical factors that 
can contribute actively to a positive outcome, or ‘critical success factors’ (CSF). 
Furthermore, the interplay of these different factors is likely to be influential based 
on the data from this study.  
 
Therefore, this study argues that an extension of the framework provided by 
Decker et al. (2012) is a necessary next step for the discipline of CM. By 
augmenting the concept of CFF with CSF, it becomes easier for practitioners to 
achieve adaptably designed systems at the outset of any CM enterprise, 
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increasing the likelihood of success. In addition, both the CFF and CSF identified 
in this study show tendencies towards more complex interactions that belie their 
categorisation as independent items on a checklist. This underlines the need for 
research to better investigate such possible interactions, possibly building on 
some of the conclusions from this study. 
 
7.3 Successful change needs system understanding 
The analysis not only confirmed the lack of systemic approaches as a gap in CM 
but also provided more knowledge about what system understanding means in the 
context of successful change. The research results contribute to a better grasp of 
systemic understanding from a theoretical perspective and yet indicate how to 
improve the work of practitioners at the same time.  
 
This study has found that system understanding from the perspective of the 
change manager is reflected in a set of competencies. The first two contribute to 
better understanding the system by questioning existing assumptions as a default 
strategy and seeking to understand existing relations. Explicitly trying to 
understand those relations improves anticipation and, when considering their 
dynamics, the effectiveness of responding. Two helpful competencies could be 
identified at the design stage: to explicitly look out for and consider side-effects 
and increasing the awareness for inadequate structures before initiating a change 
project. Both require the organisation to support the manager, who might 
otherwise fail with the implementation in spite of possessing such competencies. 
However, it has been found that the manager’s leverage in attracting such support 
involves taking some responsibility on their part. 
 
At the organisational level, system understanding is reflected within several 
aspects of the four cornerstones, and as such generally increases the adaptive 
capacity of an organisation. While this is intertwined with the above described 
competencies of managers, some aspects are unique to the organisation. The 
analysis revealed inadequate structures and processes as principal constraints at 
the moment of anticipating difficulties in change projects. In contrast to this, 
constraints that originate in the environment were rather rare. When such 
difficulties occurred, the organisations showed a tendency to respond passively, a 
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fact that the interviewees noted. Therefore, it is argued here that the presence of 
observable passivity in organisational responses can be interpreted as an indicator 
of a lack of systemic understanding. Such an indicator would allow practitioners to 
respond in an actual situation, as it is derived from a perspective of how work is 
done, rather than how it is imagined (Hollnagel, 2014d). Practitioners could then 
move to improve organisational system understanding. 
 
 
7.4 Successful change benefits from design and from 
understanding human aspects 
The analysis has identified that successful change benefits from adapting 
structures and processes. However, the managers were often either not 
empowered or simply didn’t understand them. Based on the definition of HFE by 
the IEA, it is necessary to understand humans and system components in order to 
design adequate interfaces. How can CM do better? 
 
Two requirements have been discovered that enable the change manager to 
perform adequate structural and process design: relevant competencies and 
support by the organisation. The aspect of competencies is discussed elsewhere 
(see last section and below). However, organisational support has more to do with 
human aspects. 
 
The first aspect of organisational support relates to activities, processes and 
structures that support a shared understanding of the project and hence a SMM. 
System understanding, as discussed in the previous section, is needed to create 
those preconditions and yet is increased at the same time by the existence of a 
SMM. 
 
The second aspect of organisational support concerns the provision of consultants 
or other specialized personnel. Whilst reported as helpful within several project 
phases and along most cornerstones, effective use is not a given and requires a 
thorough understanding of how consultants can contribute to the specific project 
requirements. 
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The third and final aspect of organisational support is granting authority to the 
change manager that allows him or her to apply their design competencies and 
perform adequate structural and process adaptations. This is by far the most 
important precondition because the lack of alignment between managerial 
competencies, the constraints of the project and missing authority to adapt 
structures can result in frustration and reduced motivation. This was observed in 
many of the projects. Creating such alignment is basically a matter of designing 
adequate interfaces. This final aspect, the design orientation and underlying 
competencies, highlights the contribution of HFE and RE to successful change. It 
also highlights the contribution of this research to the field of HFE, because Grote 
(2014) claimed that safety via the management of risk will provide momentum to 
the field of HFE and has the potential to provide benefit to other industries not 
immediately associated with safety concerns.  
 
7.5 Successful change requires lessons learned 
Lessons learned was and is a huge topic within the field of CM (Burnes, 2004a; 
Cameron & Green, 2015). Therefore, it is one of the most striking findings of this 
study that lessons learned are often not embraced. One might think that 
organisations do indeed learn from past processes but the data showed that this is 
most consistently the case only when the outcome of that process is a failure. 
However, as discussed above, RE and safety 2 approaches point out the potential 
of learning from successful processes, potential that is not tapped according to the 
results of this study. Therefore, lessons learned appears to be mostly reactive 
rather than forward adaptive.  
 
Sustainable learning is a precondition for successful future change projects. This 
study therefore concludes that the lack of learning from successful projects 
together with the reactive nature of many lessons learned constitutes the 
bottleneck of successful future change. In a sense, successful projects doom 
future projects to fail. This has an especially grievous effect on the capability of an 
organisation to design its structures in preparation for future projects. Therefore, 
this bottleneck prevents organisations from achieving adaptiveness as advocated 
by RE. This study argues that future research should investigate how to optimize 
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lessons learned, such that the potential of a forward adaptive approach could be 
exploited by practitioners and academics alike. 
 
7.6 Successful change depends on managerial competencies 
So far it has been demonstrated that the design orientation of HFE can be a useful 
tool for CM, mainly because it addresses the interface function of the change 
manager. This role as an interface was researched by Raelin and Cataldo (2011) 
and they demanded more empowerment for middle managers. Not only has this 
claim been confirmed in this study but it has been enriched with further details.  
 
The gap between CM theory and practice, identified in the literature, leads 
managers to largely ignore theory (Bamford & Forrester, 2003). This aspect was 
largely confirmed by this research. The interviewees did not mention any explicit 
theory as a basis for their activities in change projects. More often than not it 
seemed that experience determined their approach. They made use of a broad 
bundle of skills that were accumulated over the years but not explicitly related to 
CM. Whenever they spoke about helpful aspects within their projects, they were 
asked to further elaborate on them. When follow-up questions addressed theory in 
its broadest sense, no specific references were given. 
It seems that even if competencies are well developed, they are detached from 
theory. A future research agenda should therefore not only address the 
development of a valid framework but also identify how such a framework could be 
applied in practice, or in other words, how those that need it could become aware 
of its existence. 
 
This research has provided two aspects that add to the claim of Raelin and 
Cataldo (2011) for empowerment. On the one hand it is the provision of 
competencies for CM, which has just been described as a weakness of the 
organisation. On the other hand, it is the design of adequate structures and 
processes which are needed to allow the manager to make use of their 
competencies. This second aspect is closely linked to organisational design. A 
future research agenda should therefore address the identification of additional 
competencies as well as finding potential structural constraints for their effective 
application. 
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The competencies and beneficial behaviours that emerged, apart from system 
understanding (see sections above), concern the creation of an SMM and the 
management of staff. 
 
7.5.1 Shared Mental Model 
A shared understanding or Shared Mental Model has been identified as a central 
competency with multiple and intertwined relations to many of the themes found in 
this study. It can serve as a link through which the effectiveness of other 
competencies is increased. Relations were found in: acceptance of the project, 
passive behaviour, consideration of others, a shared vocabulary and finally in 
cooperation and active participation. It can further be concluded that the manager 
not only needs these competencies themselves but should also make sure to 
increase shared understanding of others. 
 
7.5.2 Management of staff 
With the relevance of human aspects for designing interfaces, it is most interesting 
that one of the managers’ competencies is being sensitive to people aspects. This 
mainly concerns the monitoring function and can also uncover difficulties before 
the project starts (anticipation) and of course while it is in progress (responding). It 
was highly beneficial to consider others (staff and external stakeholders) and to 
recognize dynamics among those people. Interacting with employees on a regular 
basis and fostering their active participation is a combination that was observed to 
a significant extent in successful projects and was often missing in failed projects. 
However, empowerment is needed for those competencies to become effective. 
 
It is argued that organisations could better exploit this potential of managers. From 
a design perspective this would mean to institutionalise or somehow formalise the 
use of those competencies and to examine how they could be acquired more 
effectively. Additional research could shed light on how best to achieve this. 
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8. Conclusion and limitations 
This study set out with the aim of exploring the benefit of HFE and safety science 
applications to change projects via investigating them through the lens of the four 
cornerstones of RE. It further asked for the organisational and individual 
perspective. Several conclusions can now be drawn on the basis of these 
research aims. 
 
1. HFE and safety science have the potential to deliver theoretical and 
practical contributions to CM. The study showed that their knowledge can in 
fact be adapted and that new knowledge has been created. This is due to 
the stronger and more mature theoretical framework of both disciplines and 
to their intense application in practical settings of high-risk environments. 
An example for this argument is how complexity has been embraced as a 
concept for several decades whilst CM has only recently explicitly focused 
on the shift to complexity. 
 
2. The dissociation of success and failure, organisational versus individual 
perspective, and the four cornerstones were each essential for reaching the 
findings of this study. Several core findings would not have been achieved if 
any had been left out, for example those discussed under the following 
point. 
 
3. One specific and counterintuitive finding relates to the shortcomings of 
organisational learning and confirms the benefits of the explorative safety 2 
perspective that this research has adopted. The dissociation of failure and 
success allowed identifying the shortcomings of learning from successful 
projects. Only the safety 2 focus made this possible. The dissociation of 
organisational and individual perspectives allowed the study to show that 
successful learning from projects of all kinds is mainly limited by the 
structural constraints of the organisation in question. Only this approach 
prevented the more effective individual learning from outshining the 
organisational one. Finally, the dissociation of the four cornerstones of RE 
allowed locating this learning challenge. Only by using such a framework 
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was it possible to see the specific learning aspect in the repeated themes 
and topics which otherwise would have merged into a more general picture. 
Explicitly asking for how learning happens and how it leads to 
understanding what has happened was a prerequisite. 
 
However, it has to be admitted that this study has limitations, mainly the relatively 
low number of twelve professionals interviewed. The in-depth exploration of their 
projects and more than 360 pages of transcribed interview data counter-balances 
this weakness. The possible relations between CFF and CSF that this study has 
shed some light on, have to be further investigated.  
 
Furthermore, drawing an exact line between the organisational and the individual 
perspectives can be regarded as a second limitation. Although this might reduce 
the strength of the respective findings, it has to be clearly noted that such a clear 
distinction was not found in the literature. It appears to be a general challenge that 
this study alone cannot solve.  
 
Finally, the context of this study, industries and organisations located in Germany, 
could also be considered as a limitation. Further studies are suggested to execute 
similar research in others contexts, which can support the development of 
comparative studies 
 
However, the explorative nature of this research and its contributions from its 
novel view on familiar problems outweighs the above limitations and offers a large 
potential to inform future research. 
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9. Professional development 
Embarking on a journey with the goal of obtaining a doctoral qualification and 
providing new knowledge to science is demanding. However, everybody 
experiences different challenges. My abilities to meet these challenges were 
grounded in my career up to the point of engaging in the DBA and yet were also 
the reason to start the programme in the first place. 
 
My background as an officer and helicopter pilot in the German army, in 
combination with a university degree in pedagogics and an MBA in international 
management set the scene for founding my own company, offering training and 
consulting in high risk environments. An interest in interdisciplinary approaches 
has been helpful ever since and in combination with my past work has fuelled my 
professional interest of engaging in a DBA, of which the more practically oriented 
framework was the most important reason for joining the programme. 
 
Several challenges were identified in the first-year assignment about professional 
development. They can now be reflected upon in light of the experience collected 
during the past four years. 
1. The time demands of a part-time program had to be aligned with the 
challenges of a full working schedule, where serving the aviation industry 
required much flexibility. This challenge was not underestimated but turned 
out to be as demanding as foreseen. To counter the negative effects of 
periods with high work load, which partly prevented focused work on the 
thesis, time-slots for full-time DBA work were identified. Although they had 
to be shortened sometimes due to the aforementioned flexibility, major 
milestones could only be achieved in this way. However, one challenge had 
to be constantly faced: the reserved time for specific tasks was always 
paired with the risk of underestimating how much time these tasks actually 
require. The type of work on a doctoral level can therefore by no means be 
compared with that of an MBA and one should always consider more 
buffers. Even though the challenge of required time allocation was 
considered, this specific aspect was underestimated. 
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2. Thinking in a scientific way was never experienced as a big challenge but 
putting that manner of thinking in writing definitely was. Bringing across 
thoughts, understandably and at the same time readably, such that the 
reader is guided along the relevant ideas to a result that makes sense was 
the central challenge. This was to a large part due to the fact that I am not a 
native English speaker. Much was learned by sitting down with native 
speakers and academics to forge that skill. I would probably consider this 
challenge to be more demanding than conducting the research or 
identifying relevant literature. This has to do with the fact that creating new 
knowledge is a challenge on its own, where help can only be offered in an 
indirect way since nobody has walked that specific way before. 
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Appendix B - Design principles for STS 
Principles of sociotechnical design (Clegg 2000) 
 Meta Principles (1-7)  
1) Design is 
systemic 
Systems are interconnected and exclusive emphasis on single 
elements should be avoided. Awareness on unintended 
consequences should be kept up even though some might only be 
seen when the system is in operation. The impact of design choices 
should be considered and tracked (tools and processes for review 
and amendment). 
(2) Values and 
mind-sets are 
central to design 
They can be articulated in different ways but include core ideas that 
guide the design process. Therefore, existing practices should be 
challenged and critical questions should be asked. In general, the 
assumption that humans are error prone and should be designed 
out of the system if possible, should be questioned. Humans are 
seen as an asset and technology is there to deliver complementary 
skills and abilities to meet system requirements. 
(3) Design 
involves making 
choices 
This relates to the sociotechnical arrangements to be designed as 
well as to the processes through which they are designed. These 
choices are not independent and might affect each other, but they 
are also not deterministic and different degrees of freedom remain. 
Choices therefore constrain other choices. 
(4) Design 
should reflect 
the needs of the 
business, its 
users and their 
managers 
Even though obvious all too often the design does not meet all the 
needs, which is why it is explicitly stated as a principle. Dangers are 
that the latest fad or fashion might affect design or technological 
aspects might determine agendas for change. 
(5) Design is an 
extended social 
process 
Design continues beyond implementation and is affected and 
affects the people involved in implementation, use, management 
and maintenance. In addition, many stakeholders might have an 
effect on (the social nature of) system design. Hence design and its 
meaning can be interpreted in different ways.  
(6) Design is 
socially shaped 
Wider social factors should also be considered. Design choices are 
thus partly social phenomena and socially shaped. This includes 
fads and fashion. 
7) Design is 
contingent 
No ‘one best way’ exists and design choices do not have universal 
application because they are contingent. Their nature is however 
not well understood. Context, competing demands and their 
opportunity costs have to be considered. But an optimum choice 
might not be found nor understood. 
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Principles of sociotechnical design (Clegg 2000) 
Content Principles (8-13) 
(8) Core processes 
should be 
integrated 
Splitting core process across artificial organisational boundaries 
should be avoided. People should be able to manage complete 
processes and have the resources and authority for that. 
Structures have to fit the appropriate process (no delays, 
repetitions etc.). Fragmentation of production, design and user 
is a good example. 
(9) Design entails 
multiple task 
allocation between 
and amongst 
humans and 
machines 
Multiple task allocations are the core of sociotechnical design. 
The principle refers to criteria and guidelines of well-designed 
jobs and e.g. how or if team-work is an effective choice. A 
difficulty is that there is little work about establishing the 
contingencies under which certain forms of work organisation 
are optimal. 
(10) System 
components 
should be 
congruent 
New systems might change existing one but they can also be 
assimilated. Accommodation then becomes a catalyst for 
change. The design of control and information systems is 
highlighted and a set of further criteria is given in Clegg (2000). 
Information should support those taking action. 
(11) Systems 
should be simple 
and make 
problems visible 
If systems are simple their ease of use is promoted. Further 
concerns are ease of understanding and learnability. By 
allocating resources to problem solution addressing difficulties is 
more likely. 
(12) Problems 
should be 
controlled at 
source 
Variances should be controlled at source. Time and resources 
are saved, motivated people can act and cognitive people can 
learn. Empowerment and semi-autonomous work-groups are 
methods. It has to be checked if the principle is applicable (see 
No 7). This principle works best with higher levels of uncertainty. 
(13) The means of 
undertaking tasks 
should be flexibly 
specified 
Work systems should not over-specified in order to stay flexible. 
Local experts are seen as assets and have to be allowed, 
especially in bureaucratic organisations. Complexity of systems 
might put natural boarders to this principle. Local tailorability has 
to be checked against costs from a technical perspective. 
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Principles of sociotechnical design (Clegg 2000) 
Process Principles (14-19) 
(14) Design 
practice itself is a 
sociotechnical 
system 
Design processes are increasingly subject to sociotechnical 
changes and have to be designed as well. Sociotechnical 
thinking and principles have to be applied to them as well. 
(15) Systems and 
their design should 
be owned by their 
managers and their 
users 
This relates to No 8 and the end-user should be included in the 
design as well as the managers that will be responsible for its 
management, use and support. This is a turnaround on the 
“user participation” as the expert should have an assisting 
function. 
(16) Evaluation is 
an essential aspect 
of design 
New systems often do not provide the expected performance 
improvements because systematic evaluation is rarely 
undertaken. Many reasons exist e.g. over-optimistic estimates 
due to political statements for persuasion to release capital. 
Avoiding exposure to failure is another reason. When new 
projects wait the past becomes less interesting. Evaluation is a 
requirement for learning and thus has to be pluralistic. 
(17) Design 
involves 
multidisciplinary 
education 
If design is undertaken by people with partial knowledge it can 
only be partially effective. Pluralism is the goal and a means to 
address complexity. Creative and innovative solutions are more 
likely to emerge. Drawing on the social and the technical side 
requires considerable resources and support. 
(18) Resources and 
support are 
required 
Expertise, knowledge and expertise require time and money. 
Timeline and budget are constraints. Time and expertise are 
considered the most important since application of the principles 
so far consumes time. Support through methods and tools and 
through structures and mechanisms has also to be provided. 
Not only during but also after the design process (se No 5). 
(19) System design 
involves political 
processes 
The principles highlight the political nature of change. 
Stakeholders will not see the requirements involved in these 
principles as trivial. Senior Managers need to give support and 
cannot just abrogate their responsibilities to the “technical 
guys”. Mechanisms for this need to be in place. 
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Appendix C - Difficulties and “myths” of safety 
Difficulties and “myths” of safety approaches based on Hollnagel (2014) and Pitzer (2015) 
Difficulty Description Problematic assumption 
Causality 
credo 
The logic of forward causality, from cause to effect, is 
equally applied to observed effects. The result is 
backwards causality, from effect to cause. While this is 
possible in relatively uncomplicated systems, it is 
impossible in complicated or complex systems. 
1. Assumption of reverse 
causality 
2. Rationality assumption: It is 
logically possible to reason 
backwards. 
The 
pyramid of 
problems 
Also called accident pyramid. Parts from the assumption 
that an increasing level of severity of an event equals to 
a smaller number of occurrences e.g. for every major 
injury there is a higher number of minor injuries and an 
even greater number of near misses. 
1. Categories of events can be 
defined in an unambiguous way. 
2. There is a relationship 
between categories e.g. the 
more near misses the more 
injuries 
The 90% 
solution 
(Human 
Error) 
Human error has been seen as the possible cause for 
90% of accidents and is used as explanation for adverse 
outcomes. Human error is used as a catch-all category 
and not a meaningful term, since it can denote a cause, 
an event or an outcome. There is a lack of agreement 
about what “human error” is. The 90% suggest that 
something is fundamentally wrong with the design and 
operation of socio-technical systems. 
1. If humans are 90% 
responsible when something 
rarely goes wrong, are they also 
responsible when it goes right in 
most other cases? 
2. Who or what is responsible for 
the remaining 10%. 
Root cause Suggests to find a definitive cause for an adverse 
outcome while ruling out alternate explanations and 
stopping the motivation to look further. 
1. There is one or several basic 
or first causes. 
2. Eliminating the cause makes 
failure impossible. 
3. The system can be 
decomposed into basic 
elements. 
4. The dynamic of the system 
can be explained on the level of 
decomposed elements. 
Causation The lack of data on events in near-zero organisations makes quantification of risk nearly 
impossible and turns it into a guess. Risks have a certain probability and through analysis 
it can be found and precautions can be taken. 
Compliance Compliance is advocated as a way to prevent negative 
outcomes when procedures that shall guarantee safety 
are followed. Compliance makes people less responsible 
to threats and its signals. It also reduces attention. 
1. Procedures consider all 
possible outcomes in complex 
systems and thus guarantee 
safety 
Risk control Organisations with risk control systems create a 
complexity of their own. The risk control itself can create 
unwanted side effects e.g. risk homeostasis, where risks 
are perceived as controlled and thus might increase risk 
propensities because people think they are safe. 
1. No negative side effects of 
risk control systems. 
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Appendix D – Training syllabus CRM 
Training syllabus for Crew Resource Management Training (CRM) 
Commission Regulation (EU) No 965/2012 - AMC1 ORO.FC.115 Crew resource 
management (CRM) training – Flight crew  
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Appendix E – Training syllabus Maintenance Human Factors 
Training syllabus for human factors training in aviation maintenance organisations 
based on Commission Regulation (EU) No 1321/2014 Appendix II (Part 145) – 
AMC 145.30(e) 
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Appendix F - Resilience Engineering Principles 
 
Resilience Engineering Principles (Lay et al., 2015) 
 
Principle 1: Variability and uncertainty are inherent in complex work. 
Principle 2: Expert operators are sources of reliability. 
Principle 3: A system view is necessary to understand and manage complex work. 
Principle 4: It is necessary to understand “normal work”. 
Principle 5: Focus on what we want: to create safety. 
 
Resilience Engineering Principles (Woltjer et al., 2015b) 
 
1. work-as-done, 
2. varying conditions, 
3. signals and cues (for anticipation, monitoring, response),  
4. goal trade-offs, 
5. adaptive capacity, 
6. coupling and interactions, 
7. timing, pacing, and synchronization, 
8. under-specification and approximate adjustments. 
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Appendix G – Change management methods 
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Appendix H – Distribution of themes in the four cornerstones 
Monitoring Successful Projects Failed Projects 
Individual 
perspective 
Organisational 
perspective 
Individual 
perspective 
Organisational 
perspective 
Number of quotes 21 35 19 17 
Number of 
themes 
12 27 14 10 
Total count of 
themes 
27 48 25 25 
 
 
Responding Successful Projects Failed Projects 
Individual 
perspective 
Organisation 
perspective 
Individual 
perspective 
Organisation 
perspective 
Number of quotes 60 47 27 46 
Number of 
themes 
32 24 20 24 
Total count of 
themes 
75 61 36 57 
 
 
 
  
Anticipating Successful Projects Failed Projects 
Individual 
perspective 
Organisation 
perspective 
Individual 
perspective 
Organisation 
perspective 
Number of quotes 33 24 21 18 
Number of 
themes 
20 17 11 11 
Total count of 
themes 
46 37 22 27 
Learning Successful Projects Failed Projects 
Individual 
perspective 
Organisation 
perspective 
Individual 
perspective 
Organisation 
perspective 
Number of quotes 83 37 55 17 
Number of 
themes 
38 19 29 11 
Total count of 
themes 
98 40 70 21 
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Appendix I – Definition of themes (Monitoring Cornerstone/Individual) 
Theme Description Category 
Low stress The interviewee does not experience the project as 
stressful 
Individual 
aspects (s) 
Limited awareness 
on human aspects 
The interviewee lacks awareness of human-related 
aspects of his colleagues or subordinates 
Active participation of 
staff 
Indications for active employee participation, e.g. 
supportive behaviour and extra work 
Human aspects 
(s) 
Visible competence The competence of other people as an indicator for 
performance 
Lack of knowledge The organisation or higher management lacks specific 
knowledge related to and important for the project 
 
Organisation 
aspects (s) 
Confirmed planning The project develops according to plan Project aspects 
(s) Difficulties overcome Difficulties and insecurities well managed 
Increased KPI 
measurement 
More measurement of KPI or shorter intervals 
Rumours about 
difficulties 
Rumours as an indicator for unnoticed difficulties  
Open communication 
 
Problems and concerns openly addressed Monitoring 
process and 
interpretation 
Aspects (s) 
Perceived cooperation A general feeling of good cooperation between employees 
and teams that was helpful and that everybody enjoyed  
Seeking regular 
feedback/exchange 
The effort to exchange information and get feedback from 
others 
Self-critique A critical view of the interviewee of his own performance  Individual 
aspects (f) Difficulties not  
recognized 
Realizing difficulties within the project too late or by 
surprise 
Taken for granted  
attitude 
Assumptions that were taken for granted and not verified 
Human limitations 
 
Reaching or crossing limits of human performance, e.g. 
frustration 
Human aspects 
(f) 
Humans as indicators 
for difficulties 
Realizing problems within the project through awareness 
of human behaviour, e.g. reduced motivation or increased 
critique 
No active reporting Information had to be looked for and was not 
communicated 
Reduced participation Like a negative version of the theme “active participation 
of staff” where employees reduce their level of active 
participation. 
Lack of knowledge See above Organisation 
aspects (f) 
Inappropriate design Processes and structures were inappropriate or hindered 
project success 
Project aspects 
(f) 
Lack of strategic focus Lack of focus on the main goal and purpose of the project 
Target(s) not reached Important milestones of the project were not reached 
Delayed negative 
effects 
Negative effects, results and side effects of activities (e.g. 
of consultants) were not or could not be recognized 
immediately 
Monitoring 
process and 
interpretation 
aspects (f) Insufficient 
implementation 
The implementation process was not carried out with 
enough effort  
Lack of cooperation and  
communication 
Not providing relevant and necessary information and 
support 
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 Appendix J – Definition of themes (Monitoring 
Cornerstone/Organisation) 
Theme Description Category/group 
Absence rate (+) The absence rate was evaluated as positive 
Indicators/KPI (hard) (s) 
Break-even (+) Break-even was reached 
Cost (+) Costs were evaluated as positive/not too high 
Economic non-specified (+) 
The interviewee referred to economic benchmarks in a 
positive way, but did not specify exactly which numbers 
Milestones/deadlines (+) Milestones and deadlines were met 
Number of customers (+) The number of customers was evaluated as positive 
Quality of data (+) The collected data provided enough information 
Regulation adherence Business practice was within regulatory limits 
Revenue (+) Revenue was evaluated as positive 
Stock (+) Stock level was evaluated as positive 
Customer satisfaction (+) Customers were largely satisfied with performance 
Indicators/KPI (soft) (s) 
Passion score staff (+) Staff motivation commitment was good or high 
Planning confirmed The project develops without significant changes  
Indicators (s) Targets reached/positive 
results 
The aim of the project was reached or the results evaluated 
as positive 
Significant positive external 
feedback 
Customers and external sources were satisfied with 
performance and procedures Perceived/noticed aspects 
(s) 
Active participation of staff 
Indications for active employee participation, e.g. supportive 
behaviour and extra work 
Aim for SMM 
Effort to achieve a shared mental model (SMM) of the project 
for stakeholders Process and 
interpretation/social 
processes (s) 
Regular/high rate of 
exchange 
High rate of exchange of information relevant to the project, 
e.g. many meetings in person 
Seeking feedback Feedback was collected actively 
Management support Support by higher management, e.g. providing data 
Process and 
interpretation/Aspects of 
higher management (s) 
Open upward reporting Open communication towards higher management 
Insufficient 
information/support mgt. 
Not enough higher management monitoring support, e.g. lack 
of understanding or difficulty aversion 
Automated 
measurement/interpretation  
Data collection and interpretation was automated 
Process and 
interpretation/Measurement 
and process (s) 
Improved measurement 
tool 
The quality of the monitoring tool was increased 
Increased rate of 
measurement 
More measurement or shorter intervals 
Focus on opportunities  Positive perspective on achieving additional business  Process and interpretation 
(s) Follow standards Norms and standards were used 
Absence rate (-) Absence rate was too high 
Indicators/KPI (hard) (f) 
Economic, non-specified (-) The interviewee referred to economic benchmarks in a 
negative way, but did not specify exactly which numbers 
Targets not reached/ 
insufficient results 
The aim of the project was not reached or the results were 
evaluated as insufficient 
Indicators (f) 
Culture/goal misalignment Clash of culture and aim of the project 
Perceived/noticed aspects 
(f) 
Difficulties not recognized Difficulties were not identified soon enough 
Informal/semiformal 
reporting 
Information was collected in a non-formal way through 
interaction  
Limited social awareness No awareness of morale and climate 
Insufficient 
information/support mgt. 
Not enough monitoring support by higher management e.g. 
lack of understanding or difficulty aversion 
Process and 
interpretation/Aspects of 
higher management (f) 
Ignoring discrepancies  Information/Indicator discrepancies not addressed 
Process and 
interpretation/Measurement 
and process (f) 
KPI/Indicators without 
enough interpretation 
Information collected but not interpreted or not 
interpreted consistently enough, even though this was 
possible 
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Appendix K – Definition of themes (Responding 
Cornerstone/Individual) 
Success 
Theme Description Category/grou
p 
Re-evaluate current 
approach 
The actual approach within the project was questioned 
 
1 / Awareness 
Awareness of social 
dynamics 
The manager was considering social dynamics of stakeholders and 
the team(s) or department(s) 
Awareness of own emotions The manager was aware of the emotional impact that the project had 
on himself 
SMM on difficulties A shared mental model (SMM) of the difficulties within the project 
existed with others 
Awareness on human 
resources 
The availability and limitations of human related resources was 
considered 
Long-term thinking Long-term effects and side-effects were considered 
Pursue goals determinedly The goals of the project were in the focus all the time 1 / Coordination 
and leadership Active participation (hands 
on) 
The manager was involved in activities and hence had an active and 
concurrent understanding of related aspects 
Seek lateral cooperation Cooperation with units on the same organisational level 
Managing needs of 
stakeholder 
The needs of stakeholders were considered 
Establish shared vocabulary Using terms that are common to everybody 
Adapting structures and 
processes 
The manager was able to change structures and processes 
according to project requirements 
Realise failure and take 
corrective action 
The manager realised that something went wrong or failed and took 
corrective measures 
Proactive adjustment 
(competent risk taking) 
Activities that are based on a forward-looking perspective, involving 
consciously taking risks without endangering project elements  
Cooperative decision 
making 
The manager was taking decisions and included other stakeholder 
and employees in the process 
Show trust to employees The manager visibly exhibited trust towards employees 1 / Management 
of staff Empower staff Employees receive freedom to take decisions and act 
Competence based 
allocation of staff 
Staffing and allocation of employees is based on required and 
available competencies 
Keep staff updated Employees are provided with continuous updates on project 
progress 
Direct interaction with 
affected staff 
Communication with staff by the manager happens constantly 
Objective approach The visible effort of collecting and analysing facts neutrally 1 / Helpful 
activities and 
support 
External help (coaching) Using external help e.g. by consultants or coaches 
Accepting and dealing with 
uncertainty 
Project planning and management considers uncertainty 
Lack of awareness of social 
dynamics 
Not enough consideration of social dynamics between employees 2 / Awareness 
Lack of lateral coordination 
from others 
Lateral cooperation between units/departments is low 
 
2 / Coordination 
and leadership 
Proactive adjustments but 
risking negative outcomes 
A forward-looking perspective is applied but the manager accepts 
the risk of identified negative results 
Culture of fear Employees associated mistakes with blaming 2/ Management of 
staff 
Request direct 
management support 
Support from the next management level was sought 
 
3 / Positive effects 
Open upward reporting Open and regular flow of information to next management level 
without holding back negative aspects 
Top management support Support from the C-Level and board 
Direct management support Support from the next management level 
Lack of direct management 
support 
Not enough support from the next management level 3 / Negative 
effects 
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Failure 
Theme Description Category/group 
Awareness of social 
dynamics 
Consideration of social dynamics between 
employees 
1. / Awareness 
Re-evaluate current 
approach 
The manager re-evaluates the approach taken in the 
project 
Awareness of failure /not 
reaching goal 
The manager is aware that failure is happening and 
the goal likely not being achieved 
Awareness/management of 
negative emotions 
The manager is aware of his own negative emotions 
and engages in cooping 
Realise failure and take 
corrective action 
The manager realises that important project elements 
have failed and is adjusting them 
1. / Coordination and 
leadership 
Seek coordination with 
affected parties 
Coordination with those affected by the change 
project is sought 
Keep going attitude 
(perseverance) 
The manager keeps up with constraints and slow 
progress or a lack of results 
Direct interaction with 
affected staff 
Communication with staff by the manager happens 
constantly 
1. / Management of 
staff 
Support cooperation within 
team 
Cooperation with the project team is supported by the 
manager 
Consider needs of staff The needs of staff are considered by the manager 
Motivation and proactive 
behaviour 
Behaviour can be described as proactive while the 
motivation for the project is high 
1. / Helpful activities 
and support 
Lack of awareness of social 
dynamics 
Not enough consideration of social dynamics 
between employees 
2. / Awareness 
Lack of awareness of 
culture 
Not enough consideration of organisational culture 
Not understanding 
dynamics/problem 
The difficulties and how they affect the project are not 
understood properly 
Negative emotions Negative emotions about or due to the project 
Lack of lateral cooperation 
from others 
Lateral cooperation between units/departments is low 2. / Coordination and 
leadership 
Keep going attitude 
(firefighting) 
The manager is keeping up with constraints and slow 
progress and has to react to short-term problems 
Direct management support Support from the next management level 3. / Positive effects 
Lack of management 
support 
Lack of support from the next management level 3. / Negative effects 
Lack of top management 
support 
Not enough support from the top management level 
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Appendix L – Definition of themes (Responding 
Cornerstone/Organisation) 
Success 
Theme Description Category/group 
SMM on difficulties A shared mental model (SMM) of the difficulties 
within the project existed 
1 / Awareness 
Pursue goals consistently 
 
Goals were followed fast and without deviating 1 / Coordination and 
leadership 
Proactive external 
communication 
Communication with external stakeholders was 
proactive 
Adapting structures and 
processes 
The organisation was able to change structures and 
processes according to project requirements 
Just leadership Leadership was fair and treated employees equally 1 / Management of 
staff Flexible reduction of staff It was possible to reduce staff with flexible measures 
Empower staff Employees received freedom to take decisions and 
act 
Competence based 
allocation of staff 
Staffing and allocation of employees is based on 
required and available competencies 
Direct interaction Regular communication and interaction with 
employees 
Keep staff updated Employees are provided with continuous updates on 
project progress 
Provide resources  The required resources are provided 1 / Helpful activities 
and support Cooperative attitude Stakeholders are willing to cooperate 
End and restart without 
redesign 
The project was stopped but then reinitiated without 
adjustment 
2 / Coordination and 
leadership 
Reactive adaptation 
(firefighting) 
Adaptations were reactive and based on upcoming 
problems and difficulties 
Decision process too slow It took very long to take decisions  
Inadequate allocation of 
staff 
Staffing and allocation of employees is not based 
sufficiently on required and available competencies 
2 / Management of 
staff 
Ignoring feedback and 
competence 
Feedback and competences are not considered and 
not made use of 
Not providing enough 
resources  
The organisation did not provide enough or no 
adequate resources 
2 / Helpful activities 
and support 
Cooperative attitude Staff responded with the will to cooperate 3 / Positive effects 
Increased cooperation The project was accepted by employees and led to 
an increase in cooperation 
Pressure experienced as 
positive 
Performance pressure was experienced as helpful 
Motivation and  
proactiveness 
Employees accepted the project and acted in a 
proactive way 
Lack of commitment Employees had not enough commitment 3 / Negative effects 
Resistance (loss of 
privileges) 
Some employees reacted with resistance when their 
privileges were reduced 
Culture of low engagement The general will for engagement within the project 
was low 
Frustration Employees reacted with frustration to how the project 
went 
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Failure 
Theme Description Category/group 
Realise failure and take 
corrective action 
The actual approach within the project was 
questioned and adapted 
1 / Coordination and 
leadership 
Re-evaluate actual 
approach 
The actual approach within the project was 
reconsidered 
Adapting structures and 
processes 
The organisation was able to change structures and 
processes according to project requirements 
Keep staff updated Staff was provided with current updates 1 / Management of 
staff 
Lack of analytical action 
and systemic awareness 
The organisation did not evaluate and consider 
systemic aspects enough e.g. not considering 
feedback 
2 / Awareness 
Disruptive event not 
compensated 
A disruptive event did not trigger corrective 
adjustments 
2 / Coordination and 
leadership 
Single non-systemic 
intervention 
An intervention was performed without considering 
side-effects 
Reactive adaptation 
(firefighting) 
Adaptations were reactive and based on upcoming 
problems and difficulties 
Non-goal-oriented 
activities 
Activities without focus on the goal 
Repeat failure without 
adjustment 
The same approach that led to failure was applied 
Passive behaviour No activities or adjustments in spite of difficulties 
Inadequate coordination 
with others 
Coordination with other stakeholders was not 
adequate 
Not responding to social 
dynamics 
Social dynamics of staff were recognized but not 
acted upon 
2 / Management of 
staff 
Competencies not 
understood 
The benefit of available competencies of employees 
was not comprehended by the organisation 
Blaming culture Difficulties were often approached with blaming 
behaviour 
Inadequate structures Available structures were not beneficial for the 
project  
2 / Helpful activities 
and support 
Not providing enough 
resources 
The organisation did not provide enough or no 
adequate resources 
Keep motivation up 
 
Employees showed their will to perform despite 
difficulties 
3 / Positive effects 
Initial supportive attitude The initial reaction to the project was supportive 
Frustration Employees reacted with frustration 3 / Negative effects 
Lack of commitment Employees did not have enough commitment 
Egoistic protective actions Staff tried to secure their personal ground 
Biased by past negative 
experience 
Past negative projects influenced the current project 
Resistance Some employees reacted with resistance to the 
project 
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Appendix M – Definition of themes (Anticipation 
Cornerstone/Individual) 
Success 
Theme Description Category/group 
Analyse/plan before acting Forward looking perspective, seeking to understand 
before actions are taken 
1 / Awareness and 
assessment 
Evaluation of own 
competencies 
Reflecting on the own competencies versus the 
requirements 
Compare with past figures Compare past results from similar projects 
Project evaluated as useful The manager is convinced of the project benefit 
Large perception range Considering distant aspects and events 
Request support 
 
Requesting support for the project from 
management 
1 / Actions 
Communicate/manage 
social acceptance 
The manager is engaged in activities that increases 
employee acceptance of the project 
Positive attitude The manager has a positive attitude regarding the 
project 
1 / Attitude 
Management commitment The manager expects management commitment 
Critical perspective The manager reflects on the project situation 
critically  
Resourceful perspective 
seeking opportunities 
The manager knows about the ability to perform and 
seeks to exploit opportunities 
Wrong assumptions about 
SM 
The assumptions about shared understanding are 
not correct 
2 / Awareness and 
assessment 
Positive perspective but 
not enough preparation 
 
A positive attitude towards the project is not 
reflected in adequate preparation, underestimating 
the project  
2 / Attitude 
Management 
pressure/unclear support  
The manager expects pressure from management 
and is unsure about their support 
3 / Internal 
Inadequate 
structure/design 
Existing structures are expected to provide 
difficulties 
Project not attractive It seems that people will not look forward to the 
project 
Social/human challenges Difficulties between groups and single employees 
are expected 
Uncertainty Several project aspects cannot be calculated or 
have a high variability 
Warning signs based on 
experience 
The manager recognizes potential risks that he 
knows from other projects 
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Failure 
Theme Description Category/group 
Recognized but doubted The manager has recognized difficulties but does 
not believe they are real 
2 / Awareness and 
assessment 
Recognized without 
enough relevance to act 
The manager has recognized difficulties but sees no 
need to act 
2 / Actions 
Concerns not considered 
by others 
The concerns of the manager are not shared by 
others 
2 / Attitude 
Inadequate 
structure/design 
Existing structures are expected to provide 
difficulties 
3 /Internal 
Inadequate process Existing processes are expected to provide 
difficulties 
Lack of experience/system 
knowledge 
The manager evaluates his experience and 
understanding of the organisation as not high 
enough  
Not enough resources The manager expects a lack of resources 
Passive behaviour of staff The manager expects staff to behave passively 
Hidden agenda The manager expects conflicting and hidden goals 
from stakeholders 
Lack of need to act The manager expects stakeholders to underestimate 
difficulties 
Scope too large The manager evaluates the project as having a too 
large scope 
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Appendix M – Definition of themes (Anticipation 
Cornerstone/Organisation) 
Success 
Theme Description Category/group 
Use expert knowledge Expertise of skilled employees was used for 
preparation 
1 / Awareness and 
assessment 
Consider different 
perspectives 
Different perspectives were considered when 
assessing the project 
Consider 
uncertainty/complexity 
Uncertainty and complexity were considered in the 
assessment of the project 
Request feedback Feedback from others was sought 
Allow emergence of people 
knowledge 
The organisation created an atmosphere that 
allowed knowledge to emerge without being 
requested 
Active awareness of 
risk/threat 
The organisation was actively trying to consider an 
be aware of risks and threats 
Provide enough resources The organisation provided necessary resources to 
anticipate developments 
1 / Actions 
Contingency planning The organisation is prepared for negative 
developments 
Competent risk taking Risks were taken without risking significant negative 
effects 
Proactive communication 
(internal/external) 
Communication (internal and external) was 
performed in a proactive way on the basis of 
anticipated developments 
Fear of mistakes/failure The fear of mistakes and failure was too high 3 /Internal 
Minor risks/precautions Only minor risks were identified and minor 
precautions necessary 
Not able of managing 
complexity 
The ability to deal with complex situations and 
developments was identified as too low 
Not meeting target The probability of not reaching the target was too 
high 
Reduced cooperation Cooperation has been diminishing to a point where it 
was seen as a risk 
Loss of customer The risk of losing customers was identified   3 /External 
Threat of unemployment The project could involve job-cutting 
 
Failure 
Theme Description Category/group 
Good perception range 
 
Forward thinking and consideration of distant aspects 1 / Awareness and 
assessment 
Lack of experience about 
system dynamic 
Not enough understanding about the dynamic 
interactions within the organisation 
2 / Awareness and 
assessment 
No system/forward thinking Not considering systemic effects and/or their possible 
future developments  
Risks and concerns ignored Deliberately not considering risks and concerns brought 
up by employees and/or managers 
2 / Actions 
Recognized without enough 
relevance for action (10) 
Recognized aspects were underestimated and no need 
for precautions seen 
Inadequate structure/design Structures and processes were expected to be 
inadequate for the project 
3 /Internal 
Inadequate tools/approach Methods and procedures for anticipation are seen as 
inadequate and/or expected to not provide required 
performance 
Not enough system 
understanding 
Not understanding the dynamics of interactions within 
the system is seen as a risk or difficulty 
Overambitious goals The goals are seen as too difficult to reach 
High level of difficulty Competencies and skills will have to be at a high level 
to manage the project  
No contingency planning Not preparing enough for possible negative events is 
seen as a risk 
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Appendix N – Definition of themes (Preparation) 
 
Theme Description Category/group 
Helpful aspect: 
Dense training history 
The managers have access to a broad selection of 
helpful competencies and skills 
Individual / Training 
Helpful aspect: 
Will for continuation 
training 
The managers are willing to increase their skill-set 
Non-helpful aspect: 
Not enough adequate 
training received 
Not enough of the required skills and competencies 
have been provided to the managers so far 
Non-helpful aspect: 
No training received 
None of the required skills and competencies have 
been provided to the managers in the past 
Helpful aspect: 
Past experience available 
The managers have experience from past projects Individual / Expertise-
Experience 
Helpful aspect: 
Availability of experts 
The managers have access to experts 
Helpful aspect: 
Availability of coaching 
The managers have access to coaching 
Helpful aspect: 
Adequate amount of 
training provided 
The adequate amount of training was provided by 
the organisation to employees and/or managers 
Organisation / 
Training 
Helpful aspect: 
Adequate amount of 
training provided to 
management 
The adequate amount of training was provided by 
the organisation for the management 
Non-helpful aspect: 
Lack of adequate amount 
of training 
Not enough training was provided by the 
organisation to employees and/or managers 
Helpful aspect: 
Availability of external 
experts 
External experts were available or made available 
for the organisation 
Organisation / 
Expertise-Experience 
Non-helpful aspect: 
Lack of management 
expertise 
 
Management was not having enough expertise for 
the requirements of change projects 
Non-helpful aspect: 
Experts not used 
Experts were available but not used by the 
organisation 
Non-helpful aspect: 
Lack of lessons learned 
The organisation has not made enough or little use 
of past projects as far as preparation for future 
projects is concerned 
Organisation / 
Approach 
Non-helpful aspect: 
Lack of awareness/attitude 
Relevant aspects or developments are not noticed 
by the organisation 
Helpful aspect: 
Framework/support 
provided  
The required framework (e.g. structures, processes 
and resources) and/or support are provided 
Organisation / 
Structure 
Non-helpful aspect: 
Lack of framework/support 
The required framework (e.g. structures, processes 
and resources) and/or support are not provided or 
too little 
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Appendix O – Definition of themes (Learning cornerstone/Individual) 
 
Success 
Theme Description Category/group 
Knowledge about WAD The manager has a detailed understanding of the background and 
content of the project; WAD (work as done) 
1 / Attitude and 
behaviour 
Adapt process to humans Human needs are considered when processes are being 
designed 
1 / Coordination and 
communication 
Decisive leadership/pursue 
goals determinedly 
Goals are being followed determinedly and with the will to achieve 
results 
Internal cooperation Cooperation between different units had significant positive effects 
Open internal/external 
communication 
Exchange between units and towards external contacts/partners 
is open and relevant information is not held back 
Stop project A relevant part of the project/sub-project was stopped and had 
positive effects on the overall success   
Active participation of staff Staff was empowered to take part in planning and decision-
making during the entire project 
1 / Staff 
Broad/shared acceptance of 
project  
The content/goal/process was broadly accepted by affected 
people 
Visible commitment of 
management 
It was visible that the management supported the project 
Consultant support Consultants had a significant effect on the result 1 / External or project 
Competent risk-taking Risks were taken without compromising or endangering relevant 
aspects but achieving improved results 
2 / Attitude and 
behaviour 
Proactiveness Taking actions before anticipated difficulties could arise 
Decisive leadership 
 
Taking required decisions without unnecessary waiting time or 
inactivity 
2 / Coordination and 
communication 
SMM A shared mental model (SMM) about the project was given 
Autonomy/controversy in 
teams  
Teams were allowed with a large amount of autonomy and 
controversial opinions were tolerated 
2 / Staff 
Active participation See above (here: not as reason but helpful aspect) 
Direct interaction Direct interaction with employees of the project or with those 
affected by the project 
Evaluate engagement  Evaluate engagement of employees (critically) as a basis for 
adequate action e.g. replacement 
Visible commitment of 
management 
See above (here: named as support not as reason for result) 
Trusting experts Experts (internal or external) were consulted and advice followed 2 / External or project 
Base success on result The evaluation of success was solely based on the result 3 / Coordination and 
communication Lack of SMM No shared mental model about the project 
Project too big Scope of project to large 
Reactive adaptation Actions were taken reactively without foresight or anticipation 
Inexperienced management Management did not have enough experience 
Negative effects on people A variety of negative effects e.g. frustration, loss of credibility 3 / Staff 
Adequate preparation To prepare adequately based on knowledge about the project 4 / Attitude and 
behaviour Better perception range More forward looking 
Competent risk taking Taking more risks without compromising or endangering relevant 
aspects but achieving improved results 
Seek system understanding More efforts to understand system dynamics 
Maintain open/adaptive attitude More consideration of alternative approaches and staying flexible 
Communicate content and 
benefit 
Explain how the project will be performed and which benefits it will 
have 
4 / Coordination and 
communication 
Communicate method  Explain which method will be used 
Develop SMM Create a shared mental model 
Use expertise of staff Use available expertise of employees 
Active participation of staff Seek to empower staff to take part in planning and decision-
making during the entire project 
4 / external or project 
Direct interaction Seek direct interaction with affected employees in the 
project 
Show visible commitment Show visible commitment when responsible for a future 
project 
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Failure 
Theme Description Category/group 
Not realizing/accepting 
failure 
Failure was not accepted or realised while in progress 1 / Attitude and 
behaviour 
Inadequate 
structure/process 
Inadequate processes and structures had a significant 
effect on the result 
1 / Coordination 
and 
communication Wrong assumptions Wrong assumptions had a significant effect on the result 
Lack of system 
understanding 
A lack of system understanding had a significant effect on 
the result 
No visible management 
commitment 
That the management not visibly supported the project had 
a significant effect on the result 
Project not accepted The project was rejected by employees and that had a 
significant effect on the result 
1 / Staff 
Resistance Employees did work against the project, affecting the 
outcome 
Not addressing needs Needs of staff were not addressed and partly affected the 
outcome 
No reporting by staff Staff did not communicate enough and the lack of 
information affected the result significantly 
Inadequate use of 
external support 
(consultants) 
External resources e.g. consultants were not used properly 
and affected the outcome 
1 / External or 
project 
Lack of cooperation 
towards partners 
Cooperation with business partners was named as a 
reason for failure 
Self-critique The manager critically questioned his performance 2 / Attitude and 
behaviour Experience from past 
negative project 
Experience from past negative project had positive effects 
on managing the current project 
Passive behaviour 
 
Actions were not taken and decisions not made when 
needed  
3 / Attitude and 
behaviour 
History of 
failure/difficulties 
Past difficulties and failure affected the managers 
approach negatively 
No understanding of 
context 
The context of the project was not sufficiently understood 
by the manager 
3 / Coordination 
and 
communication No management support Management did not sufficiently support the project 
No direct interaction with 
staff 
Not enough direct interaction with employees of the project 
or with those affected by the project 
3 / Staff 
Poor consultant 
performance 
Performance of consultants was low 3 / External or 
project 
Increased complexity The complexity of the content and the project situation was 
high 
Success starts with 
humans 
Humans are seen as the main reason for success and 
shall be considered more 
4 / Attitude and 
behaviour 
Relate theory to practice The gap between theory and practical application shall be 
reduced 
Apply self-
critique/evaluation 
More self-critique and critical reflections shall be made 
Seek system 
understanding  
More efforts shall be made to understand system 
dynamics 
4 / Coordination 
and 
communication Smart use of resources More sustainable use of resources 
Seek resources/support Seeking support and resources access more actively 
Seek management 
support  
Seeking management support and resources access more 
actively 
Seek direct interaction Seeking more direct interaction with employees of the 
project or with those affected by the project 
4 / Staff 
Create commitment 
through sense-making 
More efforts shall be made to increase the understanding 
of employees about why the project is necessary 
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Appendix P – Definition of themes (Learning 
cornerstone/Organisation) 
Success 
Theme Description Category/group 
Competent risk taking Risks were taken without compromising or endangering 
relevant aspects but achieving improved results 
1 / Approach 
Adapt structures and 
processes 
Adapting processes, procedures and structures 1 /Activities 
 
Seek SMM Seeking a shared mental model 
Trust experts about WAD Consider and follow advice of experts about how work is 
done 
Repeat successful 
procedure 
Repeat what lead to success in a prior project 
Understand problem first Seek to understand problems before acting with side-
effects 
2 / Approach 
Competent risk taking 
 
Seek taking risks without compromising or endangering 
relevant aspects but achieving improved results 
Know when to stop Seek stopping a project or sub-project in time when a 
defined threshold is passed 
Request external 
feedback 
 
Seek more external feedback 2 /Activities 
Accept/consider 
uncertainty 
Increase acceptance and consideration of uncertainty  
Define role/task of 
consultants 
Roles and tasks of consultants shall be defined more 
accurately 
Not considering critical 
feedback 
Critical feedback was not considered 3 / Approach 
No lesson learned No lessons learned were done but no specific reason was 
named 
No lesson 
learned/selective 
confirmation 
No lessons learned were done because isolated positive 
aspects were used for confirmation 
No lesson learned 
(frustrated staff) 
No lessons learned were done and resulted in a high level 
of employee frustration  
Restart without redesign The project was stopped and restarted without changing 
the design 
3 /Activities 
Documented but not 
evaluated 
Documentation was performed but no evaluation done 
No documentation No documentation was performed 
Difficulties with change 
from within 
The organisation was having difficulties to initiate needed 
change from within (without external trigger or problem) 
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Failure 
Theme Description Category/group 
Change of approach/mindset The result led to a change in the approach towards 
change 
1 / Approach 
More direct interaction with 
staff  
More direct interaction with employees of the project or 
with those affected by the project was done 
1 /Activities 
Change of 
structures/processes 
Processes and structures were change as a result of the 
failed project 
Increased perception range The perception range was increase because of the 
negative project outcome 
Change mindset to constant 
unease/forward thinking 
The organisation is trying to use more forward thinking 
and to constantly maintain a critical attitude 
2 / Approach 
Analyse failure The organisation wants to improve the quality of the 
analysis (of failure) 
2 /Activities 
Critically evaluate external 
support 
The organisation will put more emphasis on critically 
evaluating the need for external support as well as the 
support as such 
Communicate/act visible and 
consistent 
The organisation will put more emphasis on consistent 
and visible communication and action 
No lesson learned 
 
No lessons learned were done 3 / Approach 
Mindset of arrogance The organisation behaved as if they could not fail 
Not using 
resources/support/experience 
The organisation had resources, support and/or 
experience available but made no use of them 
3 /Activities 
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Appendix Q – Distribution of themes and their total count 
Individual responding: Distribution of themes and their total count 
  Successful 
projects 
Failed 
projects 
First category:  
Adaptive behaviour/capacity 
Number of themes 23 11 
Total count 61 18 
Second category:  
Non-adaptive 
behaviour/capacity 
Number of themes 4 6 
Total count 4 14 
 
Comparing the total count 
between groups of themes 
in the first vs. in the second 
category 
Awareness 14 - 1 5 - 7 
Coordination and 
leadership 
25 - 2 7 -7 
Management of 
staff 
16 - 1 7 - 0 
Helpful activities 
and support 
6 - 0 1 - 0 
 
Organisational responding: Distribution of themes and their total count 
 
  Successful 
project 
Failed project 
First category:  
Adaptive behaviour/capacity 
Number of themes 12 4 
Total count 39 7 
Second category:  
Non-adaptive 
behaviour/capacity 
Number of themes 6 13 
Total count 10 38 
 
Comparing the total count 
between groups of themes 
in the first vs. in the second 
category 
Awareness 2 - 0 0 - 6 
Coordination and 
leadership 
16 - 7 6 - 24 
Management of 
staff 
13 - 2 1 - 4 
Helpful activities 
and support 
8 - 1 0 - 4 
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Individual anticipating: Distribution of themes and their total count 
  Successful 
project 
Failed project 
First category: Helpful 
(proactive) actions and 
behaviour 
Number of 
themes 
11 0 
Total count 32 0 
Second category: Non-
helpful actions and 
behaviour 
Number of 
themes 
2 3 
Total count  3 6 
Comparing the total count 
between groups of themes 
in the first vs. in the second 
category 
Awareness 12 - 2 0 - 1 
Actions 4 - 0 0 -3 
Attitude 16 - 1 0 - 2 
 
Organisational anticipating: Distribution of themes and their total count 
  Successful 
project 
Failed project 
First category: Helpful 
(proactive) actions and 
behaviour 
Number of 
themes 
10 1 
Total count 26 1 
Second category: Non-
helpful actions and 
behaviour 
Number of 
themes 
0 4 
Total count 0 17 
Comparing the total count 
between groups of themes 
in the first vs. in the second 
category 
Awareness 15 - 0 1 - 5 
Actions 11 - 0 0 - 12 
Attitude 0 - 0 0 - 0 
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Appendix R – Interview Questions 
Question 1 (warm up)  
Could you tell me what comes to your mind when you think about change 
projects? 
Question 2-A (successful project) 
Please think about a particular challenging project that went well and achieved the 
desired results. What were the main reasons that it went well? 
Question 3-A 1 (cornerstone – learning) 
Did you or the organisation change anything after this project went so well? 
Question 3-A 2 (cornerstone – learning) 
Did you or the organisation take any lessons learned from this project and what 
were concrete consequences from those learnings? 
Question 4-A 1 (cornerstone – responding) 
How did you become aware of the challenges?  
Question 4-A 2 (cornerstone – responding) 
How were the challenges handled by you, by the involved people and by the 
organisation? 
Question 4-A 3 (cornerstone – responding) 
What were the results? 
Question 4-A 4 (cornerstone – responding) 
What was helpful and what wasn’t? 
Question 5-A 1(cornerstone – monitoring) 
What made you think that everything went well or as it was planned? 
Question 5-A 2(cornerstone – monitoring) 
Were there any indicators that you were looking for, in order to ckeck if everything 
went right? 
Question 5-A 3(cornerstone – monitoring) 
Where did you get this information from, other people, observations or from the 
organisation? 
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Question 6-A 1 (cornerstone – anticipating) 
What were your expectations before the project began? 
Question 6-A 2 (cornerstone – anticipating) 
Where there any risks or dangers to the project and if there were, how were they 
dealt with by you other people or the organisation? 
Question 6-A 3 (cornerstone – anticipating) 
Did you or other people take any general precautions? 
----------------------------------- 
Question 2-B (failed project) 
Please think about a project that did not go well, did not achieve the desired  
results or even failed. What were the main reasons for these results? 
Question 3-B 1 (cornerstone – learning) 
Did you or the organisation change anything after this project went that way? 
Question 4-B 1 (cornerstone – responding) 
How did you become aware of the challenges?  
Question 4-B 2 (cornerstone – responding) 
How were the challenges handled by you, by the involved people and by the 
organisation? 
Question 4-B 3 (cornerstone – responding) 
What were the results? 
Question 4-B 4 (cornerstone – responding) 
What was helpful and what wasn’t? 
Question 5-B 1(cornerstone – monitoring) 
When and how did you realise that the project would not go as planned or that 
difficulties were ahead? 
Question 5-B 2(cornerstone – monitoring) 
Looking back, what indicated or could have indicated those difficulties and 
challenges? 
Question 6-B 1(cornerstone – anticipating) 
Which of the difficulties were anticipated by you, other people or the organisation? 
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Question 6-B 2(cornerstone – anticipating) 
Did everybody who was involved in the project know about these difficulties? 
Question 6-B 3(cornerstone – anticipating) 
What were the consequences to these anticipations, how did you and others act 
upon them? 
Question 7 
What kind of preparation/training for the role of change manager did you receive 
and was it helpful or would you have needed any other preparation/training? 
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Appendix S – Invitation letter 
Dear Mrs./Mr. XXXXX 
As I previously informed you, I am a doctorate student at the University of 
Portsmouth / Portsmouth Business School and I would like to invite you to 
participate in the research study: 
A human factors view on the safety of organisational change – a shift of 
managerial mindset from failure and success towards resilience engineering 
 
Your participation of this study is entirely up to you. This letter will explain why the study is 
being done. This information sheet will help you to decide whether you wish to be a part of 
this study or not. This would take approximately 15 minutes. Please do not hesitate to 
contact me in case you have any questions.  
 
Purpose of the study?  
The research intends to explore the potential of high-risk industry-related human factors 
and safety knowledge to the field of organisational change. 
There is also a lot of research still to be done in order to get to a systemic understanding 
of failed change or even finding a common language for failure reasons (Decker et al. 
2012). Such an understanding would be needed in order to provide the basis for a similar 
approach as in high risk industries. In other words, there is a wide range of research gaps 
that all come with the promise of reducing the failure rate of change projects. 
The study wants to find out what we can learn from these fields in order to increase the 
success rate of change projects? 
 
Why have I been invited?  
You have been invited because of your experience with change projects. This experience 
could help to improve the success of change projects in the future. 
 
Do I have to take part?  
No. Your participation is entirely up to you. If you agree to participate, please sign the 
consent form attached to this invitation. Version number V02. 
 
What will happen to me if I take part?  
If you agree to take part in this study, you will be interviewed for a maximum time of 2 
hours. The interview will be conducted in German language. It will be digitally recorded 
and transcripted afterwards. The interview will take place in you local office or any other 
location that you prefer.  
The questions will mainly be about your experience with change projects. Of special 
interest are those factors that you consider as relevant for success or for failure. 
 
Expenses and payments  
The participation on this research study does not involve any recompense or cost 
compensation. I will undertake any travel necessary to be able to interview you. I will also 
use as little time as possible. After acceptance of the thesis at the University of 
Portsmouth, I will get you a copy of the final version on request.   
 
What will I have to do?  
As participant you will be asked to be interviewed for up to 120 minutes regarding your 
experience with change projects. 
 
 
 
What are the possible disadvantages and risks of taking part?  
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The only commitment from your side will be your time and there are no risks involved 
because all information will be confidential. Moreover it is entirely up to you which 
information you want to share. 
 
What are the possible benefits of taking part?  
In order to improve the success rate of change projects, the results of the study might be 
of interest to you and will be shared with you on request, via sending you a copy of the 
thesis or, if preferred, a summary. If the results will inform an innovative business training 
and you or your firm are interested in its implementation, your company will receive a 
discount due to your participation in the interview. 
 
Will my taking part in the study be kept confidential?  
The interview is absolute anonymous and all information will be treated strictly confidential  
The data from interviewed persons will therefore be stored in a password protected file on 
a password protected computer. For later access this data will be secured in several 
redundant hard drives, stored in closed areas where only the researcher has access. Any 
paper-based material will also be stored in the same place and recordings will be stored 
there as well. The names of the interviewees as well as their organisation will not be noted 
in the data, instead numbers and codes will be assigned. 
 
The research data will be kept for 10 years after completing the research in line with UoP 
Retention Schedule for Research Data. Original consent forms will be kept securely by the 
researcher for 30 years after completing the research. If no longer required it will be 
securely destroyed. Paper based data, records and notes will be scanned and then 
destroyed as well.  
The original consent forms will be stored in a personal locked and secure archive at the 
researcher’s premises. The data will only be used for this study.  
 
If you join the study, it is possible that some of the data collected will be looked at by 
authorised people to check that the study is being carried out correctly. All will have a duty 
of confidentiality to you as a research participant and we will do their best to meet this 
duty.  
 
It is very unlikely, due to the subject of the study, but still possible that authorities might 
request access to the research data. In this very unlikely case the identity of the 
interviewees might have to be disclosed to the authorities. Even in such a case data 
security as well as confidential handling will still be respected. 
 
What will happen if I don’t want to carry on with the study?  
As a volunteer you can stop your participation at any time and you do not have to give any 
reasons. In that case all data and information will be destroyed and will not be included in 
this study. If data analysis has already started or one week has passed after data 
collection, then this will not be possible and the data will be used in the study. 
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What if there is a problem? 
If your have any concerns, queries, or complaints about any aspects of this study, please 
contact the researcher first. The contact details of the researcher:  
Holger Kunzmann | up753837@myport.ac.uk | +49 (0)172-7320981  
The contact details of the supervisor: Dr James McCalman | james.mccalman@port.ac.uk 
| 02392 844035  
If your concerns or complaints are not resolved by the researcher or by the supervisor, 
you can contact the Dean:  
Dean: Professor Gioia Pescetto 
Telephone: +44 (0) 023 9284 8484 
Email: gioia.pescetto@port.ac.uk  
Richmond Building Portland Street Portsmouth  
PO1 3DE  
If the complaint remains unresolved, please contact: The University Complaints Officer 
+44 (0) 23 9284 3642 complaintsadvice@port.ac.uk  
 
 
Who is organising and funding the research?  
The research is fully self-funded and nobody will receive any financial contribution by 
conducting this research.  
 
Who has reviewed the study? 
Research in the University of Portsmouth is looked at by independent group of people, 
called a Research Ethics Committee, to protect your interests. This study has been 
reviewed and given a favourable opinion by University of Portsmouth Research Ethics 
Committee. 
 
 
Thank you very much for taking time to read this information as well as for 
considering to take part in the study. If you participate your consent will be sought;  
please see the accompanying consent form.  
You will be given a copy of this information sheet and your signed consent form, to 
keep. 
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Appendix T – Ethical Approval Final Letter 
 
 
 
 
12 December 2016 
 
Holger Kunzmann 
DBA Student 
Portsmouth Business School 
 
 
Dear Holger 
 
Study Title: A human factors view on the safety of 
organisational change – a shift of mindset of 
managers from failure and success towards 
resilience engineering 
Ethics Committee 
reference: 
E418 
 
 
Thank you for submitting your documents for ethical review.  The Ethics 
Committee was content to grant a favourable ethical opinion of the above research 
on the basis described in the application form, protocol and supporting 
documentation, revised in the light of any conditions set, subject to the general 
conditions set out in the attached document, and with the following stipulation: 
The favourable opinion of the EC does not grant permission or approval to 
undertake the research.  Management permission or approval must be obtained 
from any host organisation, including University of Portsmouth, prior to the start of 
the study.   
 
Summary of any ethical considerations: 
- 
Documents reviewed 
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The documents reviewed by Dr Peter Scott [LCM] + PBS Ethics Committee 
  
Document    Version    Date    
Ethical Review form 1 09 Nov 16 
Participant invitation sheet and information letter 1 09 Nov 16 
Consent form 1 09 Nov 16 
Ethical Review form  2 29 Nov 16 
Participant invitation sheet and information letter 2 29 Nov 16 
Consent form 2 29 Nov 16 
Interview questions 2 29 Nov 16 
Commentary on changes 1 29 Nov 16 
   
   
   
 
 
Statement of compliance  
The Committee is constituted in accordance with the Governance Arrangements 
set out by the University of Portsmouth. 
 
After ethical review 
 
Reporting and other requirements 
The attached document acts as a reminder that research should be conducted 
with integrity and gives detailed guidance on reporting requirements for studies 
with a favourable opinion, including: 
 Notifying substantial amendments 
 Notification of serious breaches of the protocol 
 Progress reports 
 Notifying the end of the study 
 
 
 
 
Feedback 
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You are invited to give your view of the service that you have received from the 
Faculty Ethics Committee.  If you wish to make your views known please contact 
the administrator, Christopher Martin. 
     
Please quote this number on all correspondence:   E418 
 
Yours sincerely and wishing you every success in your research 
 
 
Chair  
Email:  
 
Enclosures: 
 
“After ethical review – guidance for researchers” 
 
 
Copy to:   
 
Prof James 
McCalman 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
